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Children engage in third-party punishment (3PP) from a young age in response to 
harm and fairness violations. However, several areas about children’s 3PP are still 
un-investigated: their motivations for engaging in 3PP; the emotional consequences of 
enacting 3PP; and the effect of moral domains on 3PP. 
In order to explore these topics, I developed two computerised paradigms: the 
MegaAttack game and the Minecraft Justice System. The former was used with 5- to 
11-year-olds in the UK (Experiments 1-2) and Colombia (Experiment 3); the latter with 
British, Colombian and Italian 7- to 11-year-olds (Experiment 4). In both paradigms, as 
players violated different types of moral norms, children were asked to judge their behaviour 
and offered the opportunity to punish them. Additionally, in the Minecraft paradigm children 
could also compensate the victims. 
The type of transgression children watched did not fully predict their choice of 3PP 
type in terms of moral domains (Experiments 1-2), but significantly affected their severity 
and endorsement of 3PP (Experiment 4). 
Children did not appear motivated by reputational concerns, as their 3PP severity was 
not influenced by an audience, operationalised as cues of observation (Experiment 2) or 
accountability (Experiment 3). 
Children’s enjoyment of 3PP was generally low, although there were differences 
across countries (Experiments 2-3).  
In Experiment 4 children enjoyed compensating more than punishing. When asked 
whether they endorsed deterrence or retribution as their 3PP motive, children 




Reported deterrent motives, and lack of 3PP enjoyment or preference for 
compensation, together suggest that children, differently from adults, are not motivated by 
the retributive desire to see wrongdoers suffer. 
Results have implications for theoretical accounts of the cognitive and affective 
processes involved in 3PP, methodological implications for future research avenues and, 

























Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1. Normativity and mechanisms of social norm enforcement 
Humans are unique among all animal species in how they regulate their social life 
through compliance with social norms (Elster, 1989). Social norms are defined as behaviours 
which are accepted as appropriate ways of acting towards anyone (including the self) and, 
therefore, generate social expectations (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). According to Bicchieri 
(2005) social expectations are to be divided into empirical expectations (i.e., beliefs about 
how people typically behave) and normative expectations (i.e., beliefs about how people 
think they ought to behave). By applying this theoretical framework it is possible to further 
classify social norms: descriptive norms are social norms motivated exclusively by empirical 
expectations, while moral norms are social norms motivated by both types of expectations. 
Importantly, the stronger the social expectations, the more likely people who deviate from the 
norms in question will incur negative sanctions such as reputation loss, overt tattling, covert 
gossip, shunning and punishment. On the contrary, people abiding by those norms will be 
rewarded with positive sanctions in the form of liking, appreciation, trust and respect 
(Bicchieri, 2005; Tomasello, 2014). Thus, our motivation to conform to social norms stems 
partly from not wanting to be disapproved of, or even punished, by others, and partly from 
our need to belong and to be accepted by the group (Over, 2016; Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012). 
Enforcement of social norms has been thought to be of fundamental importance in 
order to promote cooperation (Axelrod, 1986; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002), as well 
as to guarantee social order (Elster, 1989) and the smoothening of social interactions in 
general (von Rohr, Burkart, & Van Schaik, 2011). However, more recent evidence from 
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experimental and observational studies alike (which will be discussed in this chapter in 
section 1.3) have brought into question the effectiveness of social norm enforcement in 
stabilising cooperation (for a review, see Raihani & Bshary, 2019). Thus, the purpose of 
social norm enforcement is perhaps more complex than was presumed. 
Enforcement of social norms relies on two related mechanisms. First, individuals 
make judgments about others’ value as social norm-followers on the basis of direct or indirect 
experiences (i.e., social evaluations). Second, they negatively sanction those who do not 
comply with social norms. 
A specific case of enforcement of social norms is represented by punishment. 
Punishment is a sanctioning behaviour in which an individual inflicts a cost on the 
wrongdoer. Punishment may entail a cost for the punisher, such as emotional unease, fear of 
physical or social retaliation, expenditure of energetic or economical resources 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Raihani, Thornton, & Bshary, 2012). However, the extent of 
the cost of meting out punishment can vary greatly, depending on the context, including cases 
in which it is barely costly to the punisher (Pedersen, McAuliffe, & McCullough, 2018). For 
example, punishers do not need to fear retaliation in anonymous interactions (Piazza & 
Bering, 2008), or when wrongdoers are unaware that negative consequences for them are due 
to punishment rather than to chance (Crockett, Özdemir, & Fehr, 2014). My working 
definition of punishment will thus encompass also these instances in which punishers do not 
have to pay any physical, economic or social cost to enact punishment. Hence, in these cases 
the main determinant of the cost incurred by the punishers would be represented by the 
emotional unease they might experience in seeing the wrongdoer suffer. 
Importantly, punishment can come in two main forms: second-party punishment 
(2PP), where the wrongdoer is punished by the victim of the norm violation, and third-party 
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punishment (3PP), where the wrongdoer is punished by an unaffected bystander to the norm 
violation. Whereas second-party punishers correct the behaviour of transgressors essentially 
for personal benefits, third-party punishers pay a cost (of varying degree) primarily for the 
benefit of others (Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012). To note, the benefits victims of 
transgressions accrue from 2PP (by avenging themselves) or 3PP (by being avenged by 
someone else) are not immediate. Rather, they are delayed and conditional on a behavioural 
change in the punished individual towards a more cooperative disposition (Jensen, 2010; 
Raihani et al., 2012). Furthermore, since third-party punishers often intervene on behalf of 
victims they are not related to or they might not even encounter again, 3PP cannot be 
explained by taking into account only theories of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) or reciprocal 
altruism (Trivers, 1971). For this reason 3PP, unlike 2PP, has been defined as an altruistic 
behaviour in biological terms, i.e. behaviour that increases the recipient’s fitness to the 
detriment of the actor’s own fitness (Hamilton, 1964). However, this does not necessarily 
imply that 3PP is altruistic in psychological terms, namely motivated by prosocial intentions. 
It is possible that 3PP is proximately motivated by the desire to see the wrongdoer suffer, and 
that any resulting increase in cooperation is merely an unintended, though positive, 
by-product (Jensen, 2010).  
 
1.2. Developmental literature on third-party social evaluations 
and punishment 
In order to investigate the development of normativity, it is fruitful to analyse when 
children start reacting to social norm violations as uninvolved third-parties on behalf of 
victims. Children’s sense of normativity is indeed considered mature only when the 
enforcement of social norms is applied in an agent-neutral manner to all, rather than being 
parochially limited to the self or important others (Tomasello, 2014). Victims’ reactions to 
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norm transgressions will not be examined in the present PhD thesis as they are more likely 
(or as much likely) to arise from personal expectations – how victims themselves want to be 
treated by others – than from generalised social expectations – how they expect people to 
behave towards anyone – (De Waal, 2014; von Rohr et al., 2011). 
Despite its relevance for unveiling the cognitive underpinnings of human 
other-regarding concerns (Jensen, Vaish, & Schmidt, 2014), the branch of developmental 
psychology dedicated to the study of agent-neutral normativity by means of experimental 
methods is still quite recent. For decades scholars have investigated the development of 
normativity only in verbal children, by interviewing them about their hypothetical responses 
to norm-violations (Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986; Killen, Smetana, & Smetana, 2006; Nucci, 
2001; Smetana, 1981; Smetana, Schlagman, & Adams, 1993; Stern & Peterson, 1999; Tisak 
& Jankowski, 1996; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). This choice has obviously excluded pre-verbal 
children from investigations, precluding the possibility to get a comprehensive picture of the 
early stages of normativity development. Moreover, interviewees recommending that a 
wrongdoer should “get into trouble” do not necessarily act upon their own recommendations 
when they themselves witness a real-life wrongdoing (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Smith, 
Blake, & Harris, 2013). Therefore, in the last few years this problem has been addressed by 
complementing interview studies with experimental studies adopting implicit measures of 
children’s judgements as well as observations of children’s behavioural reactions to actual 
rather than hypothetical moral transgressions. With this regard, a summary of the most 
relevant experimental findings regarding children’s third-party social evaluations are reported 
below, followed by a comprehensive literature review on the state-of-the-art in the research 




Lately there has been a growing body of research on infants’ reputation-related 
attitudes that has been based on implicit measures, such as spontaneous looking times and 
preferential reaching. Interestingly, infants make something like judgments from a very 
young age: 3- and 6-month-old infants already seem to evaluate characters differently on the 
basis of how they behave towards others. They demonstrate their preference for a character 
who has acted prosocially over one who has acted antisocially by either approaching or 
looking more towards the former (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007, 2010; Scola, Holvoet, 
Arciszewski, & Picard, 2015). Additionally, from 4.5 months of age infants even prefer a 
puppet who has acted antisocially rather than prosocially towards hindering agents (Hamlin, 
2014; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011). Infants aged 12 to 18 months prefer agents 
who have distributed goods equally compared to agents who have performed unequal 
distributions (Geraci & Surian, 2011). Lastly, infants of 10 months of age expect third parties 
to reward fair rather than unfair distributors (Meristo & Surian, 2013), and prefer to look at 
the test events when they see an antisocial action performed towards an unfair rather than a 
fair donor (Meristo & Surian, 2014). 
Once children acquire language, they start verbalising their judgements in the form of 
protests against those who do not follow game rules – both in explicit rule-governed games 
(Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 
2008, 2009; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012) and implicit rule-governed games 
(Rakoczy, 2008; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009) – even when they themselves are not 
negatively affected by the rule breaking. From their third year of age, children have also been 
shown to engage in third-party interventions to defend the entitlement of others (Schmidt, 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013), and to prevent the destruction of someone’s piece of artwork 
(Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011) or the theft of someone’s property (Rossano, Rakoczy, 
& Tomasello, 2011). 
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Moreover, children not only make judgments about others’ value as norm-followers 
but they also gradually take such evaluations into account in order to regulate their own 
interactions with these individuals, even in situations in which the norm violation is not 
directly experienced but just observed vicariously. For example, infants just over one year of 
age have been shown to reject large offers from a wrongdoer in favour of accepting smaller 
offers from a do-gooder (Tasimi & Wynn, 2016), and to prefer to take a toy from an 
individual who had allocated goods equally rather than unequally to third-parties (Lucca, 
Pospisil, & Sommerville, 2018). It has also been shown that children from their second year 
of life prefer to help a prosocial over an antisocial individual in reaching an object (Dahl, 
Schuck, & Campos, 2013), and choose to give favourite toys to prosocial agents and withhold 
toys from antisocial agents (Van de Vondervoort, Aknin, Kushnir, Slevinsky, & Hamlin, 
2018). Additionally, 3- to 4.5-year-old children selectively avoid helping those who cause – 
or even intend to cause – others harm (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010), and tend to 
allocate resources to prosocial rather than antisocial individuals (Hamlin et al., 2011; 
Kenward & Dahl, 2011). Finally, by 5 years of age children distribute more resources to 
those who enforce social norms compared to non-enforcers (Vaish, Herrmann, Markmann, & 
Tomasello, 2016). 
It should be noted, however, that preference for prosocial agents may arise from 
increased motivation to interact with pleasant individuals, while passive avoidance of 
antisocial agents may arise from decreased motivation to interact with unpleasant individuals. 
For this reason, such reactions do not necessarily constitute a proof of children’s sense of 
normativity. In fact, punishment of wrongdoers from a third-party perspective would be a 
much more conclusive evidence of children’s awareness of the normative dimension of other 
people’s actions (Kenward & Östh, 2015). 
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The first study in a laboratory setting to be published on children’s 3PP behaviour is 
also the one with the youngest sample (pre-verbal children). Specifically, in the study devised 
by Hamlin et al. (2011) 19-month-old US toddlers were made to observe a puppet either 
trying in vain to open a box or dropping a ball after a short play. The puppet subsequently 
interacted with other two puppets, a prosocial and an antisocial character. After observing 
these interactions, the participants were assigned to one of two different conditions, named 
“Giving a Treat condition” and “Taking a Treat condition”. In both conditions children were 
engaged in a two-alternative forced choice task. Indeed, in the Giving-a-Treat condition the 
experimenters distributed a treat to the children requiring them to choose whether to give it to 
the prosocial or the antisocial character. Instead, in the Taking-a-Treat condition the children 
were instructed to choose whether to take a treat away from the antisocial or the prosocial 
character in order to allocate it to a third character who did not have any treats. Toddlers 
tended to direct the Giving action towards the prosocial character and the Taking action 
towards the antisocial character, thus punishing the latter. In such a way, the authors 
demonstrated that toddlers considered more appropriate to see bad things happen to bad 
characters than to nice characters. Nevertheless, it remained to be clarified whether children 
would spontaneously punish an antisocial character when not forced to assign a negative 
outcome to anyone but were only provided with an opportunity to do so at their personal cost. 
The same live puppet show featuring the prosocial and antisocial characters was later 
shown to verbal US children from 3 to 5 years of age with an important adaptation: the forced 
choice implicit task (i.e., taking/giving a treat to the characters) was substituted with an 
explicit question (i.e., “Who should get in trouble?”). Despite the cognitive load that 
especially 3-year-olds experienced, children’s verbal responses consistently indicated that it 
was more appropriate to have punishment allocated to the antisocial rather than the prosocial 
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character (Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 2017), in accordance with previous interview 
studies (e.g., see Killen et al., 2006). 
Differently from the experiment conducted by Hamlin et al. (2011), another early 
study investigated young children’s costly punishment behaviour without adopting a forced 
choice task (Robbins & Rochat, 2011). In their experiment, each child took part in a Triadic 
Sharing game along with two puppets. In the first rounds one puppet always generously split 
its coins between itself, the other puppet and the child, while the second puppet always made 
selfish allocations in order to keep the majority of the coins for itself. After the last round of 
sharing, the experimenters allowed the child to sacrifice their own coins if they wanted one of 
the puppets (or both) to be punished. Punishment consisted of taking away some of the 
puppet’s coins. Children were not forced to assign a punishment to one of the two puppets: 
they could decide to punish one or both puppets or none. When 3- and 5-year-old US children 
were tested, it was shown that by 3 years of age children are willing to enact costly 
punishment. However, 3-year olds punished the selfish and the generous puppet 
indiscriminately. Only 5-year olds proved to orientate their punitive actions systematically 
towards the selfish puppet, thus conveying moral approval or disapproval for the puppets’ 
actions. Interestingly, these results were not confirmed when the method was adapted for 
testing 5- to 6-year-old children from rural Samoa (Robbins & Rochat, 2011). Indeed, when 
they chose to punish, Samoan children did not express any preference for punishing the 
selfish over the generous puppet. Although this experiment may suggest that at least US 
children pay costs to prevent others from receiving unfair treatments, this design confounds 
2PP and 3PP: it is possible that children punished the selfish puppet because they themselves 
were the victims of its misbehaviour, and not because they were motivated to intervene on 
behalf of the generous puppet. 
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Subsequently, Kenward and Östh (2012) developed an experimental protocol in 
which not only were children not forced to choose who to punish between two characters, but 
they were not even explicitly encouraged to punish, unlike in Robbins and Rochat’s (2011) 
experiment. In Kenward and Östh’s (2012) study, the target of investigation were children’s 
punitive tendencies in response to different types of punishment demonstrations. Specifically, 
adult demonstrators played out stories in which a perpetrator doll made an unprovoked 
physically harmful attack on a victim doll (e.g., hitting, stamping on or kicking). After the 
attack a witness doll (third-party) intervened to enact either a consistent punishment (by 
targeting the perpetrator) or an inconsistent punishment (by targeting the victim). At this 
point, 4-year-old Swedish children were asked to retell the story, given free choice to change 
the witness doll’s behaviour if they wanted to. It was found that, following a consistent 
punishment demonstration, no child modified the story. Instead, following an inconsistent 
punishment demonstration, the majority of children modified the story in such a way that it 
was now the perpetrator rather than the victim to be admonished or punished. Therefore, 
these results demonstrate that young children’s preference for fictional scenarios in which a 
third-party punishes a moral norm transgressor is strong enough to overcome their propensity 
to imitate adults’ actions, which itself has been proved to be very strong (e.g., Horner & 
Whiten, 2005). It still remained to be understood if children have a natural tendency to act 
themselves as third-party punishers against real people violating norms. 
Although the studies being taken into consideration so far have the merit of indicating 
that punitive sentiments towards norm transgressors develop very early in human ontogeny, 
they have a serious limitation: all made use of fictional characters. This is problematic since it 
is known that children begin to understand pretence from 2.5 years of age (Walker‐Andrews 
& Kahana‐Kalman, 1999). Thus, it cannot be ruled out that older children punishing dolls or 
puppets realise that they are not actually punishing. For this reason in the majority of the 
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following studies the role of the norm transgressor has been assumed by real people – 
children or adults depending on the specific protocol (Dixson & Kenward, in prep; 
Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum, López-Pérez, Van Dijk, & Van Dillen, 2019; 
Gummerum, Takezawa, & Keller, 2009; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; Kenward & 
Östh, 2015; Lergetporer, Angerer, Glätzle-Rützler, & Sutter, 2014; McAuliffe, Jordan, & 
Warneken, 2015; Salali, Juda, & Henrich, 2015). 
 Among the first studies employing real norm violators there are the experiments 
conducted by Gummerum et al. (2009), Jordan et al. (2014) and McAuliffe et al. (2015). 
They all adopted a three-player Dictator game paradigm whose general structure was as 
follows: the participants were led to believe that two people – a dictator and a recipient – had 
been involved in an economic game, where the dictator could decide how to split some 
resources (candies or coins) between themselves and the recipient, while the recipient could 
only accept (but not reject) the allocations. The participants were then told that their task was 
to determine if such allocations were acceptably fair to the recipient or not. When considered 
too selfish, the participants could punish the dictator by reducing their resources. However, 
these three experiments differed in a few important details. In McAuliffe et al. (2015) it was 
manipulated whether participants (5- and 6-year-old US children) had to pay a cost to punish 
unequal allocations and whether such inequity resulted from dictator’s generosity or 
selfishness. Instead, in Gummerum et al. (2009) and Jordan et al. (2014) the punitive option 
was always costly since the participants (respectively, children of 7 and 11 years of age and 
adults living in Germany, and children of 6 and 8 years of age living in the US) were required 
to sacrifice part of their own endowment of candies or coins whenever they decided an 
allocation was unfair to the recipient. Moreover, in Gummerum et al.’s (2009) and Jordan et 
al.’s (2014) experiments the effect of group membership on children’s enactment of 3PP was 
evaluated by manipulating whether the dictator and the recipient were in the participant’s 
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group. Specifically, in Gummerum et al. (2009) both the dictator and the recipient were either 
out-group or in-group members of the participant. In addition to these combinations, in 
Jordan et al. (2014) the dictator and the recipient could also belong to different groups, in 
such a way that one of them was an in-group while the other an out-group member in relation 
to the participant. 
 The study by Gummerum et al. (2009) showed that both 7- and 11-year-old children 
were willing to pay an economic cost to punish fairness norm violators. Their punishment 
severity was affected by age (i.e., children were harsher punishers than adults), but not by 
group membership. Conversely, adults punished unfair in-group members more severely than 
unfair out-group members. This makes sense if it is considered that, from punishing in-group 
relative to out-group members, people are more likely to reap the benefits of converting 
wrongdoers into cooperators (Norms-Focused Hypothesis, McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016). 
Another, more mechanistic explanation is that violations committed by in-group members 
threaten group identity and are therefore perceived as requiring higher punishment (Kerr, 
Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995). 
In the study by Jordan et al. (2014) it was found that the rates of costly 3PP (which 
are distinct from 3PP severity) increased over development. Interestingly, the findings 
showed also that both 6- and 8-year-olds were more likely to pay to punish selfish allocations 
made by out-group dictators rather than in-group dictators (transgressor bias), suggesting that 
children, differently from adults in Gummerum et al.’s (2009) experiment, may view 3PP as a 
way to impose a cost upon potential competitors. Additionally, they revealed that 6-year-olds, 
but not 8-year-olds, were more likely to punish fairness norm violations that negatively 
affected in-group recipients rather than out-group recipients (victim bias). This suggests that 
3PP is biased from its emergence, but that this bias partially decreased with age, meaning that 
children across development tend to become more impartial when enforcing norms. All the 
18 
 
evidence gathered by Jordan et al. (2014) is thus consistent with the possibility that children’s 
3PP is modulated by affective preferences for in-group members (Mere Preferences 
Hypothesis, McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016). 
Regarding the main findings of the study by McAuliffe et al. (2015), it demonstrated 
that, whereas 5-year-olds showed only sensitivity to the cost of punishment but not to 
distributional inequity, 6-year-old children were sensitive to both factors. This means that 
6-year-olds punished less when doing so was personally costly, and that they punished more 
when the dictator’s allocation was unequal – and selfish – rather than equal. Moreover, 
6-year-olds have been shown to be more sensitive to inequity when it derived from 
selfishness rather than from generosity. In other words, they rejected unequal generous 
allocations more than equal allocations but less than unequal selfish allocations. Finally, 
McAuliffe et al.’s (2015) study is notable for having demonstrated that, when children were 
given the opportunity to punish a norm violation, they engaged in 3PP very frequently (in 
more than 80% of cases). 
Another study made use of an economic paradigm, this time to assess if children tend 
to imitate a model's choice to enact 3PP (Salali et al., 2015). Specifically, 3- to 8-year old 
Canadian children were required to observe a three-player Dictator game played by two 
children – in the roles of dictator and recipient – and one adult model. Each participant 
experienced one of six different combinations of conditions and treatments: conditions were 
the dictator's allocations to the recipient (fair vs. unfair), while treatments were the model's 
decision to punish the dictator (unknown vs. no punishment vs. punishment). After having 
seen the dictator’s proposed allocation and the model’s reaction, children were given the 
opportunity to decide between punishing or not punishing the dictator (punishment consisted 
in taking away some stickers from the dictator). Punishing the dictator was costly: children 
had to give away one of their stickers for each punishment decision. This study showed that 
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children, regardless of their age, are willing to pay a cost to imitate a model’s action both in 
the case of consistent punishment (i.e., punishment of a dictator offering unfair allocations) 
and inconsistent punishment (i.e., punishment of dictator offering fair allocations). It is 
noteworthy that imitation rates increase (not decrease) with age. However, only older 
children imitate not-punishing for both fair and unfair allocations. These results are therefore 
partially in disagreement with those obtained by Kenward and Östh (2012) since these 
researchers had found that 4-year-old children are willing to imitate a model’s action only in 
the case of consistent punishment, but they are able to overcome their imitative tendency 
when the model has enacted an inconsistent punishment. This lack of external validity could 
be due to the way in which the model’s inconsistent punishment was operationalised in the 
two studies: in Kenward and Östh’s (2012) study inconsistent punishment was directed 
towards the victim of the norm transgression (i.e., character being subjected to physical 
harm); in Salali et al.’s (2015) instead it was directed towards the norm-follower (i.e., dictator 
offering fair allocations). It is therefore likely that, when it came their turn to decide whether 
to imitate the model, children felt more uncomfortable in reiterating punishment on someone 
who already had suffered an immoral act rather than on someone who had not. Another 
possible explanation is that, although the model represented an authority in both cases, 
children believed that moral norms related to issues of harm were more authority-independent 
than those related to the fairness domain. 
A further research group examined children’s propensity to incur economic costs to 
enact 3PP against real norm violators. Differently from Gummerum et al. (2009), Jordan et al. 
(2014), McAuliffe et al. (2015) and Salali et al. (2015), in the protocol being applied by 
Lergetporer et al. (2014) the norm violation pertained to cooperation instead of resource 
distribution (fairness domain). Another important difference is that Lergetporer et al. (2014) 
adopted the so-called “strategy method” (Selten, 1967), whereby third-parties’ punishment 
20 
 
decisions are contingency commitments made prior to (rather than after) discovering 
potential violators’ actual behaviour. In this experiment 7- to 11-year-old Italian children 
played a two-player Prisoner’s dilemma game (cooperation game) in the presence of a 
third-party peer having the opportunity to enforce the social norm of cooperation by 
punishing defectors. More precisely, at the beginning of the game the third-party had to 
decide whether to invest a token to punish the player if this player should later defect in the 
game. Although players were aware they could be sanctioned by the third-party, they were 
not aware of the third-party’s decision before choosing to defect or cooperate. Whenever the 
third-party decided to invest the token in punishment, the player lost all gains in case of 
defection. Conversely, in cases of player’s cooperation, the third-party could exchange the 
token with a reward. By adopting such a procedure, the researchers found out that children 
act as third-party punishers very rarely (in less than 10% of cases), in clear contrast with what 
was found by McAuliffe et al. (2015), whose experiment showed high rates of 3PP (in more 
than 80% of cases). But this low incidence of punishment might be due to the fact that 
third-parties had to decide to invest their resources in punishment before – rather than after – 
having seen the violation of the cooperative norm. These results were then compared with a 
control condition in which the players played the Prisoner’s dilemma game without being 
observed by a third-party. The comparison demonstrated that the sole threat of 3PP more than 
doubles players’ cooperation rates (58% in the presence of third-party vs 25% in the absence 
of third-party). This might indicate that 3PP has evolved as a mechanism to sustain 
large-scale networks among unrelated strangers by discouraging violations of cooperation 
norms (see related evolutionary debate in section 1.3). 
Other examples of the strategy method being applied to the study of children’s 3PP, 
this time in comparison with 2PP, can be found in Gummerum & Chu (2014) and 
Gummerum, López-Pérez, Van Dijk, & Van Dillen  (2019). Differently from Lergetporer et 
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al. (2014), in these two experiments punishment was designed to be elicited by unfair 
distributions of resources rather than by lack of cooperation. Specifically, in the 3PP 
condition children played a three-player Dictator game in which the child was the potential 
third-party punisher. Each 3PP commitment required children to invest some of their 
economic resources to reduce the dictator’s payoff. In the 2PP condition children took instead 
the role of the responder in a two-player Ultimatum game. The Ultimatum game is similar to 
a two-player Dictator game (i.e., game involving only a dictator and a recipient), but differs 
from it in that the responder has the possibility to either accept or reject the allocation decided 
by the proposer. In case of acceptance, the resources are divided according to the proposal; in 
case of rejection (which is a form of 2PP), both players receive nothing. 
Gummerum & Chu’s experiment (2014) was aimed at investigating the development 
of the capability to integrate outcome and intention information into punishment behaviour in 
a UK sample. Participants (children, adolescents and adults) were asked how they would 
react to a range of possible allocations made by the dictator in the 3PP condition or by the 
proposer in the 2PP condition. As in Lergetporer et al. (2014), participants had to commit to a 
punishment decision before they discovered the dictator/proposer’s actual allocation. 
Crucially, participants knew that the dictator/proposer could decide the allocation by 
choosing between two fixed options: the default one was unequal to the advantage of the 
dictator/proposer, while the alternative one could be more unequal, equal, or advantageous to 
the recipient/responder. The contrast between the two options thus allowed inference 
regarding the dictator/proposer’s intention: e.g., choosing the default unequal option when the 
alternative was even more unequal would be indicative of positive intentions, whereas 
choosing the default unequal option over the equal alternative would indicate negative 
intentions. It was found that 8-year-old children were sensitive only to information about the 
outcome of the allocations (i.e., whether they were equal or unequal), whereas adolescents 
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took into consideration both outcomes and intentions in 2PP but not in 3PP. The integration 
of outcome and intention information in both 2PP and 3PP began to be detectable only from 
early adulthood. Measures of reaction times revealed that for adults and partly for adolescents 
making intent-based punishment decisions was more cognitively demanding when outcome 
information (i.e., dictator/proposer choosing an unequal allocation) was in contrast with 
intention information (i.e., dictator/proposer discarding an even more unequal alternative). 
Gummerum et al. (2019) investigated the role of emotions in motivating costly 2PP 
and 3PP against unfairness violations, respectively in the two-player Ultimatum game and 
three-player Dictator game, across different age groups (children, adolescents and adults 
living in the UK). Different components of emotional appraisals were taken into account: one 
more automatic, arousal, and the other more deliberate, valence. Arousal was measured via 
skin conductance while valence via explicit emotion ratings. It was found that, whereas 
unfairness of proposer/dictator’s allocations influenced both 2PP and 3PP across all age 
groups, the effect of emotions varied depending on several factors: self-relevance of the 
transgression (2PP vs 3PP), participants’ age, and type of emotional appraisal considered. 
Specifically, 2PP was associated with both more negative emotional valence and higher 
emotional arousal (especially in children compared to adolescents and adults). However, 
valence mediated the link between unfairness and 2PP in all age groups, while arousal did so 
only in adults. In order to explain these age differences in the mediation analyses, 
Gummerum et al. (2019) referred to Dys and Malti’s (2016) argument that during 
development emotional reactions may gradually become automatic following repeated 
associations between the occurrence of a moral transgression and its deliberate emotional 
appraisal. The “automatisation” of emotional appraisal processes would thus be indicative of 
moral norm internalisation. From this perspective, Gummerum et al.’s (2019) 2PP results 
would be explained by children and adolescents being solely reliant on deliberate emotional 
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appraisal to prompt them to engage in 2PP. On the contrary, adults would have already 
automatised their emotional reactions so that arousal and valence are in line to jointly elicit 
2PP. Differently from 2PP, 3PP was associated with more negative emotional valence but not 
higher emotional arousal. Moreover, valence mediated the link between unfairness and 3PP 
only in adults, while arousal in neither age group. These findings are therefore consistent with 
the view that automatic emotional appraisal can be elicited only in second-party contexts, 
when the transgression is self-relevant to the punisher (Civai, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Gamer, & 
Rumiati, 2010). In third-party contexts, instead, participants may engage in deliberate 
emotional appraisal to the view of a victim receiving an unfair allocation. However, for their 
negative emotions to motivate costly 3PP further deliberate processes seem to be needed, 
such as affective perspective-taking with the victim. In children and adolescents the 
motivating role of emotions in 3PP enactment is thus prevented by their under-developed 
perspective-taking skills (Will, Crone, van den Bos, & Güroğlu, 2013). Conversely, when 
adults are confronted with transgressions as third-parties, their capability to take the victim’s 
perspective may contribute to bridge the “self-relevance gap”. 
As pointed out by Kenward and Östh (2015), a limitation of the experimental studies 
described so far is that costs being paid by the children who decide to punish are defined in 
economic terms, whereas in real life such costs are frequently social and consist of a risk of 
retaliation from the punished individual (Janssen & Bushman, 2008). Kenward and Östh 
(2015) therefore developed an experiment in which 5-year-old Swedish children were shown 
a video representing two adults (presented as real): an antisocial individual who destroyed a 
gift they had just received, and a neutral individual who kept the gift. Children were then 
given the possibility to assign positive (normal good-tasting sweets) or negative outcomes 
(disgusting-tasting fake sweets) to the two adults. The experimenters manipulated whether 
children were led to believe they would allocate sweets to the recipient anonymously or in 
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person. It was found that, both in the anonymous and in-person condition, neutral individuals 
were assigned only positive outcomes in the great majority of trials. Conversely, antisocial 
individuals were usually assigned negative outcomes, as long as children were told they 
would remain anonymous. Most children who were instead told they would make the 
allocation in person did not assign negative outcomes, although a minority did so. This 
indicates that children considered the situation as real and that, although they would have 
wanted to punish antisocial adults, they preferred not to run the social risk to do so in person. 
It is noteworthy that boys punished more frequently than girls. 
When the aforementioned protocol was adapted for testing Melanesian children, it 
was interesting to analyse cultural comparisons. In this new study carried out by Dixson and 
Kenward (in prep), 4- to 10-year old Melanesian children had the possibility to distribute 
good or disgusting sweets to an antisocial or neutral adult in one of four different conditions, 
obtained by combining the presence or absence of economic and social costs inherent in the 
choice to punish. Thus, the conditions were: “free anonymous” (neither economic nor social 
costs), “costly anonymous” (economic cost but no social cost), “free in-person” (social cost 
but no economic cost) and “costly in-person” (both economic and social costs). It turned out 
that also Melanesian children punished more the antisocial than the neutral individual. 
Moreover, the punishment rate towards the antisocial individual was shown to increase with 
age and to decrease when it was economically costly and when meted out in person. 
Nevertheless, almost a third of Melanesian children punished the antisocial individual in the 
costly anonymous condition. 
 Lately, children’s punitive justice has been directly compared with restorative and 
distributive justice, although not in situations where children interact with actual people. The 
punitive-restorative justice comparison has been dealt with in a study conducted by Riedl, 
Jensen, Call and Tomasello (2015) where 3-year-old German children, after having witnessed 
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resources being taken away from a doll victim by a doll transgressor, had to choose whether 
to give back the resources to the victim (i.e., restoration) or to make them inaccessible to the 
transgressor (i.e., 3PP). Neither choice was costly (at least in physical, economic or social 
terms) to the participants. Children proved to have a preference for restoration over 3PP, 
demonstrating to prioritise concern for the victim over consideration about the outcome for 
the transgressor. Smith and Warneken (2016) tackled instead the punitive-distributive justice 
comparison by examining US children’s allocations of rewards (e.g., feeding pets or testing 
computer games) and punishments (e.g., cleaning tables) to fictional students depending on 
the information about their past behaviour (i.e., whether they had behaved well or not in the 
classroom). Both types of allocations were at no personal cost for the participants. Children 
of 4-5 years of age were more likely to split both rewards and punishments equally among the 
fictional recipients. Vice versa, older children and adults were more sensitive to issues of 
merit, thus assigning more rewards to students who were well-behaved and more 
punishments to students who misbehaved more. Interestingly, the developmental trajectory of 
punishment allocation decision-making was perfectly mirrored by that of reward allocation. 
One of the most recently published studies about children’s 3PP investigated whether 
punishment rates are affected by the type of punishment children can enact against norm 
violators. Specifically, in the study conducted by Marshall, Gollwitzer, Wynn, and Bloom 
(2019) 4- to 7-year old US children watched a puppet show on a laptop depicting a prosocial 
and an antisocial character interacting with the protagonist puppet. Through a button board 
children were instructed they could administer either rewards (i.e., tickles) or corporal 
punishment (i.e., hits with a hammer) to each character. Whereas the prosocial character was 
tickled more than hit, the antisocial character was not hit significantly more than tickled, thus 
showing no evidence of selective 3PP. This indicates that children’s willingness to enact 3PP 
varies depending on the type of punishment at their disposal. Inflicting harm on a 
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transgressor might thus be considered more socially inappropriate by children than 
withholding or taking away resources (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum, López-Pérez, 
et al., 2019; Gummerum et al., 2009; Hamlin et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et 
al., 2015; Riedl et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015). It is unclear, 
however, how to reconcile Marshall et al.’s (2019) null result with Kenward and Östh’s 
(2015) finding that children engage in harm-inflicting 3PP at least when their anonymity is 
guaranteed. However, the punishment types adopted in the two studies had both a negative 
impact on the transgressor’s physical sphere but at different levels. It is thus possible that 
children tested by Kenward and Östh (2015) showed a propensity to punish while those tested 
by Marshall et al. (2019) did not because punishment severity is arguably higher in the case 
of hitting someone with a hammer than in the case of giving someone bad tasting sweets. 
Children might be adverse to a corrective use of high severity-physical harm. 
The last study published on children’s 3PP was conducted by Yudkin, Van Bavel and 
Rhodes (2019). They tested 3- to 6-year old US children using a naturalistic method: 
participants were shown videos depicting two actual children – an actor and a recipient – who 
were drawing pictures. The recipient had to leave for a while so they asked the actor to hold 
their picture until they came back. Then, the actor was shown either ruining (harmful 
condition) or carefully holding the recipient’s picture (harmless condition). Participants could 
enact two types of 3PP: the costly version consisted of closing a slide the actor wanted to 
play with – a decision that would have also prevented the punisher from going down it. The 
relatively non-costly version consisted in withholding a sticker from the actor. In accordance 
with McAuliffe et al. (2015), it was found that children punished the harmful actor more 
frequently when 3PP was non-costly than when it was costly. Moreover, rates of both costly 
and non-costly 3PP increased with age, comparably to what was observed by Dixson and 
Kenward (in prep) and Jordan et al. (2014). With regard to costly 3PP, Yudkin et al. (2019) 
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also manipulated participants’ sense of authority (i.e., whether the punisher wore a symbol of 
leadership or not) and group membership (i.e., whether the children in the video belonged to 
a different or the same group as the punisher). Older children were not influenced by either 
manipulation; conversely younger children in a position of authority punished the harmful 
actor more frequently when they were in-group rather than out-group members. This latter 
result is thus in the opposite direction to what was found by Jordan et al. (2014) in children, 
but clearly mirrors Gummerum et al.’s (2009) finding in adults. Finally, when Yudkin et al. 
(2019) analysed the explanations children provided for their punitive decisions, it emerged 
that children’s justifications that focused on the desire to see the transgressor change their 
behaviour and learn a lesson correlated with punishment rates. Interestingly, this raises the 
possibility that children are motivated by deterrence (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002) 
and pedagogical considerations (Funk, McGeer, & Gollwitzer, 2014) when they administer 
3PP. 
To sum up, children engage in 3PP from a very young age (Hamlin et al., 2011), even 
when they have to pay an economic cost (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum, 
López-Pérez, et al., 2019; Gummerum et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2014; Lergetporer et al., 
2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015) or a social cost 
(Dixson & Kenward, in prep; Kenward & Östh, 2015). Children intervene as third-party 
punishers when they observe a range of norm violations, involving issues of fairness 
(Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum, López-Pérez, et al., 2019; Gummerum et al., 2009; 
Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015) or 
harm (Hamlin et al., 2011; Kenward & Östh, 2012, 2015; Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 
2017). Types of punishment investigated have mainly consisted of children withholding or 
taking away resources from transgressors (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum et al., 
2019; Gummerum et al., 2009; Hamlin et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 
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2015; Riedl et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015), or inflicting them harm 
(Dixson & Kenward, in prep; Kenward & Östh, 2015; Marshall et al., 2019). It has been 
demonstrated that 3PP rates in children increase in response to modelling (Salali et al., 2015) 
and with age (Dixson & Kenward, in prep; Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Salali 
et al., 2015), but that 3PP severity decreases with age (Gummerum et al., 2009). There is also 
indication that gender (Dixson & Kenward, in prep; Kenward & Östh, 2015), culture 
(Robbins & Rochat, 2011) as well as authority and ingroup-outgroup dynamics influence 
punitive behaviour (Gummerum et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2014; Yudkin et al., 2019). 
Additionally, children being asked to allocate 3PP show a shift from equality-based to 
merit-based distributions with increasing age (Smith & Warneken, 2016), but not from 
outcome-based to intent-based distributions until adulthood (Gummerum & Chu, 2014). 
Moreover, pre-schoolers prefer victim restoration over 3PP of transgressors (Riedl et al., 
2015). There is also some indication that children’s explanations of the reason to intervene as 
third-party punishers are deterrence- and pedagogy-focused (Yudkin et al., 2019). Finally, the 
experience of negative emotions does not appear to motivate 3PP decisions in children 
(Gummerum, López-Pérez, et al., 2019). 
From the review of children’s 3PP literature just provided, it appeared that little 
attention has been paid so far to the development of 3PP motivations. In order to discuss this 
topic, I will now take an adaptationist stance, according to which cognitive mechanisms have 
functions shaped by selective pressures. I indeed believe that research investigations at the 
mechanistic level can be greatly aided by functional considerations. Shifting focus from the 
developmental to the evolutionary literature about 3PP will thus inform the design of the 
experiments for the present PhD thesis, by guiding me in generating novel proximate research 
questions (MacDougall-Shackleton, 2011). I anticipate here that the study of the adaptive 
functions of 3PP behaviour in adults (see section 1.3) has allowed me to identify the 
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following as potential candidates of children’s 3PP motivations to further explore at the 
proximate level: retribution (i.e., punishment as an end in itself); deterrence (i.e., punishment 
as a means to an end, namely deterring future transgressions); and reputation (i.e., 
punishment as a signalling tool).  
 
1.3. Evolutionary explanations of third-party punishment in 
humans 
Compared to other animal species, humans cooperate at an unprecedentedly high 
level, especially with non-relatives and strangers. Punishment of wrongdoers by third-parties 
has been traditionally indicated as a key factor in sustaining the progressive establishment of 
large-scale cooperative networks by discouraging violations of cooperation norms (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1992). 3PP seems to be a human universal as all populations tested so far – 
including urban, rural and nomadic populations – have shown some willingness to punish 
norm transgressors, albeit with significant cross-cultural variation in terms of frequency and 
severity (Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al., 2007). However, the emergence of 3PP in our 
species constitutes an evolutionary conundrum: apparently, this behaviour is beneficial for 
the group’s welfare but is detrimental for the punishers themselves, who suffer an immediate 
fitness disadvantage relative to their group members. As punishers do not obviously 
compensate their fitness costs with kin or reciprocity benefits, scientific efforts have been 
focused on elucidating the conditions that made it possible for 3PP to be under positive 
selection (Raihani & Bshary, 2019). 
Computational models to account for the evolution of 3PP have hypothesised that 
members of a group can choose one of three alternative behavioural strategies when 
confronted with cooperation dilemmas. People can be pure cooperators, who abide by 
cooperation norms but never punish those who do not follow suit; non-cooperators, who 
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neither adhere to cooperation norms nor punish; or strong reciprocators, who both comply 
with cooperation norms and punish norm transgressors. Agent-based simulations have 
demonstrated that, for stabilising cooperation in large groups of genetically unrelated 
individuals, strong reciprocators must be in equilibrium with cooperators and 
non-cooperators (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Gintis, 2000). 
According to the cultural group selection hypothesis, proximate preferences for strong 
reciprocity can spread in the population via social learning mechanisms, such as conformist 
transmission (Henrich & Boyd, 2001), particularly under conditions of strong between-group 
competition. Thus, groups with a more pronounced propensity to punish violations of 
cooperation norms would have a competitive advantage by virtue of their resulting higher 
levels of within-group cooperation. It is indeed likely that in our ancestral past more 
cooperative groups were at lower risk of extinction because they were more capable of 
managing the storage of common resources, to jointly patrol their territory, to organise 
hunting and warfare (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003). In such an evolutionary 
scenario, third-party punishers would derive inclusive fitness benefits (i.e., the success of an 
individual in passing on its genes to the next generation, considering also the shared genes 
passed on by its kin, Hamilton, 1964)  from the increased prosperity of their own group 
(Raihani & Bshary, 2019). 
Importantly, the main assumptions of group selection accounts of 3PP are that: 1) 
Punishment evolved because of its capacity to induce wrongdoers to assume a more 
cooperative attitude in the future. 2) Punishment-mediated increase in cooperation improves 
the welfare of the group (Raihani & Bshary, 2019). 
Classic studies of punishment employing economic games have shown that average 
intra-group cooperation levels, in the form of contributions to the “public good”, are higher 
31 
 
when participants are given the possibility to punish non-cooperators than when such 
possibility is not provided (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
However, this does not prove that non-cooperators turn into cooperators after being subjected 
to punishment. In other words, these studies do not control whether increased intra-group 
cooperation is the result of conditional cooperation or actual punishment. A more recent 
study seems to point at the former rather than the latter explanation. Although 
counterintuitive, it was found that the possibility of being punished increased both the 
number of non-cooperators and the average contributions to the public good (Kirchkamp & 
Mill, 2018). Thus, it might be that the act of punishment itself is not effective at modifying 
non-cooperators’ behaviour. However, the threat of punishment might reassure people who 
are already willing to cooperate that those who have exploitive intentions will pay a cost if 
they decide to actualise them (Raihani & Bshary, 2019). 
 Although it remains to be verified whether 3PP is able to improve intra-group 
cooperation rates (i.e., proportions of cooperators in a group) under certain conditions, the 
aforementioned studies nevertheless demonstrated the positive impact of 3PP on group’s 
cooperation levels (i.e., average contributions of cooperators) (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Kirchkamp & Mill, 2018). However, growing 
evidence suggests that the effectiveness of 3PP even in promoting cooperation levels is 
context-specific. For example, the benefits of 3PP are higher when: 3PP is mild vs severe 
(Jiang, Perc, & Szolnoki, 2013); 3PP is enacted in wealthy high-trust societies vs low-trust 
ones (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013); and punished individuals are reminded of third-party 
punishers’ contributions to the “public good” rather than of their earnings (Nikiforakis, 
2010). 
Moreover, critics of group selection models of 3PP have pointed out that traditional 
“public good” experimental paradigms ignored a key factor while evaluating group’s welfare: 
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the risk of third-party punishers being retaliated against. Retaliation is indeed impossible in 
one-shot interactions, when punishers’ identity is kept anonymous and group composition is 
modified at every round of the game (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). Although these expedients had been adopted to rule out the possibility of 
reciprocity and reputation formation among participants, they compromised the ecological 
validity of the experiments. When participants have instead the opportunity to retaliate, 3PP 
does not always promote cooperation, but it can trigger an escalation of counter-punishment, 
detrimental for the group’s welfare. Specifically, when 3PP can be avenged, people’s 
willingness to act as third-party punishers against non-cooperators drastically drops 
(Balafoutas, Grechenig, & Nikiforakis, 2014). In these conditions lower 3PP rates can lead to 
a progressive reduction in group’s cooperation levels compared to situations in which 3PP 
cannot be avenged (Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis & Engelmann, 2011). Under threat of 
retaliation group cooperation levels are thus comparable to those observed when individuals 
do not have any 3PP opportunities in the first place (Engelmann & Nikiforakis, 2015). 
Although not all experimental studies have found that mushrooming of counter-punishment is 
accompanied by lowering of average group’s cooperation levels (Fehl, Sommerfeld, 
Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2012), several computational models do not support the 
evolution of human cooperation when non-cooperators have the chance to retaliate against 
third-party punishers (Hauser, Nowak, & Rand, 2014; Janssen & Bushman, 2008; Rand & 
Nowak, 2011). 
It is also noteworthy that people assign 3PP to non-cooperators even in scenarios 
where there is no chance for the group to benefit from a potential change in the targets’ 
behaviour. Not only do people enact 3PP in one-shot interactions (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2002), but during repeated-interaction experiments they even 
show higher levels of 3PP in the last rather than first rounds (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 
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2008, as cited by Raihani & Bshary, 2019). On a proximate level of analysis, this suggests 
that people are willing to engage in costly 3PP purely for the sake of giving the wrongdoers 
their “just deserts”, without any further instrumental reason (either deterrent or pedagogical). 
Such a behaviour would thus be in line with a retributive motivation to punish. On an 
ultimate level of analysis, it has been argued that the adaptive function of 3PP is not to reform 
non-cooperators’ behaviour, but to decrease their fitness in the current generation and thus 
their number in the following generations. For this to be possible, there is no necessity for 
non-cooperators to learn any moral lesson (Crockett et al., 2014). 
Interestingly, people have also been shown to engage in antisocial punishment – 
namely punishment of cooperators rather than non-cooperators – especially after having been 
themselves targets of 3PP (Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008). This form of “do-gooder 
derogation” might represent a way for antisocial punishers to level out group members’ 
payoffs so that none stands out against the others, or to increase their own payoff to establish 
a more dominant status within the group hierarchy (Sylwester, Herrmann, & Bryson, 2013). 
Relative payoff concerns can also offer an explanation for third-party punishers’ 
sensitiveness to inequality. Indeed, those people who engage in the costly reduction of payoff 
differences between group members, when inequalities are the product of chance, are likely 
to be the same people who enact 3PP against individuals unwilling to cooperate in the group 
(Johnson, Dawes, Fowler, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2009). Furthermore, 3PP of unfairness 
seems to be proximately motivated more by envy of the wrongdoer’s higher payoff than by 
moralistic anger towards the unfair behaviour victims had to experience (Pedersen, Kurzban, 
& McCullough, 2013). 
All this evidence thus weakens the claim that 3PP is a tool at the service of 
within-group cooperation. At the most, according to this perspective, the 
cooperation-enhancing effects of 3PP that occur in some circumstances might just constitute 
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an evolutionary by-product. Therefore, group selection explanations of the evolution of 3PP 
have been recently challenged by individual selection accounts, such as the signalling and 
deterrence hypotheses (Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016). 
According to the signalling hypothesis, third-party punishers would accrue indirect 
fitness benefits from their intervention via reputational gains. Third-party punishers’ 
motivation to boost their reputation is indeed revealed by the so-called “audience effects”. 
Specifically, individuals invest more resources in enacting 3PP when they are aware their 
decisions will be communicated to an audience (be it constituted by other participants or the 
experimenter) than when their decisions will remain anonymous (Kurzban, DeScioli, & 
O'Brien, 2007). Thus, 3PP would function as a mechanism to signal punishers’ cooperative 
qualities, such as trustworthiness (Barclay, 2006; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016; 
Jordan & Rand, 2017), concern about group’s shared values and social standing of the victim 
(Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009, 2011), as well as commitment to impartiality and fairness 
(Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Nelissen, 2008). Additionally, 3PP could also work as a 
costly signal of formidability, defined as enhanced ability to impose costs upon others 
(Lukaszewski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 2016). Thus, 3PP might be akin to a strategy 
to assert dominance (Gordon, Madden, & Lea, 2014; Sylwester et al., 2013). If 3PP is used as 
a competitive tool, this would provide an explanation for why wrongdoers do not increase 
their investments in cooperation following punishment. Third-party punishers and their 
potential witnesses might interpret a change in the wrongdoers’ behaviour as an act of 
subordination, which would lower the wrongdoers’ social status within the group (Raihani & 
Bshary, 2019). To conclude, from an evolutionary perspective, in the case of cooperation 
signalling, third-party punishers would derive benefits from being appreciated by bystanders 
and thus preferentially selected in future interactions. Conversely, in the case of formidability 
signalling, punishers would benefit from being feared by observers, who will be consequently 
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dissuaded from implementing any exploitive intentions they might have (Gordon et al., 2014; 
Raihani & Bshary, 2015a, 2015b). 
Another account disputing group selection models of 3PP evolution is the 
aforementioned deterrence hypothesis. Its proponents argue that 3PP might stem from a 
psychological mechanism evolved to prevent mistreatments from occurring to oneself or 
valued others (Delton & Krasnow, 2017). Since humans’ ancestral social life was spent in 
small-scale societies characterised by high strength-of-ties and low mobility (Roos, Gelfand, 
Nau, & Carr, 2013), the capability to infer that mistreatment of one individual could predict 
subsequent personally-relevant mistreatment was likely to have adaptive value. In support of 
the deterrence hypothesis, it has been found that when no other information is available to the 
punishers, they base their punishment decisions on how they have seen third-party victims 
being treated by wrongdoers. When instead they have also access to information about how 
they would be personally treated by wrongdoers, this information overrides the one related to 
the treatment of third-parties in driving 3PP decisions (Krasnow et al., 2016). 
Evidence that 3PP is also administered with the goal to deter misbehaviours from 
happening again to people the punisher has a welfare stake in comes from ethnographic 
(Boehm, 1987; Ericksen & Horton, 1992) and experimental studies (Lieberman & Linke, 
2007; Pedersen et al., 2018). All these works are concordant in reporting that people 
preferentially act as third-party punishers on behalf of their family members or friends or at 
least in-group members, compared to strangers. Thus, in real-life settings and in experiments 
not laden with demands for punishment, interventions on behalf of strangers tend to be rare 
and practised when costs for punishers are low. When this type of intervention does occur, a 
plausible explanation is that third-parties’ inaction would be negatively judged by an 
audience (Pedersen et al., 2018). In conclusion, if 3PP has evolved as a deterrent mechanism 
36 
 
to protect oneself and important others from wrongdoers’ misbehaviours, third-party 
punishers can reap both direct and inclusive fitness benefits from their interventions. 
Whatever the resolution of this debate about 3PP’s ultimate causes (i.e., adaptive 
functions), the present PhD thesis will be focused on its proximate causes (i.e., psychological 
mechanisms). However, a theoretical framework about 3PP behaviour would be incomplete if 
developmental investigations were fully disentangled from phylogenetic research (Tinbergen, 
1963). The early onset of 3PP in children across different populations makes 3PP a good 
candidate for being considered a species-specific behaviour enabling human sociality. 
Nevertheless, such a definition would be premature without having verified whether 3PP is 
present in the behavioural repertoire of other animal species (Nielsen & Haun, 2016). 
 
1.4. Comparative literature on third-party social evaluations and 
punishment 
Whereas information about the ontogeny and evolution in our species of social norm 
enforcement, and 3PP in particular, has been rapidly accumulating over the past few years, 
research in the phylogenetic distribution of such behavioural reactions offers a still 
fragmented picture. Although this PhD thesis will not present new studies about the 
enforcement of putative social norms in non-human animals, the last section of this literature 
review will be dedicated to the comparative literature on the topic for completeness of 
information. As in the section dedicated to the developmental literature (section 1.2), here I 
will report comparative psychology findings comprising both mechanisms social norm 




Regarding the experimental evidence of non-human animals’ social evaluation skills, 
researchers have tested great apes – namely chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas 
(Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) – by showing them interactions between 
actual humans or animated objects either in food-sharing or helping scenarios. It has been 
found that, even without being imparted any sort of training, chimpanzees – but not bonobos, 
gorillas and orangutans – spent significantly more time in proximity of a donor who had 
demonstrated generosity rather than selfishness towards a human begging for food (Russell, 
Call, & Dunbar, 2008). Conversely, in another food-sharing experimental paradigm, 
chimpanzees did not preferentially choose to beg from the generous over the selfish donor 
after having observed them interacting with a human or a chimpanzee beggar. Chimpanzees 
started exhibiting a preference for the generous donor in third-party contexts only after 
extensive training consisting in direct interactions with the two donors (Subiaul, Vonk, 
Okamoto-Barth, & Barth, 2008). In a following experiment, chimpanzees and orangutans – 
but not bonobos and gorillas – showed to approach more frequently a prosocial experimenter 
who had tried to give food to a human third-party compared to an antisocial experimenter 
who had prevented the food giving. However, the testing of great apes’ third-party social 
evaluation skills was preceded by direct interactions between the great apes and the two 
experimenters (Herrmann, Keupp, Hare, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013). A more recent study, 
modelled after the human infant paradigm developed by Hamlin et al. (2007), has analysed 
bonobos’ third-party evaluations of animated objects in place of human adults. In the 
animations bonobos could see a recipient alternatively being helped by a prosocial agent and 
being hindered by an antisocial agent in reaching a goal. When required to reach for either 
the helper or the hinderer (preference for the neutral recipient was not assessed), surprisingly 
bonobos favoured the hinderer – a choice that may be indicative of attraction towards 
dominant individuals (Krupenye & Hare, 2018). 
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Among primates, studies about third-party social evaluations have also been carried 
out on monkeys, specifically tufted capuchins (Sapajus paella), common marmosets 
(Callithrix jacchus) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). Capuchins have been tested 
both in helping and reciprocity paradigms, whereas marmosets and squirrel monkeys only in 
reciprocity paradigms. Both experimental paradigms displayed interactions between humans, 
not between conspecifics or animated objects. In the helping paradigm a neutral person (i.e., 
recipient) was shown attempting in vain to open a container. Capuchin monkeys could either 
see the recipients’ requests for help being responded to by a helper or ignored by a 
non-helper. When capuchins had to decide which of the two actors to accept a food offer 
from, they preferred the neutral recipient over the non-helper (negativity bias) but they did 
not exhibit any preference between the neutral recipient and the helper (lack of positivity 
bias). In a follow-up experiment to investigate whether capuchins are sensitive to actors’ 
intentionality, the lack of a helping response was represented as either intentional (i.e., actor 
unwilling to help) or accidental (i.e., actor too focused on another task to notice the request 
for help). In this case, the subjects favoured the neutral recipient over the intentional 
non-helper, but did not manifest any preference between the neutral recipient and the 
accidental non-helper (Anderson, Kuroshima, Takimoto, & Fujita, 2013). In the reciprocity 
paradigm, instead, the capuchins watched a human actor (i.e., recipient) donating their 
resources to a second actor, who in turn decided to either reciprocate the act (i.e., 
reciprocator) or not (i.e., non-reciprocator). In the testing phase, the capuchins were required 
to choose which of the two actors to take food from. To note, differently from the helping 
paradigm, here the recipient is not a neutral person because they initiated a prosocial 
interaction with the other actor. It was found that capuchins preferred the recipient over the 
non-reciprocator (negativity bias), but were at chance when the choice was between the 
recipient and the reciprocator (lack of positivity bias). Interestingly, capuchins took the 
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second actor’s wealth into account when making their social evaluations. Indeed, a follow-up 
experiment revealed that the discrimination against the non-reciprocator occurred only when 
this actor actually refused the recipients’ requests of reciprocation, not when they were 
incapable of fully reciprocating because of lack of initial resources (Anderson, Takimoto, 
Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2013). A similar reciprocity paradigm was also adopted with common 
marmosets and squirrel monkeys. Both species, like capuchins, exhibited a negativity bias by 
avoiding the non-reciprocator. Additionally, whilst marmosets did not have any positivity 
bias (like capuchins), squirrel monkeys surprisingly did also show a preference for the 
reciprocator over the recipient (Anderson, Bucher, Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2016; Kawai, 
Yasue, Banno, & Ichinohe, 2014). 
Comparably to what Krupenye & Hare (2018) did with bonobos, McAuliffe at al. 
(2019) have recently adapted the human infant paradigm from Hamlin & Wynn (2007) for 
use with dogs. In this way it was possible to test whether dogs manifest a preference for 
non-human agents who behave prosocially versus antisocially in third-party virtual 
interactions. Specifically, McAuliffe at al. (2019) made dogs watch videos in which an 
animate object, while trying to reach a goal, was either assisted by a helper shape or impeded 
by a hinderer shape. Contrary to human infants and bonobos, dogs did not preferentially 
approach either the hinderer or the helper. However, they spent more time exploring the 
hinderer over the helper shape, possibly in an attempt to understand the reason for the agent’s 
puzzling antisocial behaviour. 
Another adaptation of Hamlin & Wynn’s (2007) paradigm was produced by Johnson 
et al. (2018) to investigate bottlenose dolphins’ (Tursiops spp.) social predictions in abstract 
contexts. In this experiment dolphins watched videos of a prosocial and an antisocial shape 
interacting with another shape, a neutral recipient. After the prosocial and antisocial shapes 
had moved off-screen in opposite directions, the recipient momentarily disappeared behind an 
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occluder located at the centre of the screen. By analysing dolphins’ anticipatory head turns as 
a proxy of their looking patterns, it has been demonstrated that dolphins expected the 
recipient to reappear from the occluder in correspondence with the side where the prosocial 
shape had last be seen. This indicated that dolphins predict that the recipient would follow 
and affiliate with a prosocial rather than with an antisocial agent. 
Outside the class of mammals, third-party social evaluations have been investigated 
only in fish, specifically in the mutualism between the cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) 
and its client reef fish. In the field, clients are more likely to invite inspections by cleaners 
they saw acting cooperatively towards other clients. Conversely, clients avoid cleaners they 
spotted cheating during the cleaning service provided to other clients (Bshary, 2002). In the 
laboratory, on the basis of the observation of third-party interactions, clients have been shown 
to spend more time in proximity to cleaners known to be cooperative compared to cleaners 
whose cooperative tendencies are unknown (Bshary & Grutter, 2006). 
Coming to the comparative research about punishment, it has been shown that 
whereas 2PP is a widespread behaviour in the whole animal kingdom (Bshary & Grutter, 
2002, 2005; Clutton-Brock, Russell, Sharpe, & Jordan, 2005; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; 
Hauser, 1992; Jensen, 2010; Mulder & Langmore, 1993), actual 3PP seems to be a uniquely 
human characteristic (Riedl et al., 2012). However, behaviours resembling 3PP (which will 
be explained below) have been observed in eusocial insects like bees (Ratnieks & Visscher, 
1989), wasps (Wenseleers et al., 2005) and ants (D'Ettorre, Heinze, & Ratnieks, 2004); 
cleaner fish (Raihani, Grutter, & Bshary, 2010; Raihani, Pinto, Grutter, Wismer, & Bshary, 
2011); and non-human primates, both in apes (de Waal, 1982; Vervafcke, De Vries, & van 
Elsacker, 2000; Watts, 1997; Zucker, 1987) and monkeys (Kaplan, 1978; Kummer, 1967; 
Kurland, 1977; Petit & Thierry, 1994; Ren et al., 1991). 
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3PP-like behaviours in eusocial insects are often referred to as “worker policing” and 
consist in workers’ interventions to defend the queen’s reproductive primacy by destroying 
the eggs laid by other workers (Ratnieks & Wenseleers, 2005) or by attacking such workers 
(Ratnieks & Visscher, 1989). However, what could appear as an altruistic behaviour on the 
part of non-reproductive workers is in fact usually coerced by the colony’s queen via 
chemical messages rather than being enacted voluntarily (Monnin, Ratnieks, Jones, & Beard, 
2002; Ratnieks & Wenseleers, 2008), unlike actual 3PP in humans. Additionally, policing 
behaviour in eusocial insects bestows on the workers benefits in terms of inclusive fitness as 
they share more genes with the queen’s offspring than with other workers’ offspring (Monnin 
& Ratnieks, 2001). 
The term “policing” is also used to describe third-party interventions carried out by 
non-human primates to interrupt conflicts arisen within their social group, usually over access 
to food or sexual partners (de Waal, 1982). Policing interventions are impartial because the 
arbitrator does not support either party involved in the conflict. In other words, policing in 
non-human primates, differently from both policing in eusocial insects and actual 3PP in 
humans, does not target specifically the transgressor. Performers of policing tend to be 
high-ranking individuals as they can afford not to fear redirected aggressions. On a proximate 
level, these individuals’ third-party interventions might be motivated by a basic form of 
“community concern” (von Rohr et al., 2012). However, ultimate causes of impartial policing 
behaviour are most likely ascribable to the indirect fitness benefits the arbitrator gains from 
increased group stability (Flack, de Waal, & Krakauer, 2005; Flack, Girvan, de Waal, & 
Krakauer, 2006). 
Another evidence of 3PP-like behaviour comes from the work on the mutualistic 
relationship between the bluestreak cleaner wrasses (Labroides dimidiatus) and their reef-fish 
clients: by removing ectoparasites from their clients’ skin, cleaners obtain the majority of 
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their nutrients. However, they occasionally “cheat” by eating off portions of their clients’ 
living tissues – which are preferred over ectoparasites as they have higher nutritional value. It 
has been observed that clients receive a higher quality cleaning service when they are 
inspected by male-female pairs of cleaners rather than by singletons (Bshary, Grutter, 
Willener, & Leimar, 2008). This is due to the fact that male cleaners punish their female 
partners when they catch them cheating. As a consequence, females increase their 
cooperation rates towards the clients in future joint inspections (Raihani et al., 2011). 
However, this behaviour does not constitute an example of actual 3PP because both the client 
and the male cleaner are victims of the female’s cheating act: every time it is bitten, the client 
swims away and the male cleaner thus loses the opportunity to eat ectoparasites. Therefore, 
by punishing the female, the male cleaner does not only benefit the client but he also derives 
direct fitness advantages in terms of food-provisioning from his investment in punishment 
(Raihani et al., 2010). 
Experimental evidence of actual 3PP in non-human animals is scarce, even amongst 
our closest living relatives. To date, there have been only a handful of studies – all conducted 
in laboratory settings on captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) – aimed at testing the extent 
of the sense of normativity in non-human animals by analysing the conditions triggering their 
punitive behaviours. In order to verify whether evolutionary precursors of 3PP behaviour are 
present in non-human animals, it is crucial to investigate whether they, like humans, 
intervene as uninvolved third-parties on behalf of victims suffering from a behavioural 
transgression. Von Rohr and colleagues (2011) have argued that an essential precondition for 
the evolution of social norms is the existence of what they call “personal norms”. Whereas 
social norms are defined by social expectations (empirical and/or normative) about the 
appropriate ways of acting towards anyone, personal norms are defined by personal 
expectations about the appropriate ways of acting towards the self. Below evidence of 
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chimpanzees’ behavioural reactions to violations of their personal and social expectations is 
reported. 
When chimpanzees experience disadvantageous inequity as the result of a 
transgression committed at their personal expense – i.e., when a conspecific stole food from 
them – they show vengeful reactions in the form of 2PP against the transgressor. Conversely, 
when the disadvantageous inequity is not due to a transgression, such as in the case of 
viewing a conspecific eating desirable food they have never had access to, chimpanzees do 
not manifest any spiteful reaction against the other individual (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 
2007). Moreover, after direct interaction with an antisocial agent who withdrew previously 
offered food, chimpanzees are willing to pay a cost (in terms of physical effort) to see the 
transgressor being punished by someone else, suggesting that the view of vicarious 2PP is for 
them a rewarding experience (Mendes, Steinbeis, Bueno-Guerra, Call, & Singer, 2018). 
Crucially, when dominant chimpanzees see a group member take food away from another 
individual, they do not intervene on behalf of the victim by enacting 3PP, not even when the 
victim is kin of theirs. This experimental evidence thus points at the possibility that 
chimpanzees lack sensitivity to behavioural transgressions affecting others than the self, at 
least in food-related contexts (Riedl et al., 2012). 
Another study conducted on chimpanzees seems to suggest that these animals are 
instead capable of detecting behavioural transgressions affecting others than the self or 
in-group members, but in harm-related contexts. However, this capability to detect harm 
transgressions is not usually accompanied by increased emotional reactions towards the 
victims. Specifically, in this study chimpanzees’ looking patterns and physiological arousal 
were measured while they were shown a video containing scenes of an infanticide committed 
by conspecifics unknown to them. It was found that chimpanzees looked longer at infanticide 
scenes compared to control scenes displaying hunting, nut cracking or aggressive interactions 
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among adults. But crucially this increased attention did not translate into increased arousal, 
possibly because the transgression affected out-group rather than in-group members (von 
Rohr, van Schaik, Kissling, & Burkart, 2015). Therefore, chimpanzees might have empirical 
but not normative expectations about out-group members’ behaviour. It remains to be 
verified whether chimpanzees possess normative expectations about in-group members’ 
behaviour in harm-related contexts. 
Of note, absence of evidence of 3PP and normative expectations in non-human 
animals is not necessarily evidence of their absence. For example, chimpanzees might have 
normative expectations but, at the same time, it might not be possible for them to express 
such expectations through 3PP because of social factors. Specifically, when not in a position 
of power, bystanders to norm violations might fear retaliation and redirected aggressions 
upon their potential intervention (von Rohr et al., 2011). However, this does not explain why, 
when a conflict arises, dominant individuals have been observed enacting impartial policing 
behaviour but not 3PP expressly directed at the transgressor.  
In conclusion, amongst non-human animals there is remarkable cross-species 
variability in the ability to evaluate, from a third-party perspective, other individuals on the 
basis of their adherence to putative norms of behaviour (Abdai & Miklósi, 2016). When it 
comes instead to reacting to behavioural transgressions, non-human animals are prompt in 
inflicting punishment upon transgressors when they themselves are the victims, but not when 
they merely are unaffected bystanders (Riedl et al., 2012). It has been demonstrated that 
non-human animals’ behaviours that have been previously mistaken for 3PP, in reality, bring 
about direct (rather than indirect) fitness benefits to the intervener, or do not specifically 
target the transgressor, or are enacted under coercion (Jensen, 2010). Therefore, although 
further research in comparative psychology is surely needed, actual 3PP most likely is a 
uniquely human behaviour whose function is still under debate (as seen in section 1.3). This 
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implies that, even though non-human animals have clear expectations about how they want to 
be treated (Jensen et al., 2007; Riedl et al., 2012) and can even predict how others prefer to be 
treated (Johnson et al., 2018), they do not experience any sense of obligation (or “ought” 
feeling) to correct or discourage behavioural transgressions negatively affecting other 
individuals’ lives (Burkart, Bruegger, & van Schaik, 2018; de Waal, 2014). 
 
1.5. Overview of the thesis 
Having introduced elements of comparative and evolutionary psychology to 
appropriately contextualise 3PP behaviour, I now focus again on developmental research and 
address the gaps in its literature where further contribution is intended here. 
From the review of children’s 3PP literature presented at the beginning of this 
Chapter, several issues had emerged as un- or under-investigated. Firstly, the range of norm 
violations adopted to elicit 3PP has been limited to injunctive (moral) norms, and specifically 
issues of fairness and harm. Since there is no guarantee these results are unaffected by 
descriptive norm violations and generalisable to other moral domains, an important advance 
would be to understand whether 3PP is influenced by the kind of norm violations punishers 
witness. Secondly, moral violations have so far been operationalised as negative outcomes for 
the victim, mostly stemming from the transgressor’s negative intentions. Only one study 
(Gummerum & Chu, 2014) examined whether children are capable of integrating intention 
and outcome information in their 3PP decisions. However, this study was conducted by 
adopting the “strategy method”, which requires participants to make punishment decisions 
before they witness a transgression. It is yet to be verified whether the integration between 
intentions and outcomes would be facilitated by the use of more naturalistic methods, in 
which 3PP is enacted after third-parties have viewed a moral transgression. Moreover, 
whereas the role of emotions as antecedents of 3PP has begun to be clarified (Gummerum, 
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López-Pérez, et al., 2019), the emotional consequences of 3PP constitute a completely 
unexplored topic in developmental research: it needs to be understood whether children 
derive, or at least expect to derive, satisfaction from meting out 3PP against transgressors. 
Hedonic experiences or expectations of 3PP would be in line with a retributive motivation to 
punish (Crockett et al., 2014), but less likely to be consistent with a deterrent motivation. 
Another potential 3PP motivation, in addition to retribution and deterrence, is represented by 
reputation enhancement. Thus, the way to elucidate the role of reputation is through 
establishing whether children are responsive to the perceived presence of an audience when 
they make their 3PP decisions.   
In order to deepen the knowledge about children’s 3PP behaviour, I thus designed a 
series of four experiments, differing in the specific research questions and experimental 
paradigms adopted, as well as on the basis of the age range, country of residence and 
socio-economic status of the sample. 
Experiments 1-3 were conducted on a wide age range, including 5- to 11-year-old 
children, who acted as uninvolved referees in a computer game named MegaAttack. The 
game was developed from scratch by the research team and featured teams of internet players 
supposedly playing live. As these players violated fairness or loyalty norms, respectively an 
individualising and a binding moral domain (Graham et al., 2013; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009), children were offered the opportunity to punish them. Experiment 4 was instead 
conducted on a slightly narrower age range, ranging from 7- to 11-year-old children, who 
operated a Justice System in which they viewed moral transgressions of various types 
(physical harm; property destruction; theft; disloyalty/inequity; sanctity/authority 
transgression; deception/liberty violation) in Minecraft, a globally popular videogame. As 
impartial judges of the Justice System, children could respond to transgressions with two 
types of third-party interventions, namely punishment of transgressors and compensation of 
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victims. Regarding the demographics of the samples, children participating in Experiments 
1-2 lived in the UK and on average came from a highly educated middle-class background. 
Notably, the UK is considered a WEIRD country, whereby “WEIRD” is a cultural identifier 
standing for “Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic” (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). The sample of Experiment 3 was instead constituted only by 
non-WEIRD children, specifically urban Colombian children of generally low 
socio-economic status. Finally, Experiment 4 was carried out cross-culturally, recruiting 
children from the UK, Colombia and Italy of various social backgrounds. It is notable that 
Italian culture is ranked somewhere between British individualistic and Colombian 
collectivistic culture on a number of validated scales (Hofstede, 2001; House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). 
Below are reported the research questions generated from the reviewed literature that I 
decided to investigate in the present PhD thesis, subdivided by chapters and experiments.  
 Chapter 2 includes Experiments 1 and 2. Both of them were aimed at examining the 
developmental trajectory of children’s 3PP severity and clarifying whether children make the 
type of 3PP (e.g., economic or social punishment) fit the type of moral transgression (e.g., 
violation of fairness or loyalty norms) in terms of moral domains. Experiment 1 was 
additionally designed to verify whether deviations from descriptive norms (i.e., what is 
commonly done) along with deviations from moral norms (i.e., what should be done) cause 
harsher judgements of transgression severity and 3PP decisions. Experiment 2 was also 
intended to explore the affective states children experience in enacting 3PP, as well as to 
evaluate audience effects on children’s judgements of transgression severity and 3PP severity 
by presenting them with cues of observability. 
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In Chapter 3 I introduce Experiment 3. Differently from Experiments 1-2, in 
Experiment 3 the developmental trajectory of children’s 3PP severity was analysed across 
moral domains (e.g., unfairness and disloyalty). Audience effects on children’s judgements of 
transgression severity and 3PP severity were evaluated by presenting children with cues of 
accountability along with cues of observability. Experiment 3 also addressed whether 
children’s 3PP-related affective states are influenced by time (i.e., before, during and after 
punishment allocation) and task wording (i.e., emphasis vs lack of emphasis on punishment 
outcomes for the transgressor). Moreover, an entirely new issue was investigated in 
Experiment 3 in comparison to Experiments 1-2, namely the integration between outcome 
and intention information in children’s judgements of transgression severity and 3PP severity 
along the developmental trajectory and across moral domains. 
In Chapter 4 I present Experiment 4, which was intended to clarify the extent to 
which children’s compensatory and punitive decisions (i.e., 3PP severity, compensation level, 
3PP vs compensation endorsement) are determined by judgement of transgression severity, 
type of moral transgression and children’s age. Experiment 4 was also designed to examine 
whether children’s punishment- and compensation-related enjoyment are affected by a 
variety of factors, such as: judgement of transgression severity, type of third-party 
intervention, time passed since the intervention, children’s age and retribution vs deterrence 
endorsement. Moreover, in order to investigate children’s 3PP explicit justifications, it was 
assessed whether retribution vs deterrence endorsement is influenced by framing messages 
(i.e., emphasis on retribution or deterrence or compensation), children’s age and country of 
residence. Finally, in order to shed light on children’s 3PP implicit motivations, Experiment 4 





The aforementioned three experimental chapters – Chapter 2, 3 and 4 – will be 
roughly structured as papers, including an introduction with the literature related to each 
specific research topic, a methodology section with the details of each experimental 
paradigm, followed by the presentation and discussion of the results. The final chapter of the 
present PhD thesis – Chapter 5 – will bring together the findings of the four experiments in 
order to draw the conclusions deriving from this research effort and identify the avenues for 


















Chapter 2: Experiments 1-2 
A SENSE OF MORAL DUTY AND INEQUALITY AVERSION MOTIVATE 
CHILDREN’S THIRD-PARTY PUNISHMENT 
 
Experiments 1-2 combined 
2.1. General introduction 
In light of the literature review on children’s 3PP behaviour (see Chapter 1), Chapter 
2 will present two experiments that were designed to investigate the following issues: 
whether children tend to fit the kind of punishment to the kind of moral transgression in terms 
of moral domain (Experiments 1-2); whether they punish violations of descriptive norms 
(what is commonly done) as well as moral violations (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015) 
(Experiment 1); whether their 3PP responses are affected by age (Experiments 1-2) and the 
presence of an audience (Experiment 2); and what affective states they experience in enacting 
3PP (Experiment 2). In order to fill these gaps in knowledge, a two-player cooperative 
spaceship computer game – called MegaAttack – was developed to be used in experiments 
with primary school-aged children (ages 5–11 years). In MegaAttack players belonging to the 
same team cooperate with one another against computer-controlled enemies. After having 
had a chance at playing cooperatively in a team with the experimenter in a face-to-face 
interaction (offline playing phase) as game familiarisation, children changed role from 
players to referees whose job was to judge supposed internet players’ behaviour during the 
game (online refereeing phase). Children policed misbehaviours as unaffected bystanders, on 
behalf of the victims, but they were never victims themselves. To my knowledge, mine is the 
second line of research employing a virtual game to investigate children’s social cognition 
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(after the virtual ball-toss game Cyberball to study ostracism in children; Crowley, Wu, 




2.2.1. Social norm typology: moral domains, and descriptive vs 
injunctive norms 
An important debate about moral norms concerns the contraposition between monism 
and pluralism, where the former considers all moral concerns as manifestations of a unique 
moral domain (Baumard et al., 2013; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2018), 
while the latter asserts that there is more than one moral domain. Early pluralist theories (e.g. 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997) have been built on by theories such as “Moral 
Foundations Theory” and “Morality-as-Cooperation” theory. Moral Foundations Theory 
includes five moral foundations: care/harm and fairness/cheating (individualising 
foundations); loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation (binding 
foundations) (Graham et al., 2009). Morality-as-Cooperation theory is based on a 
seven-factor model of morality: family, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness 
and property (Curry, Chesters, & Van Lissa, 2019). Graham and colleagues (2013) have 
pointed out that research in developmental moral psychology has hardly begun when it comes 
to domains other than harm and fairness. 
In the context of pluralistic theories the nature of the link between transgressions 
relating to different moral domains and consequent punitive motivations has not been 
clarified. I propose two rival cognitive models: the deep separation model and the domain 
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general model. According to the deep separation model, transgressions of different domains 
lead to different types of punishment motivation, potentially motivating different types of 
punishment behaviour (Figure 1A). According to the domain general model, instead, 
detection of transgressions in different domains leads to a generic sense that a transgression 
has occurred and thus different types of transgression activate the same type of punishment 
motivation (Figure 1B).  
Given the absence of literature on children’s punitive attitudes towards violations 
apart from those related to harm and fairness, and the lack of literature comparing children’s 
punishment of violations in different domains, I investigated whether children tend to react 
differently to different types of moral norm violations. I thus investigated for the first time 
children’s punitive responses to violations of what Moral Foundations Theory considers a 
binding foundation – loyalty. In order to put the deep separation model to the test, I 
hypothesised that unfairness in resource distribution might be more likely to motivate 
economic punishment, whereas disloyalty might be more likely to motivate social 
punishment such as ostracism. I also predicted that this tendency to match the type of 
punishment with the type of moral violation would vary with age because of potential 
developmental tendencies to cognitive differentiation or integration (Siegler & Chen, 2008). 
Another norm classification approach – proposed by both Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren 
(1990) and Bicchieri (2005) – distinguishes between descriptive norms (i.e., what people 
typically do) and injunctive norms (i.e., what people think that ought to be done). Thus, moral 
norms could be considered a subset of injunctive norms. People tend to make inferences from 
descriptive norms to injunctive norms and vice versa, falling victim to the so-called 
“naturalistic fallacy” (Hume, 1739/2000). In that respect, it has been found that when an 
injunctive norm transgression is described as common, people express more lenient 
judgements. Conversely, when the same transgression is described as uncommon, people’s 
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judgements are harsher (Eriksson et al., 2015; McGraw, 1985; Trafimow, Reeder, & Bilsing, 
2001; Welch et al., 2005).  
From a developmental perspective, this descriptive-to-injunctive tendency has also 
been observed in young children involved in behavioural experiments. For example, after 
being shown how a demonstrator operates an apparatus (i.e., descriptive norm), preschool 
children employ injunctive language (‘‘You should do this’’) to protest against those who do 
not faithfully imitate the demonstration (Kenward, 2012). Interestingly, children can make 
these descriptive-to-injunctive inferences even after only one exposure to the model’s action 
(Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016). Furthermore, recent studies have demonstrated 
that young children negatively evaluate individuals who do not conform to their 
group-descriptive norm (e.g., type of food eaten), and that such negative judgements are 
justified by injunctive norm-based explanations (Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2017; Roberts, 
Guo, Ho, & Gelman, 2018; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2017).  
It remains to be understood whether children’s negative evaluations of descriptive 
norm violations can translate into 3PP towards individuals who do not conform to their 
group-descriptive norms, but on the basis of the above literature I predict that it may do so. 
However, violations of purely descriptive norms might cause weak punitive motivations, 
below the threshold for action. Therefore, rather than investigating whether a descriptive 
norm violation alone motivates punishment, I investigated whether descriptive norm 
violations would increase the severity of punishment allocated for moral norm violations. 
Because substantial variance in punishment severity is typically explained by judgements of 
transgression severity (Alter, Kernochan, & Darley, 2007), I measured and controlled for 





2.2.2. Age effect on third-party punishment 
As highlighted in the developmental literature presented in Chapter 1 (section 1.2), 
the probability of children engaging in 3PP has been shown to increase with age, across 
different countries and types of moral scenarios. Specifically, this upward developmental 
pattern in 3PP rates has been detected in Melanesian children (age range: 4 to 10 years of 
age) who witnessed antisocial actions, i.e. destruction of a gift (Dixson & Kenward, in prep), 
as well as in Western children who watched unfair allocations made during a Triadic Dictator 
Game. This latter economic paradigm has been adopted by Jordan, McAuliffe & Warneken 
(2014) with US children (age groups: 6 and 8 years of age); by Salali, Juda & Henrich (2015) 
with Canadian children (age range: 3 to 8 years of age); and by McAuliffe, Jordan & 
Warneken (2015) with US children (age groups: 5 and 6 years of age). By contrast, the 
Triadic Dictator Game study conducted by Gummerum, Takezawa & Keller (2009) revealed 
a downward developmental pattern in punitiveness. Their participants were recruited in 
Germany, and were both children (age groups: 7 and 11 years of age) and adults (mostly 
university students). Children proved to be more punitive third-parties than adults. Notably, 
in this case punitiveness was operationalised as 3PP severity rather than 3PP rates. 
However, since the majority of the literature about the development of punitiveness 
indicated an upward pattern, I predicted I would detect the same in Experiment 1 even though 




Figure 1. Cognitive models of punishment motivations illustrating the relationship 
between transgressions in different moral domains and consequent punitive outcomes. 









2.3.1. Materials  
The MegaAttack game was programmed in LÖVE, an open-source game development 
environment utilising the LUA programming language, and run on a laptop computer which 
was taken to test locations. Headphones were used so that the audio could be clearly heard in 
noisy environments like science fairs. In the test trials, participants saw recordings of games 
that they were told were being played live by internet players. The descriptive norm violation 
was operationalised as a protective-shield colour-choice made in contrast with what was 
preferred by all other player-avatars displayed in the game. The loyalty violation was 
operationalised as a refusal to protect a team member who was under deadly attack. The 
fairness violation was operationalised as an unfair distribution of game resources (gems). 
2.3.2. Sample 
Participants were 72 primary school-aged children (mean age: 8.83 ± 1.81 years; age 
range: from 5.45 years to 11.95 years; 32 females and 40 males). Six additional children were 
tested but had to be excluded from the sample: three for exceeding the set age limit (i.e., not 
older than 11 years); one for a technical failure in the equipment; one for unwillingness to 
continue; and one for difficulties in understanding the experimenter’s requests. They were 
tested in a diverse range of settings – one museum, one primary school and two science fairs 
– but the whole testing phase took place in the same medium-sized English city (from June to 
October 2017). The stopping rule was set roughly half-way through data collection: one cell 
in the eight-cell table for counterbalancing of irrelevant variables had reached 9 participants, 
so it was decided to continue until all cells had 9 participants. The study was approved by the 
Oxford Brookes University Ethical Review Committee under the project name “Children’s 
social judgement in a computer game” (Study Number 171101). 
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Thirty-five of 72 parents (18 fathers; 15 mothers; 2 unspecified) partially or fully 
completed a socio-demographic questionnaire, indicating that Experiment 1’s sample came 
predominantly from a middle-class background (the median yearly family income was 
£60,000; one out of the 35 respondents preferred not to declare) with a high education level 
(88.57% of the respondents had at least a Bachelor’s degree), and was heterogeneous in terms 
of ethnicity (parents’ nationality: 23 British, 10 non-British, 2 unspecified). 
2.3.3. Design 
I adopted a 2x2 fully within-subject design in which the factors were Descriptive 
norm violation (descriptive norm conformity vs. descriptive norm violation) and Type of 
moral transgression (fairness vs. loyalty violation). I ran one trial in each condition 
combination, with each trial featuring two unique players, one violator and one non-violator. 
In the resulting four trials a moral transgression always occurred (either a fairness or loyalty 
norm violation), and a descriptive norm violation either did or did not occur, with these 
variables counterbalanced. Two irrelevant variables were counterbalanced across 
participants: the normative colour choice (red or blue), and the order of trials. Order with 
respect to descriptive norm violation/conformity was AABB or BBAA, and with respect to 
loyalty/fairness transgression was ABAB or BABA, counterbalanced (four possible order 
variants, see Appendix A – Table α1 for details). Each test-trial featured a different pair of 
player avatars (different animals inside space-ships). 
The dependent variables measured were: type of punishment: 2 levels (economic, loss 
of gems as an in-game resource vs. social, banning from the game); severity of punishment (6 
ordinal levels; for social punishment: 0 minutes, 1 minute, 5 minutes, 20 minutes, 1 hour, 1 
day; for economic punishment: 0, 2, 5, 10, 50, or 100 gems); judgement of transgression 













Figure 2. Different stages of Experiment 1 game bouts. (A) Shield-choice stage: player 
Ostrich makes a descriptively non-normative choice. (B) Gem-collection stage: player Fox is 
under deadly threat from a Mega-attack, as disloyal player Panda ignores the situation and 
continues to collect gems. (C) Gem-division stage: unfair player Wolf is about to take more 




The procedure was divided into three phases (see full script in Appendix A – section 
α1 for further details): (1) Familiarisation, further subdivided into an offline playing 
familiarisation and a purportedly online refereeing familiarisation; (2) Four purportedly 
online test trials; (3) Final questions. Familiarisation and Final questions were identical for 
all participants. 
Parents of all children gave informed written consent for them to take part in the 
experiment. Children were tested by a single experimenter, seated at a laptop, with any 
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accompanying adults engaged in other activities (for example filling in the questionnaire). 
The procedure began with the experimenter explaining to the children that the experiment 
consisted of playing offline and refereeing online a newly devised computer game called 
MegaAttack.  
The playing familiarisation was organised into four short game bouts, aimed at 
establishing for the participant that standard moral norms applied to the game, with respect to 
issues of team loyalty and fairness in resource distribution. At the beginning, the child and 
the experimenter were automatically assigned shields of the same colour (the one that in test 
trials would be descriptively normative). They then flew space-ships, playing together as a 
team, defending themselves by shooting robot attackers, and collecting gems that initially 
went into a communal store but were manually divided between the players by one of the 
players at the end of the game bouts.  
Each of the four bouts of the playing familiarisation was constituted by a gem 
collection stage (45 seconds) followed – from the second bout onwards – by a gem division 
stage (15 seconds). The first bout had no gem division, for ease of introducing the game; the 
child decided how to split the gems at the end of the second bout, and the experimenter split 
the gems at the end of the third and fourth bouts. Both times, the experimenter split the gems 
equally between herself and the child, thus demonstrating that fair division was normal. A 
team-loyalty norm was demonstrated when the experimenter came to the aid of the child 
when the child’s space-ship was in danger of being destroyed during a mega-attack, a sudden 
event in which an overwhelming number of enemies surrounded and attacked the child’s 
space-ship at the same time (during the fourth bout). After the playing familiarisation bouts, 
the participant was told they were to referee the game by judging the behaviour of some 
internet players (the two players represented on the screen were described as having 
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connected to the game live via the internet, but the games displayed were actually 
pre-recorded).  
Differently from the bouts in the playing familiarisation, in each bout the child had to 
referee (one refereeing familiarisation bout and four test trial bouts) a shield-choice stage (5 
seconds) preceded the gem collection and division stages, in which each player chose either a 
red or blue shield. At the beginning of the refereeing familiarisation bout the descriptive 
norm was introduced to the child: the experimenter explicitly said that internet players 
commonly chose a specific shield colour over another one (red or blue counterbalanced 
across participants). To support this claim, the child was invited to pay attention to the shield 
colour used by 28 additional avatars outside the game arena, on the edge of the screen, 
presented as internet players that were waiting to play. In the refereeing familiarisation bout 
no norms were violated by the two players: both players chose the common over the 
uncommon shield colour and both players were loyal and fair to each other. For this reason 
the child was expected to conclude that no misbehaviours had occurred.  
The refereeing familiarisation was followed by four test trials (each one game bout) 
in which the child saw a combination of descriptive and moral norm-violations (as outlined 
above in section 2.2.3 about the experimental design) and heard the narration of such actions 
from a live-streamer (commentator) presented as live but actually pre-recorded (note that live 
internet-game commentary is now a common phenomenon that many children are familiar 
with (Sjöblom & Hamari, 2017). Two different male voice-overs were used, counterbalanced 
across participants. Children were expected to easily identify both the descriptive violations 
and the moral misbehaviours committed by the players since the voice-over made them 
particularly salient. Specifically, loyalty norm-violations happened when one of the players 
refused to come to the aid of the team-mate during enemies’ mega-attacks, resulting in the 
team-mate’s space-ship’s destruction (Figure 2B). Fairness norm-violations happened when 
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one of the players took for themselves all but two gems (typically the team managed to 
collect about 20 gems per bout prior to the division) (Figure 2C). Descriptive norm-violations 
happened when one of the players chose for themselves an uncommon shield colour (Figure 
2A).  
After each of the five internet scenarios shown (1 refereeing familiarisation + 4 test 
trials), in a refereeing stage the child answered for each of the two players in turn: “Did they 
do anything wrong?” If misbehaviour was identified, the child had to judge the severity of the 
norm-transgression using a 5-point smiley face scale (ranging from “super bad” to “just a 
little bad”), as well as to decide the type (social or economic) and severity of the punishment 
(Figure 2D). Each punishment choice and consequence was accompanied by audio-visual 
effects, and each punishment choice was made by computer key press, to give the child the 
impression they were genuinely acting as referee.  
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked whether they thought it was 
worse for a transgressor to receive a social or an economic type of punishment, and whether 
they believed they had actually refereed real internet players during the trials. 
2.4. Results & Discussion 
All analyses were conducted in the R programming language (RStudio Team, 2015).  
2.4.1. Preliminary analyses 
2.4.1.1. Believability of the game 
The majority of children (67 out of 72) expressed a belief about whether they had 
refereed real games. Only 37 out of these 67 children (55%) believed they had done so, 
implying that some children detected the deception involved. Nevertheless, there was no 
effect of believability on the key variables (see Appendix A – section α4 for supplementary 
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statistical analyses of Experiment 1). Therefore, for the statistical analyses data is included 
irrespective of believability. 
2.4.1.2. Punishment rate 
In 279 out of the total 288 times a moral transgression was shown children correctly 
recognised the violators and consequently punished them (punishment rate: 97%). 
Misidentification of non-violators as violators were made by 13 children, in the refereeing 
familiarisation (13 trials) or in the test trials (10 trials). These trials were not included in the 
analyses. 
2.4.2. Main analyses 
2.4.2.1. Choice of punishment types 
I calculated the proportion of trials for which a punishment type was chosen in the 
same domain as the norm violation (i.e., economic punishment for fairness transgressions or 
social punishment for loyalty transgressions) to verify whether children assigned punishment 
types randomly or not. With only two trials in each moral domain, this proportion can only 
take three values (0, .5, and 1); non-parametric analysis is therefore appropriate so sign-tests 
were conducted (excluding .5 values which are uninformative in this one-sample context). In 
unfairness trials values of 1 occurred significantly more often (n = 39) than values of 0 (n = 
11), p < .001, sign-test, whereas in disloyalty trials the difference between the occurrence of 
values of 1 (n = 30) and values of 0 (n = 17) approached but did not reach significance, p = 
.079.  
In order to investigate the effects of age on the tendency to make the punishment fit 
the crime, I also calculated an overall “Punishment Fits The Crime” (PFTC) score, as the 
mean of the above two proportions for each individual. This score did not change as a 
function of age, F(1,70) = 1.05, p = .308, R2 = .01, in contrast with my prediction.  
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There was apparently no confound between punishment type and believed punishment 
severity: 20 children considered economic punishment most severe, whereas 22 considered 
social punishment most severe, χ2 (1) = 0.10, p = .758; 25 rated social and economic 
punishment as equally severe while the remaining 2 gave no clear answer. 
Children clearly made the punishment fit the crime by assigning economic costs for 
economic unfairness, ruling out the pure domain general model, according to which 
punishment type is entirely unrelated to transgression type (Figure 1B). However, there was 
no clear evidence for such a tendency for social transgressions, for which the higher level of 
social punishment did not reach significance. Strong support for the deep separation model, 
according to which specific transgressions motivate specific punishments across domains 
(Figure 1A), is therefore also lacking. Different interpretations can explain the detected 
effect. For economic unfairness children might have been primed to select a form of 
punishment employing gems simply because gems played a salient role in the unfair scenario 
(associative model). Alternatively, children’s punishment behaviour might have been 
additionally motivated by inequality aversion, with economic costs imposed not only to 
punish but also to correct unjust resource distributions (domain general plus equalisation 
model; Figure 1C). Children of this age are indeed averse to economic inequality in 
third-party contexts (Shaw & Olson, 2012). The obtained results are consistent with both the 
associative model and the domain general plus equalisation model because they both predict 
a specific mechanism, related to gems, that causes the punishment to fit the crime for 
economic but not social transgressions. To distinguish these possibilities a follow-up 
experiment was designed (see Experiment 2). 
2.4.2.2. Effects of descriptive norm violations 
Judgements of transgression severity were not greater when the descriptive norm was 
violated (M = 3.53, SD = 0.99) than when the descriptive norm was adhered to (M = 3.49, SD 
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= 0.98), t(71) = 0.32, p = .747, d = 0.04, 95% CI for d [-0.19, 0.27]. Neither was punishment 
severity greater when the descriptive norm was violated (M = 4.39, SD = 0.99) than when the 
descriptive norm was adhered to (M = 4.33, SD = 1.00), t(71) = 0.62, p = .537, d = 0.07, 95% 
CI for d [-0.16, 0.30]. These null results could seem surprising in view of the previous 
literature that found that children evaluate individuals who do not conform to 
group-descriptive norms more negatively than those who do conform (Roberts, Gelman, et 
al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2018; Roberts, Ho, et al., 2017). However, previous research did not 
present children with deviations from descriptive norms along with deviations from 
injunctive norms as it was done in Experiment 1. What can be concluded is that 
transgressions resulting from violating both a descriptive and injunctive norm were not 
judged more severely than purely injunctive transgressions. 
To note, since it was important not to interrupt the flow of the experiment for 
believability purposes, no manipulation check at the end of each test trial was included to 
verify whether children had detected the descriptive violations. Nevertheless, I am confident 
that the null effect of descriptive violations on judgements of transgressions severity and on 
punishment severity was not due to children not registering the descriptive violations, as 
players’ uncommon shield choices were explicitly pointed out by the voice-over.  
2.4.2.3. Severity in punishment across development 
A multiple linear regression was conducted to predict punishment severity based on 
children’s age in years, controlling for their judgement of transgression severity, F(2,69) = 
9.50, p < .001, R2 = .22. Punishment severity was negatively predicted by age in years (B = 
-0.15, p = .009) and positively predicted by judgement of transgression severity (B = 0.32, p 
= .006). Thus, it was demonstrated that this decrease in children’s severity in punishment 
with increasing age was not due to older children considering the transgressions less serious. 
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This result was at odds with previous research analysing punishment rates across 




Experiment 2 was intended to resolve the uncertainty regarding the reasons for choice 
of punishment types in Experiment 1; to verify whether the downward developmental pattern 
of 3PP severity was replicable; and to investigate two new issues: potential audience effects, 
and children’s enjoyment of enactment of punishment.  
2.5.1. Why did the punishment fit the crime for unfairness only? 
Experiment 1 demonstrated economic punishment to be preferentially allocated in 
response to unfairness, but did not find clear evidence that social transgressions were 
matched with social punishment. This was most consistent with neither of the two originally 
proposed hypotheses, but rather with an associative explanation, or a domain general model 
in which equalisation motives also influence behaviour (Table 1). To distinguish between 
these new alternative hypotheses, the transgressions were modified so that gems were made 
salient in the disloyal rather than in the unfair scenario, while punishment types remained 
unchanged (an economic punishment of a gem fine, or a social punishment of a ban). 
Because gems were now associated with loyalty rather than fairness transgressions, the 
associative account predicts that the economic punishment of a gem fine would now be 
associated with loyalty rather than fairness transgressions. The unfairness now concerned a 
different resource (bombs) that could no longer be equalised by a gem fine. The domain 
general plus equalisation model therefore predicts no preference for either type of punishment 
in either condition (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Predicted punishment preference results for each condition according to 
different models, plus observed results. 

























































































































a Because economic punishment (fining of gems) can help to equalise the unfair distribution 
of gems that motivates the punishment. 
b Because economic punishment (fining of gems) could be primed by the featuring of gems in 
the transgression (unfair gem distribution). 
c Because economic punishment (fining of gems) could be primed by the featuring of gems in 







2.5.2. Audience effects on moral behaviour and judgements 
Audience effects – namely, behavioural changes induced by the presence of an 
audience or cues of observation – have been extensively investigated in adults but to a lesser 
extent in children. Adults who feel they are being watched modify their own behaviour in 
order to meet their audience’s expectations. For instance, people are more likely to engage in 
moralistic punishment when in the presence of an audience (Kurzban et al., 2007; Piazza & 
Bering, 2008). Children have also shown increased moral behaviour in the presence of an 
audience, real or believed as such. Five-year-olds are more generous when recipients are 
visible (Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 2012). Children as young as age 5 are also more 
likely to share and less likely to steal (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012), cheat 
(Piazza, Bering, & Ingram, 2011) and lie (Fu, Evans, Xu, & Lee, 2012) when someone is 
watching than when they are alone. Children as young as 6 are less likely to be fair to others 
when they can do so without appearing to be unfair (Shaw et al., 2014). 
When no actual audience is present but only implicit cues of observation – such as 
images of “watching eyes” – adults seemed to unconsciously regulate their behaviour (e.g., 
Haley & Fessler, 2005) and moral judgements (Bourrat, Baumard, & McKay, 2011), 
although this line of research has produced mixed results (Dear, Dutton, & Fox, 2019; 
Northover, Pedersen, Cohen, & Andrews, 2017; Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015). Null results 
have partly been explained in terms of exposure length to the observation cue (Sparks & 
Barclay, 2013) and anonymity (i.e., people can ignore observation cues if they are not held 
personally accountable for their actions, Raihani & Bshary, 2012). Regarding, instead, the 
effect of cues of observation on children’s moral behaviour, there is indication that the way in 
which “watching eyes” are presented (i.e., how explicit the exposure is) is the determining 
factor for finding or not finding an audience effect. Indeed, images of eyes implicitly 
presented were not effective in increasing children’s generosity in a one-shot dictator game 
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(Fujii, Takagishi, Koizumi, & Okada, 2015; Vogt, Efferson, Berger, & Fehr, 2015). However, 
Kelsey, Grossmann and Vaish (2018) observed a significant increase in children’s sharing 
tendency when the exposure to “watching eyes” switched from implicit to explicit.  
Thus, the potential effects of observation cues on a broader range of children’s moral 
behaviours, including 3PP, are of interest. For this reason in Experiment 2, once the child 
took the role of the referee, it was manipulated whether or not children were subject to cues 
of being watched. Because many potential mechanisms are involved, from strategic cognition 
concerning the expectation of approval to more automatic tendencies, in this first 
investigation of the topic no attempts to distinguish different types of mechanism were made. 
Rather, a collection of audience cues were manipulated together – presence or absence of a 
commentator and other players observing over the internet, and the attention of the 
experimenter – with the prediction that children would enact more severe third-party 
punishment against norm violators, and express more severe judgments about transgressions, 
in the Audience condition. 
2.5.3. Affective states involved in punishment 
3PP is typically associated with negative emotions such as moral outrage and anger in 
response to transgressions. However, although the experience of negative emotions appears 
to motivate 3PP decisions in adults (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Gummerum, Van Dillen, 
Van Dijk, & López-Pérez, 2016; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011), evidence 
suggests this is not the case in children or adolescents (Gummerum, López‐Pérez, Van Dijk, 
& Van Dillen, 2019). Whereas these studies have investigated the emotional antecedents to 
3PP, the understanding of the emotional consequences of carrying out an act of 3PP is still 
incomplete. To my knowledge there are no studies of young children on this topic, and the 
only experimental evidence of affective correlates with 3PP in the adult literature has 
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produced rather mixed results. Punishers are often conflicted with complex emotions that 
may also vary in quality and intensity across time. 
Neuroscientific studies employing dictator game and fMRI methodology have 
suggested that enacting 3PP is intrinsically rewarding for adult punishers. For example, after 
a dictator proposed an unfair offer, both second- and third-party punishers of the dictator 
showed stronger activation in the striatum (a brain area implicated in reward) in comparison 
to people who decided not to punish, although such activation was stronger in second-party 
punishers than in third-party punishers (Strobel et al., 2011).  
Findings regarding punishers’ reported satisfaction from psychological experiments 
are not straightforwardly reconcilable with this, however. Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert 
(2008) carried out a public goods game where a pool of participants were informed they had 
all been victims of the uncooperative behaviour of a single free rider (2PP and 3PP were 
confounded). Punishing did have an effect on people’s feelings, but in the opposite direction 
to expected: punishers felt worse than people who had not been given a possibility to punish. 
Those who simply forecasted how punishment would feel if they did punish anticipated 
feeling better than punishers actually did. Finally, 10 minutes after the game, punishers 
reported ruminating about the free rider significantly more than non-punishers.  
Following Carlsmith et al.’s (2008) findings that revenge is not as “sweet” as 
commonly believed, experimental efforts focused on the conditions in which 2PP could be 
satisfying. In an experiment analysing avengers’ satisfaction in relation to the reaction of the 
punished wrongdoer, it was found that avengers seeing a wrongdoer suffer had comparable 
satisfaction levels to those who decided not punish the wrongdoer. Further, punishers who 
saw the wrongdoer evidence contrition in response to punishment experienced an increase in 
satisfaction (Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011). 
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Another line of research has examined the relative contribution of retribution and 
deterrence motivations in 2PP and 3PP. It has been theorised that deterrence-motivated 
people employ punishment to teach a lesson to wrongdoers in order to deter future norm 
violations (forward-looking motivation), whereas retribution-motivated people use 
punishment because they derive, or at least expect to derive, satisfaction from inflicting 
damage to wrongdoers (backward-looking motivation). To provide experimental support for 
these conceptualisations, Crockett, Özdemir and Fehr (2014) allowed participants to pay an 
economic cost to sanction wrongdoers in two conditions: an open punishment condition in 
which wrongdoers learned that they had been punished for their transgression, argued to elicit 
deterrence motivations; and a hidden punishment condition in which the wrongdoer was 
made to believe their resource loss was due to chance rather than punishment, argued to elicit 
retribution motivations. It turned out that participants in the hidden punishment condition 
sanctioned the wrongdoer almost as frequently as in the open punishment condition, both in 
2PP and 3PP contexts. This showed that people experience satisfaction from enacting costly 
punishment even when there is no possibility that by punishing they could teach somebody a 
lesson. When asked to report their motivations to punish, people’s explanations did not 
correspond with their behaviour as their endorsement of deterrence motivations far exceeded 
that of retribution motivations (Carlsmith et al., 2002). 
Drawing on the experimental designs employed by Carlsmith et al. (2008), Gollwitzer 
et al. (2011) and Funk et al. (2014), I compared reported enjoyment levels when children 
were informed that they were really punishing transgressors (real punishment condition) or 
that they were simply sending a warning (warning condition) or that they were pretending to 
punish (pretend condition). Although the adult literature about punishment-related affective 
states is equivocal, I predicted that children would enjoy enacting punishment, as 
vengeance-driven retribution (Crockett et al., 2014) seems a more plausible motivation for 
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their punishment, given that deterrence is a more cognitively demanding forward-looking 
motivation, and in adolescents 3PP has in fact been linked to positive affect (Hao, Yang, & 
Wang, 2016). Specifically, I hypothesised that children who believed they allocated actual 
punishment would report higher enjoyment than children who believed they were just 
pretending to punish. Intermediate levels of enjoyment were instead predicted for children 
who believed they sent warning messages to misbehaving players. 
2.6. Method 
2.6.1. Sample 
Participants were 80 primary school-aged children (mean age: 7.91 ± 1.62 years; age 
range: from 5.27 years to 11.56 years; 23 females and 57 males); one additional child was 
tested but had to be excluded for unwillingness to continue. Children were tested in a diverse 
range of settings (two primary schools, three science fairs and at lab visits), but the whole 
testing phase took place in the same city as in Experiment 1, from December 2017 to April 
2018. The stopping rule was to collect as much data as possible by a given end date. 
Forty-three out of 80 caregivers (18 fathers; 20 mothers; 5 grandmothers) partially or 
fully completed a socio-demographic questionnaire, indicating that Experiment 2’s sample 
came mostly from a middle-class background (the median yearly family income was 
£70,000; 3 out of 43 respondents preferred not to declare) with a high education level (84% 
of the respondents had at least a Bachelor’s degree), and was predominantly British 
(caregivers’ nationality: 38 British, 5 non-British).  
2.6.2. Design 
I adopted a 2x2x3 mixed design in which the factors were: Type of moral 
transgression (2 within-subject levels: fairness transgression; loyalty transgression); 
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Audience (2 within-subject levels: present; absent); Punishment opportunity (3 
between-subject levels: real; warning; pretend). 
I ran one trial in each of the within-subject factor combinations, for a total of four test 
trials. Counterbalancing was as for Experiment 1, but with audience presence or absence 
manipulated in place of descriptive-norm violation presence or absence (see Appendix A – 
Table α2). 
The dependent variables measured were: type of punishment (gem fine or a ban as in 
Experiment 1, except the opportunity to choose no punishment was now also present); 
severity of punishment (6 ordinal levels as in Experiment 1); affective state in enacting 
punishment (11 ordinal levels from -5, “very bad”, to +5, “very good”); judgement of 
transgression severity (using the same 11-point scale, differing from Experiment 1 in order to 
use only one valence scale in this experiment and thus avoid confusion for the children). 
2.6.3. Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 2 closely resembled that of Experiment 1, thus this 
section describes only differences. There was no shield-choice stage and all players were 
automatically assigned blue shields. Game bouts still contained a gem collection stage and a 
resource division stage, but rather than a gem division stage after the gem collection stage, 
there was a bomb division stage before the gem collection stage. During the collection stage, 
two types of gems could appear: normal sized-gems (like in Experiment 1) and mega-gems 
each containing 8 normal sized-gems. The collection of the mega-gem was a cooperative task 
inspired by the string-pulling task (see for example Marshall-Pescini, Basin, & Range, 2018). 
For the mega-gem to be collected, both players had to attach to it. If instead only one player 
attached to the mega-gem, they would remain trapped, unable to protect themselves from 
enemies’ attacks. During playing familiarisation, a loyalty norm was illustrated when the 
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experimenter, once the child had attached to the mega-gem, cooperated with them by 
attaching to it too (during the third and fourth bout). There were no mega-attacks. 
 
 (A)            (B) 
  
Figure 3. Experiment 2 game bouts stages with differences to Experiment 1. (A) 
Gem-collection stage: player Badger is stuck on the Mega-gem and taking damage from 
enemies, as disloyal player Beaver refuses to release them by also attaching to the Mega-gem 
to collect the gems, and the thumbnailed live-streamer observes and commentates. (B) 
Referee stage: the participant is about to assign a 20 minute ban to player Lion, in the No 




In the four test trials the live-stream commentator was now also visible as a 
thumbnail on the screen, to emphasise that the game was observed (Figure 3A). Loyalty 
violations happened when one of the players refused to cooperate with the team-mate in the 
mega-gem collection, thus leaving the team-mate trapped on the mega-gem, incapable of 
defending themselves from enemies’ attacks (see Figure 3A). Fairness violations happened 
when one of the players took for themselves more bombs than an equal share (8/10 or 9/10 in 
the two trials).  
According to the punishment-opportunity condition children were assigned to, the 
purpose of the refereeing activity was framed differently in the punishment stage. Children 
were told they could: enact real punishment against the wrongdoers; or warn wrongdoers 
about possible future punishment; or just pretend to allocate punishment (see script in 
Appendix A – section α3.5 for further details about the framing). 
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Regarding the audience manipulation in the test trials, a range of different cues of 
observation were included. In the Audience conditions the frame outside the game arena was 
full of player avatars, with animations indicating attention paid to what was happening in the 
arena, including the refereeing. Moreover, the stage in which the child could judge and 
punish the transgressors was introduced by the live-streamer with comments such as: “Let’s 
watch the referee making their decision” or “Let’s see what the referee thinks”. Notably, the 
live-streamer remained in sight during the whole judgement/punishment phase, with the gaze 
directed at the refereeing child. Also, the experimenter appeared concentrated on the child’s 
decisions. Instead, in the No Audience conditions the frame around the arena was empty (i.e., 
no avatars formed a public) and the live-streamer, once finished commenting on the 
transgressions, disappeared from the screen either because of a fake internet connection 
problem or by pretending to move away from his computer after being called by someone, 
and thus could not have observed the punishment choices (Figure 3B). In order to further 
minimise observability cues, also the experimenter looked away from the screen, pretending 
to write something on a piece of paper.  
At the end of the experiment, each child was questioned about the affective states 
they experienced while playing (“How has it been playing the game with me?”) and 
punishing (“So when you chose time-out or losing gems, how did it make you feel?”) by 
making reference to the 11-point smiley face scale, the same that participants had to use to 
evaluate players’ transgression severity. As well as the same believability check question as 
previously put in Experiment 1, I also verified whether children remembered the 
punishment-opportunity condition they had been assigned to (real punishment; warning about 





2.7. Results & Discussion 
2.7.1. Preliminary analyses 
2.7.1.1. Believability of the game  
Possibly because an apparently real live-streamer was now present on screen, 
commenting the players’ actions, believability apparently increased: all but one of the 80 
children expressed clear beliefs, with 53 out of the 79 children (67%) believing they had 
refereed actual internet players during the test trials. As in Experiment 1, there was no effect 
of believability on the key variables (see Appendix A – section α5 for supplementary 
statistical analyses of Experiment 2), therefore for the statistical analyses data is included 
regardless of believability. 
2.7.1.2. Punishment opportunity manipulation check 
The percentage of participants that correctly remembered the outcome of their 
punishment-related choices on the transgressors was 67% among children informed they 
were really punishing, 89% among children informed they were warning players about future 
punishment, and 81% among those informed they were pretending to punish.  
2.7.1.3. Punishment rate 
When actual transgressions were shown, in 304 out of 320 test trials (95%) children 
correctly identified the violators. Of these 304 trials, children chose not to punish in only 27 
cases, therefore the punishment rate in Experiment 2 remained high (87%). Misidentifications 
of non-violators as violators were made by 2 children in the refereeing familiarisation (in one 
trial each) and 3 children in the test trials (in one trial each). These trials were not considered 




2.7.2. Main analyses 
2.7.2.1. Audience effects 
Judgements of transgression severity in the Audience condition (M = -3.23; SD = 
1.17) were significantly harsher than those expressed in the No Audience condition (M = 
-3.00; SD = 1.14), t(78) = -2.25, p = .027, d = -0.25, 95% CI for d [-0.47, -0.03]. This result is 
thus in accordance with Bourrat et al.’s (2011) study, which had found significant differences 
between adults exposed to eye images and controls in the degree of severity of their 
judgements towards moral transgression vignettes.  
However, children’s punishment severity in the Audience condition (M = 4.49; SD = 
1.20) was not significantly higher than in the No Audience condition (M = 4.36; SD = 1.33), 
t(74) = 1.10, p = .274, d = 0.13, 95% CI for d [-0.09, 0.35]. This null result is in contrast with 
findings of Kurzban et al. (2007) and Piazza and Bering (2008), who observed an increase in 
moralistic punishment when adult participants thought their reputation was at stake. It is 
plausible that Experiment 2’s audience manipulation, whilst including cues of observability 
from three different sources – the live-streamer, the audience of avatars and the experimenter 
– was insufficient to elicit children’s reputation management because they nevertheless felt 
anonymous. Two of three manipulation cues were internet-based, implying participants may 
not have felt personally identifiable as making moral choices.  
No manipulation check after the test trials was included because it would have 
interfered with believability. Nonetheless, I am confident that children registered at least one 
cue: the live-streamer’s presence (and disappearance in the No Audience condition for the 
punishment stage) were highly salient. I therefore doubt that the absence of a detected 
audience effect was due to total failure of the manipulation. I consider it more likely that a 
virtual environment in which children’s anonymity is protected has the potential to nullify the 
effectiveness of an audience in modifying children’s 3PP and moral judgements. It is open to 
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future investigations whether an audience manipulation making children feel not only 
observed but also personally accountable would affect their severity in punishing and/or their 
judgements of transgression severity. 
2.7.2.2. Affective states 
On average children did not much enjoy making punishment-related decisions: across 
conditions M = 0.13, SD = 2.51, which is not significantly different from 0, t(75) = 0.46, p = 
.648, d = 0.05, 95% CI for d [-0.17, 0.27] (Figure 4). There was an association between 
punishment condition (real; warning; pretend) and whether the participants enjoyed 
punishment (enjoyment score > 0) or not (enjoyment score ≤ 0), χ2 (2, N = 76) = 7.32, p = 
.026. Specifically, the percentage of participants that reported no enjoyment was 85% among 
children who believed they were really punishing, 58% among children who believed they 
were warning players about future punishment, and 50% among those who believed they 
were pretending to punish. Post-hoc paired comparisons (Fisher’s exact tests) revealed that 
only the difference between real punishment and pretend punishment was significant (p = 
.044). Warning about future punishment produced a level of enjoyment intermediate between 
real punishment and pretend punishment, though not significantly different to either 
(warning-real punishment, p = .097; warning-pretend punishment, p = .777). The lack of 
enjoyment is unlikely to be related to idiosyncratic properties of the enjoyment scale: 95% of 




Figure 4. Experiment 2 punishment enjoyment by punishment opportunity condition: 
real; warning; pretend. Violin plots wrapping boxplots; boxplots showing median and 
interquartile range, outliers, and a large dot for mean value. 
 
This result accords with Carlsmith et al.’s (2008) finding that punishing potentially 
has a negative impact on affective states, extending this result from adults to children: in their 
experiment punishers experienced more negative affective states than non-punishers. This 
result was particularly surprising in the light of Hao et al.’s (2016) finding that 3PP is 
associated with positive affect in adolescents. This lack of enjoyment of punishing detected in 
Experiment 2 suggests that children conceptualise punishment of wrongdoers as a moral 
duty, something that ought to be done although it is not enjoyable. Retribution is therefore 
not an adequate primary explanation for the observed punishment behaviour. In this context, 
it is difficult to distinguish between demand characteristics of the situation (referees are 
expected to punish) or deterrence motives for punishment. However, the current result 
suggests that especially in contexts where children punish without explicit demand 
characteristics (e.g., Kenward & Östh, 2015), deterrence is a more plausible motive for 
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children’s 3PP than retribution. The extent to which children’s 3PP is motivated by implicit 
demand characteristics, for example a belief that adults in general approve of punishment, is 
an open question. 
2.7.2.3. Choice of punishment types 
The analysis was the same as that in Experiment 1, with proportions of trials with the 
punishment domain fitting the transgression domain calculated. In unfairness trials values of 
1 and values of 0 were equally occurring (n = 22), indicating no tendency for the punishment 
domain to match the transgression, while in disloyalty trials the difference between the 
occurrence of values of 1 (n = 16) and values of 0 (n = 29) indicated a non-significant trend 
for economic punishment (gem fine) to be chosen for the social transgression (betrayal at the 
mega-gem), p = .072, sign test.  
Thus, while the results of Experiment 1 were predicted by both the associative and 
domain general plus equalisation models, the direction of the non-significant trend for 
gem-related disloyalty to be punished by a gem fine in Experiment 2 was predicted only by 
the associative model. The combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 render the associative 
model very plausible, according to which the preference is for punishment that is connected 
to salient but superficial features of the transgression. However, it is not possible rule out the 
domain general plus equalisation model as this is also consistent with the Experiment 1 
results and not ruled out by Experiment 2. Therefore, although the deep separation model can 
be considered discarded (because of inadequate evidence in Experiment 1 and tentative 
contrary evidence in Experiment 2), it is not possible to accurately distinguish between 
associative and equalisation explanations. Further research is needed to shed light on this 
issue. 
Finally, in order to investigate the effects of age on the tendency to make the 
punishment fit the crime, I also calculated an overall “Punishment Fits The Crime” (PFTC) 
80 
 
score, as the mean between the proportion of unfairness trials sanctioned with economic 
punishment and the proportion of disloyalty trials sanctioned with social punishment. This 
score did not change as a function of age F(1,75) = 0.00, p = .966, R2 < .001, confirming the 
result of Experiment 1.  
2.7.2.4. Severity in punishment across development 
In order to verify whether the developmental trajectory of children’s severity in 
punishment in Experiment 2 was similar to that observed in Experiment 1, I ran a multiple 
linear regression to predict this variable based on children’s age, controlling for children’s 
judgement of transgression severity. A significant regression was found, F(2,73) = 13.46, p < 
.001, R2 = .27. Again, children’s severity in punishment decreased with age in years (B = 
-0.28, p < .001), and was significantly related to judgement of transgression severity (B = 
-0.29, p = .014).  
The finding that punishment severity is negatively predicted by age was somewhat 
unexpected, considering that the majority of previous literature has focussed on children’s 
3PP rates (i.e., probability to engage vs not engage in punishment) instead of 3PP severity, 
demonstrating that they increase rather than decrease with age (Dixson & Kenward, in prep; 
Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Salali et al., 2015). It is therefore plausible that 
3PP rates and severity are governed by different cognitive underpinnings, following different 
developmental patterns. However, this remains a speculative hypothesis that will need further 
research as the present experimental paradigm had not been designed to investigate 
differences between 3PP rates and severity in detail.  
Although the replicated finding that punishment severity decreases with age had not 
been anticipated, it is consistent with research highlighting that children and adolescents are 
more severe third-party punishers than adults (Gummerum et al., 2009; Hao et al., 2016). Hao 
et al. suggest decreases in punishment severity are linked to emotional development, and in 
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line with this I suggest that the observed decrease with age of punishment severity is possibly 
correlated with some components of emotion experience. Indeed, self-reported emotion 
ratings and activity of brain regions such as amygdala, posterior cingulate and mPFC 
(measured through fMRI scanner) have both been found to be associated with the severity of 
punishment allocated to the transgressor in adults (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012). Other 
explanations for this development remain plausible and further work is necessary to 
investigate how developing affective and cognitive processes influence children’s developing 
punishment behaviour. 2. 
 
Experiments 1-2 combined 
2.8. General discussion 
My investigation has shed light on children’s 3PP by making use of an innovative 
computerised paradigm that simplified the manipulation of numerous variables. In this way, I 
tested cognitive models of punishment motivations, and examined potential mediators of 3PP 
such as descriptive-to-injunctive inferences, affective reactions, age and audience presence.  
I advanced knowledge about children’s punitive responses to moral violations in 
different moral domains in several ways. Firstly, I established that children punish loyalty 
violations similarly to fairness violations. Secondly, Experiments 1-2 provided evidence 
suggesting that there is no deep separation between different moral domains when it comes to 
the link between transgression detection and punishment motivation – there was no clear 
overall tendency to make the punishment fit the crime by matching social ostracism to loyalty 
violations and matching economic punishment to fairness violations. Thirdly, I found that 
although the basic motive to punish is therefore moral-domain-general, punishment 
behaviour can be modified by salient aspects of the transgression. Together, the results 
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provide some evidence for two different processes that may be responsible for such 
modification. That matching of the punishment to the crime was unambiguous only when the 
punishment could mitigate the crime (Experiment 1, gem fine for gem unfairness) is 
consistent with children’s well known equalisation concerns (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; 
Gummerum, López‐Pérez, et al., 2019; Jordan et al., 2014). However, this result is also 
consistent with an associative account: children simply match punishment to crime in terms 
of the objects involved. Only this account predicts the near significant (p < .1) association 
between gem-related disloyalty and gem fines in Experiment 2. I therefore suggest, given the 
plausibility of both these accounts given current and previous data, that both are likely to 
have played a role. 
Surprisingly, neither children’s judgements of transgression severity nor their 3PP 
severity were affected by deviations from group-descriptive norms, in contrast with previous 
studies that found that violators of descriptive norms are judged more severely than 
conformers by young children (Roberts, Gelman, et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2018; Roberts, 
Ho, et al., 2017). However, in these studies children were presented with extremely simple 
scenarios in which characters were defined only by their adherence to descriptive norms. I 
thus propose that descriptive-norm related effects on children’s moral behaviour, if present, 
might be weaker in more complex scenarios like the one adopted in Experiment 1, where 
descriptive information can be overridden by more salient injunctive information. 
Another variable that did not affect children’s 3PP severity was the presence of cues 
of observation. I suggest that, for a change in moral behaviour to be induced, cues of 
observation need to include the possibility that people will be held accountable for their own 
decisions. Such a possibility is absent in an anonymous experimental setting in which 
participants do not risk any obvious social cost for punitive behaviour or its absence (Raihani 
& Bshary, 2012). However, children’s judgements of transgression severity proved to be 
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more sensitive to cues of observation than punishment decisions. Indeed children expressed 
more negative judgements when being observed compared to when they were not being 
observed, mirroring the result Bourrat et al. (2011) found with adult participants. This 
evidence thus suggests that judgements of transgression severity and punishment severity 
decisions, although both involved in moral evaluation, are driven by distinct cognitive 
processes differentially affected by the very same cues of observation. It might also be that 
signalling higher moral outrage – rather than punishing transgressors more severely – is what 
confers more reputational benefits when in the presence of an observing audience. 
Regarding the effect of age on 3PP, previous literature demonstrated that the odds of 
engaging in 3PP increased between the ages of 3 and 10 (Dixson & Kenward, in prep; Jordan 
et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Salali et al., 2015). With respect to 3PP severity, 
however, Gummerum et al. (2009) and Hao et al. (2016) found that children and adolescents 
were more severe punishers than adults, consistent with the decrease in punishment severity 
between the ages of 5 and 11 I observed in Experiments 1-2. If it is indeed generally the case 
that rate of punishment increases with age, but punishment severity decreases, then it is likely 
that 3PP rates and severity follow distinct developmental trajectories with different cognitive 
underpinnings. 
I now turn to my most unexpected and informative result – the vast majority of 
children showed no enjoyment of punishment, and even warning or pretending to punish was 
not enjoyed by most.  Thus, contrary to my prediction, it is unlikely that retribution is a 
primary motivator of the observed 3PP. There are therefore two plausible explanations for the 
very high levels of punishment that were observed. Children may have been motivated by 
deterrence, or the demand characteristics of the experiment (taking the role of a referee) may 
have induced the children to think they were supposed to punish misbehaving players. In 
order words, children’s punitive responses might have been at least partially motivated by the 
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desire to conform to norms rather than to genuinely enforce moral standards of behaviour 
(Pedersen et al., 2018). A strong desire to conform would also be consistent with the 
aforementioned lack of audience effects: perceived expectations to conform to the game norm 
might have already been close to ceiling in the no Audience conditions. Further, the idea that 
children’s 3PP is not motivated by strong affective processes is consistent with findings of 
children’s increased physiological arousal in response to transgressions prior to their 
engaging in 2PP but not 3PP (Gummerum, López‐Pérez, et al., 2019). 
My research has a number of limitations that need to be acknowledged. First of all, a 
significant minority of children did not believe the moral scenarios they were refereeing had 
actually occurred. This did not affect the key variables I focused on but future work should 
aim at increasing realism of experimental settings. Believability issues, as well as the demand 
characteristics implicit in my study, may be tackled by employing non-supervised 
computerised paradigms. This would enhance the ecological validity of the methodology 
even further, as young children nowadays are increasingly accustomed to playing computer 
games by themselves. Relatedly, in order to investigate audience effects on moral judgements 
and 3PP I manipulated the levels of observation (observed vs unobserved) children were 
subjected to. It is worth specifying there was no condition where children certainly felt 
entirely unobserved, since even in the No Audience condition the experimenter was still 
present. Furthermore, rather than measuring 3PP propensity in terms of 
punishment/no-punishment binary choices, 3PP was considered on a continuum of severity. 
Therefore, distinct punishment severity scales were adopted, one for each punishment type. 
However, it is currently unknown whether children interpreted the time-out and fine severity 
scales as equivalent. However, both in Experiment 1 and 2 (where the judgement scales used 
were different), 3PP severity was predicted by judgements of transgression severity, adding 
some validity to the punishment severity scales I used. Finally, I measured emotional 
85 
 
consequences of 3PP engagement only explicitly. The employment of a wider set of measures 
(self-reported emotion ratings, skin conductance responses, facial expressions) is thus 
advisable to provide a more comprehensive picture of how children experience enacting 3PP.  
Although the literature on children’s punitive behaviour is growing (the number of 
directly relevant empirical papers has reached double digits in the last few years), there is still 
relatively little evidence speaking to children’s underlying motives for engaging in 
punishment. The finding that, at least in this context, retribution is unlikely to be an important 
motive for children’s 3PP was a surprising finding that highlights the importance of further 
investigation. Further studies clarifying the potential roles of deterrence and conformity 
motivations for children’s 3PP are now a priority. I will indeed return to this issue in Chapter 














Chapter 3: Experiment 3 
CHILDREN’S INTENT-BASED MORALITY: A NON-WEIRD PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1. Introduction  
3.1.1. General introduction 
Experiment 3 went beyond Experiments 1-2 in that it is a modified version of the 
MegaAttack game that examined the extent to which children’s moral judgements and 
decisions to enact 3PP are affected by information not only about players’ behavioural 
outcomes but also about their underlying intentions. These analyses were conducted along the 
developmental trajectory and across different moral domains. 
Additionally, I tested whether Experiment 2’s finding with regard to lack of 3PP 
enjoyment could be generalised across different countries. Thus, including children from a 
less developed, more collectivistic Hispanic country (Colombia) was expected to greatly 
enhance the external validity of my previous work. More specifically, I reasoned that 
Experiment 2’s evidence that children do not derive enjoyment from enacting 3PP with real 
(vs pretend) consequences on transgressors could be indicative of lack of a retributive 
motivation to punish. However, I could not rule out that children decided to punish under a 
retributive motivation expecting it to be satisfying, and when their expectations were not met 
they experienced low mood. In order to exclude this alternative explanation, in Experiment 3 
it was crucial to investigate the temporal changes in children’s 3PP enjoyment (in relation to 
the punishment time point). In Experiment 3 I also verified whether, provided that 3PP was 
presented as real, emphasising or not its consequences on transgressors would have an effect 
on children’s 3PP enjoyment. 
Moreover, in Experiment 2 it was found that children did not modify their punishment 
behaviour when subjected to an audience manipulation that cued observability. Therefore, in 
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Experiment 3 I adopted what I expected to be a more powerful audience manipulation – one 
that cued accountability in addition to observability. I then tested whether this could have an 
impact on children’s 3PP severity. Finally, in Experiments 1-2 3PP severity was observed 
decreasing with children’s increasing age, while controlling for judgements of transgression 
severity. Thus, a replication was attempted in Experiment 3 with the additional aim to check 
whether this developmental pattern was generalisable across different moral domains and 
cultures. 
In summary, Experiment 3 was aimed at investigating the following issues in a small 
sample of children recruited from a collectivistic and developing Hispanic country: 
developmental patterns of children’s morality across moral domains; how children’s morality 
is modulated by an audience manipulation cuing accountability; how children’s 
punishment-related affective states are affected by time and emphasis on punishment 
consequences on the transgressor; and the integration between outcome and intention 
information in children’s morality along the developmental trajectory and across moral 
domains. 
As the theory related to audience effects and punishment-related affective states has 
already been extensively covered in Chapter 2, in the next section I present only the 
theoretical background about the integration between intention and outcome information into 
children’s moral judgement and behaviour.  
3.1.2. Theoretical background 
Moral evaluations rely on two crucial factors: the outcomes deriving from an agent’s 
action and the agent’s intentions behind such action. The integration of intentions and 
outcomes into both implicit and explicit moral evaluations is one of the milestones of 
children’s development.  
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Infants, toddlers and very young children seem already impressively capable of 
integrating intentions and outcomes when implicitly evaluating moral agents, both in 
first-party evaluations (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 
2010; Marsh, Stavropoulos, Nienhuis, & Legerstee, 2010; Vaish, Hepach, & Tomasello, 
2018) and third-party evaluations (Chernyak & Sobel, 2016; Choi & Luo, 2015; Hamlin, 
2013; Lee, Yun, Kim, & Song, 2015; Vaish et al., 2010; Woo, Steckler, Le, & Hamlin, 2017). 
Specifically, by using the unwilling vs unable paradigm, it has been demonstrated that infants 
show more signs of impatience when they interact with individuals that are unwilling rather 
than unable to give them a toy (Behne et al., 2005; Marsh et al., 2010). Infants prefer to help 
willing individuals over unwilling ones, even when such willingness does not translate into a 
positive outcome (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010). In a preferential reaching task, infants 
prefer intentional over accidental helpers, and accidental over intentional harmers (Woo et 
al., 2017). However, they do not show preferential reaching when the choice is between a 
successful helper and a puppet who intended to help but failed (Hamlin, 2013). By measuring 
spontaneous looking times, it has been established that around one year of age infants expect 
an agent to preferentially avoid intentional over accidental harmers (Choi & Luo, 2015), as 
well as hinderers over agents who intended to help, irrespective of whether they fail or 
succeed in their intent (Lee et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is evidence that 3-year-old 
children are more generous when reciprocating intentional rather than unintentional 
benefactors (Vaish et al., 2018), and more likely to correct adults’ punishment decisions 
when they were imposed on puppets who committed accidental over intentional 
transgressions (Chernyak & Sobel, 2016). Additionally, children of the same age avoided 
helping adult actors who had harmful intentions, even when they did not result in harmful 
outcomes. Conversely, a selective avoidance is not detected towards actors who caused 
accidental harm (Vaish et al., 2010).  
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Whereas research employing spontaneous-response tasks has provided clear evidence 
that implicit moral evaluations are intent-based from a very early age, research adopting 
elicited-response tasks (i.e., series of questions after verbal story-telling, often accompanied 
by vignette presentation but lacking in behavioural cues of actors’ intentions) with older 
children has produced a rather different picture (for a review, see Hilton & Kuhlmeier, 2019 
and Margoni & Surian, 2016).  
When children are asked to explicitly evaluate accidental and failed intentional 
transgressions, the presence of just one negative cue – either relating to outcomes or 
intentions – is sufficient to induce them to express a negative evaluation. However, 
differently from implicit moral evaluations, explicit ones do not appear to attribute more 
weight to intentions over outcomes until later in development. At a young age, children’s 
explicit evaluations attribute equal weight to outcomes and intentions (Cushman, Sheketoff, 
Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Nobes, 
Panagiotaki, & Bartholomew, 2016), or more to outcomes over intentions (Costanzo, Coie, 
Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; Helwig, Hildebrandt, & Turiel, 1995; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 
2001; Imamoğlu, 1975; Piaget, 1932/1965; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). It is only between 
5 and 8 years of age – with the so-called “outcome-to-intent shift” – that explicit moral 
evaluations tend to become intent-based and that children’s condemnation of accidental 
transgressions begins to decrease (Cushman et al., 2013). Regarding children’s condemnation 
of failed intentional transgressions, there is both evidence that it remains steady (Cushman et 
al., 2013; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009) and also that it increases across development 
(Helwig et al., 1995). 
What appears as a U-shaped developmental trajectory (i.e., moral evaluations being 
intent-based in infancy and toddlerhood, outcome-based in early childhood, again 
intent-based in middle childhood) has been accounted for by some scholars by making 
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reference to the higher processing demands of elicited-response tasks compared to 
spontaneous-response tasks (Margoni & Surian, 2016). In elicited-response tasks, young 
children’s limitations in executive functions (Zelazo et al., 1996) and explicit theory-of-mind 
skills (Killen et al., 2011) would prevent them from sophisticated consideration of intention 
information in their explicit moral evaluations. Thus, this view posits that the 
outcome-to-intent shift is determined only by cognitive changes outside the morality realm 
(expression view/capacity model/parallel hypothesis). This model also predicts that cognitive 
development, in terms of theory-of-mind and executive functioning, equally and 
simultaneously affects different types of moral evaluation. In other words, the 
outcome-to-intention shift would have the same onset for judgements of transgression 
severity and judgements of punishment acceptability. Additionally, across development 
reliance on intention information would increase for judgements of transgression severity as 
much as for judgements of punishment acceptability (Martin, Buon, & Cushman, 2019). By 
contrast, other scholars claim that the outcome-to-intent shift in explicit moral evaluations, 
although influenced by cognitive control resources, would be mostly due to a conceptual 
reorganisation inside the morality realm (emergence view/theory model/constraint 
hypothesis) (Margoni & Surian, 2016; Martin et al., 2019). Children’s early moral concept – 
in which wrongness depends on negative outcomes – would be constrained by a 
later-developing one – in which wrongness depends on negative intentions. Different aspects 
of moral cognition would be affected differently by the development of this conceptual 
reorganisation. Specifically, the intent-based concept would nearly substitute the 
outcome-based concept in judgements of transgression severity, whereas the substitution 
would remain incomplete in judgements of punishment acceptability (Cushman et al., 2013). 
Consistent with this explanation, there is evidence that even during adulthood judgements of 
punishment acceptability tend to remain less reliant on intention information compared to 
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judgements of transgression severity (Cushman, 2008, 2013; Cushman et al., 2013). 
Additionally, Cushman and colleagues argued that the substitution of the outcome-based 
concept with the intent-based concept would begin from judgments of transgression severity, 
and only later on would impact judgements of punishment acceptability. Although no clear 
theoretical explanations have been offered for this developmental lag, there is experimental 
evidence that the outcome-to-intent shift occurs in middle childhood for judgements of 
transgression severity, and in late childhood for judgements of punishment acceptability 
(Cushman et al., 2013). Moreover, a recent study has highlighted that the outcome-to-intent 
shift in actual third-party punishment (3PP) decisions becomes apparent even later than in 
judgments of punishment acceptability – in early adulthood (Gummerum & Chu, 2014).  
3.1.3. Present study 
Almost all literature about the role of intentions and outcomes in children’s moral 
evaluations has been conducted in WEIRD (i.e., Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and 
Democratic) populations, particularly in English-speaking countries. Since studies in 
cognitive anthropology conducted on adult participants have provided evidence of 
remarkable cross-cultural variation in the weight of intentions (Barrett et al., 2016; Hamilton 
et al., 1983; McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019), it is expectable that 
WEIRD children are not necessarily representative of universal moral developmental patterns 
(Henrich et al., 2010). For this reason in my study I targeted non-WEIRD children, 
specifically urban Colombian children from low-middle socio-economic background. 
Colombia is a Western, Spanish-speaking, developing country with a very recent although 
fragile socio-political stability, following four decades of armed conflict. The ratification of 
the peace agreement between the government and revolutionary armed forces took place in 
2016, but it has recently been challenged (Casey, 2016; Daniels, 2019). 
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To carry out my study on Colombian children I developed a variation of the 
MegaAttack game that had previously been employed to test British children (see Chapter 2). 
Regarding the content of the moral scenarios, I decided to represent only events in which 
outcomes and intentions had opposite valences, namely accidental transgressions (positive 
intention, negative outcome) and failed intentional transgressions (negative intention, positive 
outcome). These cases are the most informative to study how the relative weight of intentions 
and outcome changes with age. In addition to that, the fact that each video contained only one 
negative cue, either relating to outcomes or intentions, ruled out the potential inconvenience 
that children could merely anchor their moral evaluations to the first negative cue appearing 
in the scenarios (Nelson, 1980). Finally, the accidental and failed intentional transgressions 
shown in the scenarios represented, as in the experiments on British children, either a 
violation of fairness or disloyalty, respectively an individualising and a binding moral domain 
according to Moral Foundations Theory’s definitions. On the basis of this theory, 
individualising moral domains include harm and fairness, and are defined as such because 
they are focused on the protection of individuals’ rights. Loyalty, authority and purity instead 
constitute the so-called binding moral domains because they relate to the formation and 
maintenance of cohesive social groups (Graham et al., 2009). These distinctions appeared 
particularly relevant in light of prior work on US-based adults suggesting that the role of 
intentions varies across moral domains: it has been found that intentions matter more for 
moral judgements of harm, an individualising moral domain, and less for moral judgements 
of purity, a binding moral domain (Chakroff et al., 2015; Young & Saxe, 2011; Young & 
Tsoi, 2013).  
3.1.4. Research hypotheses 
The moral evaluations I took into consideration in Experiment 3 were of two types: 
judgements of transgression severity and 3PP severity decisions.  
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First of all, I expected Colombian children to express negative judgements and 
consequently to assign some punishment to both accidental and failed intentional 
transgressions. If the aforementioned emergence view/theory model/constraint hypothesis of 
moral development (Martin et al., 2019) were to be supported, also Colombian children 
would show a developmental lag between manifesting intent-based judgements of 
transgression severity and allocating intent-based punishments. The extent of this 
developmental lag might be similar to what has been detected in WEIRD populations, where 
it is by late preschool years that children begin to integrate intention information into their 
explicit judgments of transgression severity (Cushman et al., 2013), but it is not until early 
adulthood that this occurs for punishment severity decisions (Gummerum & Chu, 2014). 
Therefore, it was expected that Colombian children in the age range of choice (5-11 years of 
age) would show evidence of the outcome-to-intention shift in their judgements of 
transgression severity but not in their punishment severity decisions. This would translate 
into children judging failed intentional transgressions more severely than accidental 
transgressions, with this gap increasing with age (Helwig et al., 1995; Nobes et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, punishment severity assigned to failed intentional and accidental 
transgressions would be of roughly equal levels (Cushman et al., 2013), and this would 
remain consistent across the set age range (Gummerum & Chu, 2014). In other words, 
intentionality of the transgressions as well as the interaction between intentionality and 
children’s age would be predictors of judgements of transgression severity but not of 
punishment severity.   
Motivated by recent findings about the different weight of intentions across moral 
domains (Chakroff et al., 2015; Young & Saxe, 2011; Young & Tsoi, 2013), I investigated 
the relationship between the domain and intentionality of transgressions by taking into 
consideration both judgements of transgression severity and punishment severity decisions. I 
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reasoned that, if the pattern of attributing more importance to the role of intentions in 
individualising over binding moral domains applies cross-culturally, Colombian children 
would assign more weight to intentions for judgements of unfairness severity compared to 
judgements of disloyalty severity. However, non-WEIRD populations tend to be more 
concerned about binding moral domains than WEIRD populations (Graham et al., 2013), 
therefore Colombian children might attach greater significance to intentions for judgements 
of disloyalty severity than for judgements of unfairness severity. I did not make any specific 
prediction regarding the effect of the interaction between domain and intentionality of 
transgressions on punishment severity. 
I also explored whether some effects found in Experiments 1-2 with UK children (see 
Chapter 2) would conceptually replicate with Colombian children while using a different set 
of moral scenarios and/or manipulations. More specifically, in Experiment 3 I aimed to 
evaluate the effects of age and audience presence on Colombian children’s judgement of 
transgression severity and punishment severity, controlling for intentionality and moral 
domain of the transgressions. I predicted that both judgement of transgression severity and 
punishment severity would decrease with increasing age as it had been observed both in 
Experiment 1 and 2 with UK children. I also explored whether the developmental patterns of 
judgement of transgression severity and punishment severity changed across moral domains, 
but I did not formulate any prediction. Moreover, by previously operationalising audience as 
the presence of cues of being observed, in Experiment 2 I found audience effects in 
judgements of transgression severity but not in punishment severity. I thus developed what I 
believed could be a stronger audience manipulation to verify whether it would exert any 
effects on punishment severity as well as judgements of transgression severity. My aim with 
the new audience manipulation was to activate in children not only concerns about being 
watched (like in Experiment 2) but also about being judged and held personally accountable 
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for their actions (Raihani & Bshary, 2012). However, I did not commit to any prediction on 
that regard as this line of research has generated highly mixed results (Bradley, Lawrence, & 
Ferguson, 2018; Dear et al., 2019; Northover et al., 2017; Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015). 
Additionally, prior research demonstrated that task framing could impact children’s 
moral evaluations (Nobes et al., 2016; Zelazo et al., 1996). However, whether this could also 
be the case for children’s punishment-related enjoyment was a completely unexplored 
question. Therefore, in Experiment 3 the framing manipulation was operationalised by 
varying the focus of the questions children were asked about their punishment-related 
enjoyment: children’s decision to act as third-party punishers was framed in such a way to 
emphasise, or not, the outcomes for the transgressors which were caused by the punishment 
that the children imposed. I predicted that inducing children to focus on the consequences of 
their punishment decisions on the transgressors would decrease their enjoyment of 
punishment due to empathic concern towards the punished transgressors. 
Furthermore, questions about children’s punishment-related enjoyment were asked at 
three time points: 1) The first time point was before children’s first punishment decision, 
namely children were required to predict how punishment would feel; 2) The second time 
point was immediately after children had punished for the first time; 3) The third and final 
time point was after children’s last punishment decision, at the end of the experiment. My 
previous results from a UK sample suggested children generally did not derive enjoyment 
from punishing when enquired about their affective states at the end of the experiment (see 
Experiment 2, Chapter 2), therefore in the current study I expected to find a similar result for 
the same time point. I additionally predicted that Colombian children’s enjoyment levels 
would vary according to the timing of the enjoyment question: the direction of this effect 
would shed further light of children’s punishment motivations. If Colombian children 
anticipate punishment to feel worse or as bad as how it actually feels at the second and third 
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time points, this would be indicative of lack of a retributive motivation to punish. Conversely, 
if Colombian children expect punishment to be satisfying, this would constitute indication of 
a retributive motivation. Depending on whether their retributive expectations are 
subsequently met or not, children’s mood would remain positive or, as it was observed by 
Carlsmith, Wilson and Gilbert (2008) in US adults, would lower at the second and third time 
points. 
3.2. Method  
3.2.1. Materials  
The MegaAttack game was run on a laptop computer which was taken to the test 
location. In the test trials, participants saw recordings of games that they were told were 
being played and commented on live by internet players. As in Experiment 2, players in 
Experiment 3 were supposed to equally distribute bombs between each other, collect normal 
sized-gems while defending themselves from enemies’ attacks, and participate in a 
cooperative task for the collection of a mega-gem. This computerised paradigm gave me the 
opportunity to present moral scenarios in such a way that children could infer characters’ 
intentions by observing their behaviour and listening to their dialogues as opposed to the 
experimenters representing their mental states. Each video presenting the moral scenarios via 
game bouts was kept short (~1 minute each) with the aim of not excessively taxing children’s 
working memory. Questions being asked to the children did not require articulated verbal 
responses. All these precautions were made to minimise the cognitive demands of my 
elicited-response task (Armsby, 1971; Farnill, 1974; Hilton & Kuhlmeier, 2018; Yuill, 1984; 






Participants were 44 primary school-aged Colombian children (mean age: 7.90 ± 1.34 
years; age range: from 5.83 years to 10.84 years; 12 females and 32 males). Children were 
tested in one primary school of the capital, from July 2018 to March 2019. The stopping rule 
was to collect as much data as possible by the end date of my gatekeeper’s working contract. 
The study was approved by Los Andes University Ethical Review Committee and later 
received Chair’s approval by Oxford Brookes University. 
All caregivers (31 biological mothers; 7 biological fathers; 3 grandmothers; 1 
adoptive father; 1 aunt; 1 stepmother) partially or fully completed a socio-demographic 
questionnaire, indicating that Experiment 3’s sample was all of Colombian nationality, of low 
socio-economic status with a low-middle education level (11% of the respondents had a 
primary school qualification; 57% a secondary school qualification; 23% a post-secondary 
school technical qualification; 9% a Bachelor’s degree).  
3.2.3. Design 
I adopted a mixed design in which the factors were: Domain of moral transgression (2 
within-subject levels: unfairness; disloyalty); Intentionality of moral transgression (2 
within-subject levels: failed intentional attempt; accident); Enjoyment question timing (3 
within-subject levels: before; during; after); Enjoyment question focus (2 between-subject 
levels: outcome of punishment; no outcome of punishment); Audience (2 between-subject 
levels: present; absent). 
Order with respect to failed intentional/accidental transgression was ABBA or BAAB, 
and with respect to disloyalty/unfairness transgression was ABAB or BABA, 
counterbalanced (see Appendix B – Table β1). Each of the four resulting test trials featured a 
different pair of player avatars (different animals inside space-ships). 
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The dependent variables measured were: Judgement of transgression severity (using 
the same 11-point scale as in Experiment 2); Severity of punishment (6 ordinal levels ranging 
from 1, “no punishment”, to 6, “1 day-ban”, as in Experiments 1-2 but with just one 
punishment type – social); Punishment-related enjoyment (as in Experiment 2 it had 11 
ordinal levels from -5, “very bad”, to +5, “very good”);  
3.2.4. Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 3 closely resembled that of Experiment 2, thus this 
section mostly highlights the differences. Playing familiarisation was identical to 
Experiment 2. Between the playing and refereeing familiarisations there was a refereeing 
introduction, differently characterised depending on whether children had been assigned to 
Audience or No Audience condition (see script in Appendix B – section β1.4). Refereeing 
familiarisation was identical to Experiment 2 for children in the No Audience condition; for 
children in the Audience condition there were some additional features (see further details 
about the audience manipulation below in this section).   
The refereeing familiarisation was followed by four test trials in which the child saw 
a combination of moral transgressions varying in terms of domain and intentionality (see 
Appendix B – Table β1). During the test trials children did not see any live-stream 
commentator, differently from Experiment 2. In place of that, children could hear purportedly 
live dialogues (actually pre-recorded) between the internet players; gender of these 
voice-overs was matched with that of the child being tested. Regarding the moral 
transgressions being shown in the videos, they could be either accidental transgressions or 
failed intentional transgressions, related either to the fairness or loyalty domain. Accidental 
transgressions were characterised by players having positive intentions (to be fair or loyal), 
followed by negative outcomes (unfair distribution of resources or failure to help in the 
mega-gem cooperative task, like in Experiment 2). Conversely, failed intentional 
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transgressions were characterised by negative intentions (to be unfair or disloyal) followed by 
positive outcomes (fair distribution of resources or participation in the mega-gem cooperative 
task). Specifically, in the case of accidental unfairness one player intended to split the bombs 
(i.e., defensive resources) equally with the team-member (5 bombs each, out of 10) but, by 
mistake, ended up with more bombs (7/10) than the equal share. In the case of failed attempt 
at unfairness, one player intended to take for themselves more bombs (7/10) than the equal 
share, but inadvertently ended up allocating equal numbers of bombs (5/10) to themselves 
and the team-member. In instances of accidental disloyalty one player intended to cooperate 
with the team-mate in the mega-gem collection but, due to a mistake, did not succeed in 
freeing the team-mate from the mega-gem (who thus remained exposed to enemies’ attacks). 
In failed attempts at disloyalty one player intended to leave the team-mate trapped in the 
mega-gem, but inadvertently set them free from the trap.  
After having seen each of the five internet scenarios (1 refereeing familiarisation + 4 
test trials), the child had to answer for each of the two players in turn: “Did this player 
behave badly?”. If a misbehaviour was identified, the child had to provide a judgement of 
transgression severity (same Likert scale as in Experiment 2) and decide the consequent 
punishment severity (same Likert scale as in Experiment 2). Differently from Experiment 2, 
in Experiment 3 children did not have to choose the type of punishment: they had at their 
disposal only social punishment in the form of a ban from the game (with the same options 
for Experiment 2’s social punishment, inclusive of “no punishment” option). 
Whereas in Experiment 2 I adopted a between-subjects manipulation to explore 
children’s punishment-related enjoyment (three punishment-opportunity conditions: real 
punishment; warning about possible future punishment; pretend punishment), in Experiment 
3 the measure of punishment-related enjoyment was conducted within-subjects. Specifically, 
here children were asked to provide their enjoyment rating at three time points (same Likert 
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scale as in Experiment 2): 1) before their first punishment decision by forecasting how 
punishment would feel (time point: before); 2) once they had punished for the first time (time 
point: during); 3) after the last punishment decision (time point: after). The focus of such 
questions about punishment-related enjoyment was varied between subjects: the framing of 
the questions highlighted, or not, the outcomes for the transgressors following children’s 
administration of punishment (outcome vs no outcome focus). For example, at the first time 
point children in the outcome focus condition were asked: “So, you might ban some players 
from the game so they can’t play for quite a while. How do you think it will feel to do that?”. 
Instead, children in the no outcome focus condition were simply asked: “So, you might punish 
some players. How do you think it will feel to do that?” (for the details of the framing 
manipulation for each time point see Appendix B – sections β1.4, β1.7, β1.8). 
Regarding the audience manipulation, the audience cues I adopted were completely 
different from Experiment 2. Indeed, the attention of the experimenter was constant across 
audience conditions; internet players’ voice-overs were always audible; the frame outside the 
game arena was always empty (no player-avatars observing); children were always 
identifiable via the nickname of their refereeing avatar, independently of audience condition. 
My aim was to make children feel they were not merely being observed, but that they were 
being judged and held accountable for their punishment decisions. To do that, in the 
refereeing introduction children being assigned to the Audience condition were told their 
refereeing performance would be rated by a referee chosen from the highest scoring referees 
in the MegaAttack game championships, who would act as their mentor. The leader-board 
with the names of the best referees was shown to the children in the Audience condition two 
times: before the refereeing familiarisation and half away through the test trials (as a 
reminder). Meanwhile, children in the No Audience condition were told no-one would 
evaluate their refereeing decisions; they did not hear any mention of the MegaAttack game 
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championships and consequently were never shown the leader-board. Afterward, once 
children in the Audience condition were allocated a specific referee-mentor at the beginning 
of the refereeing familiarisation, the experimenter drew the children’s attention towards the 
presence of the mentor’s avatar. At the end of each internet video (both in the refereeing 
familiarisation and in the test trials), the mentor’s avatar started moving and the experimenter 
reminded the child this was the signal to indicate the mentor was going to judge their 
refereeing decisions. Finally, after the end of the game (i.e., after all video trials) children in 
the Audience condition were shown the score their mentor purportedly gave to their 
refereeing performance. For ethical reasons, all the children received the same score, namely 
10 out of 10. 
At the end of the experiment, each child was asked two manipulation check 
questions. The manipulation check questions were to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
audience manipulation and the believability of the experimental setting. Specifically, children 
were questioned about whether they felt their refereeing decision were being judged (“Did 
you feel like your decisions as a referee were judged by others?”), and whether they thought 
they had actually refereed real internet players during the trials (“Do you think you really 
watched games with internet players now?”).  
3.2.5. Analysis Strategy and Statistics  
To test my research hypotheses, I adopted linear models implemented using the lme4 
package (Version 1.1-21) in the R programming environment (Version 3.5.1, R Core Team, 
2018). Depending on the type of dependent variables, I used different types of functions: 
lmer to conduct linear mixed-effects analyses on continuous variables (judgement of 
transgression severity; punishment severity; punishment-related enjoyment), and glmer to 
conduct generalised linear mixed-effects analyses on binary variables (punishment-related 
enjoyment). To note, punishment-related enjoyment was analysed in two ways: as a 
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continuous variable (with values ranging from -5 = “very bad” to +5 = “very good”) and then, 
for comparability with my previous work (Experiment 2, Chapter 2), also as a binary variable 
(values greater than 0 were recoded as “enjoyment”, while values less than or equal to 0 were 
recoded as “no enjoyment). All explanatory models included a range of independent 
variables; all but one were used as fixed factors (details in the tables presented in section 
3.3.2). Only children’s ID was used as a random factor since there were multiple data points 
per individual. The significance of fixed and random effects were obtained via ANOVA tests 
of the full model with the effect in question against the model without the effect in question.  
The statistics I utilised to calculate effect sizes is based on Nakagawa, Johnson, and 
Schielzeth’s (2017) paper. I obtained two main values for each model: R2GLMM(m), which 
measures fit of the fixed components of the model, and R2GLMM(c), which measures fit for 
fixed and random components together. Effect sizes for individual fixed factors were stated 
as ΔR2, defined as the reduction in R2GLMM(m) when that factor was removed from the model, 
but all other factors remained. 
3.3. Results  
3.3.1. Preliminary analyses 
3.3.1.1. Audience manipulation 
When children were assigned to the No Audience condition, they felt their decisions 
as referees were not being judged in 18 out of 21 cases, thus their comprehension rate was 
86%, 95% CI [64%, 97%]. When instead children were assigned to the Audience condition, 
they felt they were being judged by others only in 12 out of 22 cases, thus their 
comprehension rate was 55%, 95% CI [32%, 76%]. A Fisher’s exact test revealed that the 
comprehension rate was significantly higher in the No Audience condition than in the 
Audience condition, p = .010.  
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Because of the low comprehension rate in the Audience condition, in the models I 
developed for the Main Analyses (see Tables 2-3 and 6-7) I entered Audience perception 
rather than actual Audience condition as a modulating factor.  
3.3.1.2. Believability of the game  
A large majority of children (40 out of 44) believed they had refereed real games, thus 
the level of believability was 91%, 95% CI [77%, 97%]. There was no effect of believability 
on the key variables (see Tables 2-3 and 6-7).  
3.3.1.3. Recognition and punishment rate 
Misidentifications of non-transgressors as transgressors were made by 3 children, for 
a total of 4 trials, all in the refereeing familiarisation. Refereeing familiarisation trials were 
anyway not included in the analyses. 
Regarding the test trials, children correctly recognised the transgressors in 138 out of 
the total 176 times a moral transgression was shown, thus the recognition rate was 78%, 95% 
CI [71%, 84%]. The recognition rate was affected by both the domain (χ2 (3) = 12.15, p = 
.007, ΔR2 = .142) and intentionality of transgressions (χ2 (3) = 9.40, p = .024, ΔR2 = .125). 
Acts of disloyalty were correctly recognised as transgressions (M = 88%, SD = 33%) more 
frequently than acts of unfairness (M = 69%, SD = 46%). Failed intentional attempts were 
recognised as transgressions (M = 84%, SD = 37%) more frequently than accidents (M = 
73%, SD = 45%). 
In 129 out of the 138 times a moral transgression was correctly recognised children 






3.3.2. Main analyses  
3.3.2.1. Judgement of transgression severity in Experiment 3 
Linear mixed-effects analyses conducted using the model I developed to explain 
judgement of transgression severity (Table 2) revealed a significant interaction between 
moral domain and intentionality of the transgressions (Figure 5): whereas judgements of 
unfairness were comparable in terms of severity between accidents (M = -3.41, SD = 1.82) 
and failed intentional attempts (M = -3.45, SD = 1.62), instances of failed intentional 
disloyalty were judged more severely (M = -4.19, SD = 1.37) than those of accidental 
disloyalty (M = -3.17, SD = 1.84). Furthermore, children’s age as well as interactions 
between age and domain or between age and intentionality of the transgressions were not 
predictors of judgements of transgression severity. Finally, the perceived presence of an 
audience did not have any effect on judgement of transgression severity (audience present: M 
= -3.48, SD = 1.69; audience absent: M = -3.72, SD = 1.64). 
 
Table 2. Modulating factors of judgement of transgression severity in Experiment 3. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Age 0.72 .869 .004 
Gender 0.19 .659 .003 
Audience perception 0.09 .759 .001 
Believability 0.07 .789 .001 
Moral domain 5.81 .121 .024 
Intentionality 10.85 .013* .047 
Moral domain x Intentionality 4.18 .041* .016 
Age x Moral domain 0.38 .538 .002 
Age x Intentionality 0.17 .677 .001 







Figure 5. Judgement of transgression severity by Intentionality (accidental 
transgression vs failed intentional transgression) and Moral domain (disloyalty vs 
unfairness) in Experiment 3. 
 
3.3.2.2. Punishment severity in Experiment 3 
Linear mixed-effects analyses conducted on the model I developed to explain 
punishment severity (Table 3) did not reveal any significant interaction between moral 
domain and intentionality of the transgressions (Figure 6). Punishment severity was 
comparable between accidental (M = 3.67, SD = 1.52) and failed intentional transgressions 
(M = 4.05, SD = 1.54). However, the moral domain of the transgression was a significant 
predictor: children punished instances of disloyalty more severely (M = 4.03, SD = 1.56) than 
of unfairness (3.69, SD = 1.51). Moreover, children’s increased age significantly predicted 
decreased punishment severity, B = -0.51. Importantly, however, there was a significant 
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interaction between the moral domain of the transgression and children’s age in predicting 
children’s punishment severity. This means that punishment severity decreased with 
increasing age only in cases of unfairness (irrespective of transgressor’s intentionality), 
whereas it remained stable across ages in cases of disloyalty (again irrespective of 
intentionality) (see Figure 7). Finally, the perceived presence of an audience did not exert any 
effect on punishment severity (audience present: M = 3.63, SD = 1.57; audience absent: M = 
4.01, SD = 1.53). Judgement of transgression severity was a significant predictor of 
punishment severity: the more severely children judged the transgressions, the harsher they 
were in punishing the transgressors, B = - 0.20.    
Table 3. Modulating factors of punishment severity in Experiment 3. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Judgement of transgression severity 21.17 < .001 *** .140 
Age 13.43 .004 ** .083 
Gender 0.32 .572 .002 
Audience perception 2.37 .123 .018 
Believability 2.66 .103 .020 
Moral domain 10.03 .018 * .057 
Intentionality 3.21 .360 .017 
Moral domain x Intentionality 0.42 .516 .003 
Age x Moral domain 8.31 .004 ** .047 
Age x Intentionality 1.31 .253 .007 






Figure 6. Punishment severity by Intentionality (accidental transgression vs failed 






Figure 7. Developmental pattern of punishment severity by moral domains (disloyalty 
vs unfairness) in Experiment 3, with reference to judgement of transgression severity. 
Judgement scale ranging from -1 = “just a little bad” to -5 = “very very bad”. 
 
3.3.2.3. Comparisons with punishment severity in previous experiments 
Interestingly, it was found that Colombian children’s punishment severity was 
predicted not only by main effects of domain and age but also by an interaction between 
domain and age. This prompted my interest in re-analysing the dataset of my previous two 
experiments (similarly aged British children tested with a variation of the MegaAttack game) 
to see whether these patterns replicated or not across UK and Colombia and these results are 





3.3.2.3.1. Reanalysis of Experiment 1 with respect to predictors of 
punishment severity 
In Experiment 1, where the punishment could mitigate unfairness transgressions (i.e., 
gem fine for gem unequal distribution), linear-mixed effects analyses revealed that British 
children’s punishment severity was significantly predicted by age, moral domain and the 
interaction between age and domain, while controlling for judgements of transgression 
severity (see Table 4). Specifically, children’s age significantly predicted decreased 
punishment severity, B = -0.21. Acts of unfairness were punished more severely (M = 4.44, 
SD = 1.09) than acts of disloyalty (M = 4.23, SD = 1.23). Interestingly, British children’s 
punishment severity decreased with increasing age only in cases of disloyalty, whereas it 
remained stable across ages in cases of unfairness (see Figure 8), thus showing the opposite 
interaction to what was detected with Colombian children in Experiment 3.  
 
Table 4. Modulating factors of punishment severity in Experiment 1. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Judgement of transgression severity 20.40 < .001 *** .069 
Age 14.06 .003 ** .075 
Gender 0.37 .542 .001 
Believability 1.12 .572 .010 
Moral domain 10.38 .016 * .017 
Descriptivity 0.83 .841 .001 
Moral domain x Descriptivity 0.38 .538 .001 
Age x Moral domain 6.22 .013 * .010 
Age x Descriptivity 0.35 .555 .000 






Figure 8. Developmental pattern of punishment severity by moral domains (disloyalty 
vs unfairness) in Experiment 1, with reference to judgement of transgression severity. 
Judgement scale ranging from 0 = “not bad” to 5 = “super bad”. 
 
3.3.2.3.2. Reanalysis of Experiment 2 with respect to predictors of 
punishment severity 
Differently from Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 the punishment types children could 
allocate were not designed to reduce the inequity caused by unfairness transgressions. In this 
case, linear-mixed effects analyses revealed that British children’s punishment severity was 
significantly predicted by age, but not by domain or by the interaction between age and 
domain, again while controlling for judgements of transgression severity (see Table 5). 
Therefore, it could be concluded that punishment severity decreased with increasing age both 
in cases of unfairness and disloyalty, B = -0.24, in contrast with both Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 3. Punishment severity for acts of disloyalty (M = 4.47, SD = 1.34) was 
comparable to that for acts of unfairness (M = 4.33, SD = 1.44), see Figure 9. 
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Table 5. Modulating factors of punishment severity in Experiment 2. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Judgement of transgression severity 15.12 < .001 *** .046 
Age 20.92 < .001 *** .132 
Gender 3.68 .055 .022 
Believability 4.53 .104 .025 
Moral domain 6.25 .100 .010 
Audience 3.25 .354 .003 
Moral domain x Audience 3.02 .082 .003 
Age x Moral domain 3.27 .071 .007 
Age x Audience < .001 .988 .000 




Figure 9. Developmental pattern of punishment severity by moral domains (disloyalty 
vs unfairness) in Experiment 2, with reference to judgement of transgression severity. 







3.3.2.4. Punishment-related enjoyment in Experiment 3 
On average children did not enjoy punishing: across conditions M = -0.89, SD = 2.82, 
which was significantly more negative than 0, t(43) = -2.08, p = .043, d = -0.31, 95% CI for d 
[-0.62, -0.01].  
I first ran linear mixed-effects analyses on the model developed to explain punishment 
enjoyment as a continuous variable (Table 6). It was found that children’s punishment 
enjoyment did not depend on whether the punishment enjoyment question being asked was 
focused on punishment outcomes (M = -0.33, SD = 3.26) or not (M = -1.31, SD = 2.42). 
Likewise, the analyses also showed that the timing of the punishment enjoyment question 
(before; during; after punishment allocation) approached but did not reach significance as a 
predictor of punishment-related enjoyment (before-enjoyment: M = -1.64, SD = 3.12; 
during-enjoyment: M = -0.53, SD = 3.52; after-enjoyment: M = -0.57, SD = 3.93) (Figure 
10).  
I subsequently ran generalised linear mixed-effects analyses on the model developed 
to explain punishment enjoyment as a binary variable (Table 7). It could be confirmed that 
the focus of the enjoyment question did not exert any effect on whether children enjoyed 
punishment (enjoyment score > 0) or not (enjoyment score ≤ 0). Conversely, it was found 
that enjoyment question timing did exert a significant effect on whether children enjoyed 
punishment or not. Specifically, the percentage of participants that reported no enjoyment 
was 84% when children forecasted how punishment would feel (time point: before); 67% 
once children had punished for the first time (time point: during); 61% after the last 
punishment decision (time point: after). Post-hoc paired comparisons (Mc Nemar’s tests) 
revealed that the differences between before-enjoyment and during-enjoyment as well as 
between before-enjoyment and after-enjoyment were significant (respectively, p = .035 and p 
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= .012). Instead, the difference between during-enjoyment and after-enjoyment was not 
significant, p = .366 (Figure 10). 
 
Table 6. Modulating factors of punishment-related enjoyment as a continuous variable 
in Experiment 3. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Judgement of transgression severity (average) 0.04 .842 .001 
Age 2.22 .136 .030 
Gender 0.76 .384 .010 
Audience perception 0.02 .876 .000 
Question focus (outcome vs no outcome) 1.40 .238 .018 
Time (before; during; after) 5.58 .062 .024 
Believability 0.35 .556 .004 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p ≤ .001. 
 
 
Table 7. Modulating factors of punishment-related enjoyment as a binary variable 
(enjoyment vs no enjoyment) in Experiment 3. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Judgement of transgression severity (average) 0.76 .384 .004 
Age 7.24 .007 ** .091 
Gender 1.83 .176 .024 
Audience perception 0.04 .840 .001 
Question focus (outcome vs no outcome) 2.28 .131 .029 
Time (before; during; after) 9.58 .008 ** .086 
Believability 0.05 .830 .001 






Figure 10. Punishment-related enjoyment by time points of Experiment 3: before; 
during; after punishment allocation. Violin plots wrapping boxplots; boxplots showing 
median and interquartile range, outliers, and a large dot for mean value. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
My study has expanded the knowledge about the role of outcomes and intentions in 
children’s judgements of transgression severity, punishment severity and punishment-related 
enjoyment by testing a non-WEIRD sample, namely 5- to 11-year-old urban Colombian 
children from a low-middle socio-economic background.  
I replicated Cushman et al.’s (2013) and Gummerum and Chu’s (2014) findings by 
demonstrating that in this age range intentionality of the transgressions exerted a significant 
effect on judgements of transgression severity but not on actual decisions about punishment 
severity. On average, failed intentional transgressions were indeed judged more severely than 
accidental transgressions, whereas failed intentional transgressions were punished as severely 
as accidental transgressions. This intentionality mismatch between the two types of moral 
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evaluations indicates that even in Colombian children – as in WEIRD children – the onset of 
the outcome-to-intention shift in judgements of transgression severity occurs prior to that in 
punishment severity decisions. Specifically, signs of the former shift were detected already in 
5-year-olds, while no signs yet of the latter shift were present in 11-year-olds. The fact that 
the occurrence of the outcome-to-intent shift in Colombian children was not simultaneous 
across judgements of transgression severity and punishment severity decisions is thus in 
contrast with the expression view/capacity model/parallel hypothesis (Margoni & Surian, 
2016) but in accordance with the emergence view/theory model/constraint hypothesis (Martin 
et al., 2019). This suggests that developmental changes in children’s explicit moral 
evaluations are primarily the consequence of cognitive changes inside (i.e., conceptual 
reorganisation) rather than outside (i.e., executive functions and explicit theory-of-mind 
skills) the realm of morality.  
Interestingly, the outcome-to-intention shift in judgements of transgression severity 
was partially moral domain-dependent. Judgements of unfairness were of equal severity 
between accidental and failed intentional transgressions, while judgements of disloyalty were 
much harsher for failed intentional than accidental transgressions. This means that Colombian 
children considered  intentions more important than outcomes for judgements related to a 
binding moral domain (disloyalty) than for judgements related to an individualising moral 
domain (unfairness), thus reacting in the opposite way compared to WEIRD adults (Chakroff 
et al., 2015; Young & Saxe, 2011; Young & Tsoi, 2013). Additionally, Colombian children 
were shown to punish disloyalty more severely than unfairness transgressions; interestingly, 
punishment severity for unfairness (but not disloyalty) transgressions decreased with 
children’s increasing age. Importantly, these results were obtained while controlling for 
judgements of transgression severity (which was not influenced by age, differently from 
Experiments 1-2). Conversely, 5- to 11-year-old UK children being tested on a similar 
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paradigm reacted to the view of transgressions in quite a different way. When UK children 
could use punishment not only to make the transgressor pay for their action but also to 
equalise the unbalance between victim and transgressor, they proved to be especially 
concerned about fairness over loyalty. This is testified by the fact that punishment severity of 
unfairness was higher than that of disloyalty and remained stable across ages while 
punishment severity of disloyalty decreased (Experiment 1, Chapter 2). When, instead, UK 
children could not use punishment for equalisation purposes (thus resembling the 
experimental setting Colombian children were confronted with), their punishment severity 
was comparable across moral domains and decreased with an age-dependent pattern for 
instances of disloyalty and unfairness alike (Experiment 2, Chapter 2). My findings are thus 
in line with Moral Foundations Theory’s (Graham et al., 2013) argument that non-WEIRD 
cultures are particularly concerned about binding over individualising moral domains when 
evaluating moral behaviours, and that such selective concerns become more pronounced with 
development because of culture-directed learning processes. Whereas Moral Foundations 
Theory offers an explanation for cultural differences in the relative weight of moral domains 
per se, cultural group selection (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) can explain why intentionality is 
more important within the moral domains privileged by a specific culture. Since negative 
intentions are a stronger predictor of recidivism than accidents, it makes evolutionary sense 
that people are watchful about clues indicating someone’s intention to disregard the moral 
norms their own group cares particularly about (e.g., loyalty norms in collectivistic societies). 
However, I anticipate this general pattern to have exceptions in case of irreparable crimes, 
whose severity is already at ceiling even in the absence of recidivism (e.g., desertion, 
homicide). In those circumstances I would expect a negative relation between the importance 
of transgression domain and the importance of intentionality within it. In other words, when a 
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heinous crime is committed, people are likely to stop caring about whether such act was 
deliberate or not.  
There were some unexpected null results in Experiment 3 which merit discussion. It 
was found that, as children’s age increased, neither did judgements of accidental 
transgressions become more lenient nor did judgements of failed intentional transgressions 
become harsher. These results contrast with findings of previous studies (Cushman et al., 
2013; Helwig et al., 1995; Nobes et al., 2009) where, for judgements of transgression 
severity, the weight of intentions relative to outcomes increased with increasing age starting 
from approximately 5 years of age. I speculate that, whereas the onset of the 
outcome-to-intention shift occurs with a similar timing in WEIRD and non-WEIRD children, 
the increase in the gap between judgements of accidental and failed intentional transgressions 
might have a more culture-dependent progression: faster and continuous in WEIRD children; 
slower and in stages in non-WEIRD children. In order to explore this possibility, future 
research targeting non-WEIRD populations should test elementary school-aged children with 
a comparison group of adolescents. This would also allow the scientific community to 
understand whether the difference between judgements of disloyalty vs unfairness severity (if 
replicated) remains steady with development. Alternatively, this null result might be simply 
explained by the low processing demands of the task I used, which could have allowed even 
5-year-old children to already show a mature moral competence in weighing intentions into 
their judgements of transgression severity.  
Another variable that did not affect either children’s judgements of transgression 
severity or 3PP severity was audience, precisely the perceived presence of cues of 
accountability. This is at odds with previous findings that showed judgements of 
transgression severity being harsher in the presence of “watching eyes” (adult sample: 
Bourrat et al., 2011) or other cues of observability (children sample: Experiment 2, Chapter 
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2). An explanation for the absence of audience effects to consider is that people tend to base 
their moral judgements and punishment decisions on the heuristic that reputation is generally 
at stake, even when an audience judging their actions is factually absent (Jordan & Rand, 
2019; Tennie, 2012). This implies that even when they did not consciously perceive any 
audience holding them accountable, children in Experiment 3 might have been motivated to 
increase the harshness of their judgements and punishment decisions with the 
(non-conscious) intuition this would have conferred them potential reputational benefits. 
Importantly, I want to reiterate why in the analyses I did not use the actual presence of cues 
of accountability, but rather children’s subjective perception of such cues. Audience 
manipulation checks revealed that children who had been assigned to the Audience condition 
had a suboptimal understanding that they were being held accountable for their decisions. A 
methodological limitation potentially responsible for this shortcoming is that, in order to 
increase the believability of the MegaAttack game in the Colombian paradigm, I required 
children to assign a nickname to their own referee-avatar in such a way to resemble common 
features of PC-games children are usually familiar with. However, this made children in 
Experiment 3 always nominally identifiable and thus non-anonymous, regardless of whether 
they were actually subject to cues of accountability (Audience condition) or not (No 
Audience condition).  
Regarding children’s punishment-related enjoyment, one of the most interesting 
findings of my previous work (Experiment 2, Chapter 2) was successfully replicated in the 
Colombian sample – children’s lack of enjoyment in punishing. Moreover, whereas UK 
children’s punishment-related enjoyment (measured after punishment allocation) was on 
average neutral, Colombian children reported they generally experienced negative rather than 
neutral affective states. Such negativity was especially apparent in their ratings at the first of 
the three time points (i.e., before punishing) of Experiment 3. Indeed, Colombian children 
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made a forecasting error about their punishment-related enjoyment in the opposite direction 
to the one observed by Carlsmith et al. (2008) with US adults. Specifically, Colombian 
children anticipated punishment to feel worse (instead of better) than how it actually felt 
during and after punishment allocation. Thus, by adding this valuable cross-cultural 
dimension to my research I have strengthened my claim that retribution is unlikely to be a 
primary motive of children’s 3PP. Finally, I predicted that inducing children to focus on the 
outcomes the punishment has on the transgressor while questioning them about their 
punishment-related enjoyment would make them feel worse. In fact, it was found that 
question focus (outcome vs no outcome) was not a significant predictor of children’s 
punishment-related enjoyment. Although I did not include any manipulation check to verify 
whether the wording of the enjoyment question was effective in activating punishment 
outcome representations, I can speculate that when children are asked about the intentional 
3PP action they themselves have carried out, their affective states might be not responsive to 
variations in the outcome emphasis of such action. Sensitivity to intentions in 
punishment-related enjoyment, like in judgments of transgression severity and punishment 
severity decisions, might outweigh sensitivity to outcomes even when the behaviour being 
evaluated is one’s own rather than that of someone else.  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the sample of Colombian children that 
was recruited for this experiment was smaller in size than hoped for. Such a small sample 
size (N = 44) might have prevented the detection of effects when they were in fact present 
because of lack of statistical power. Moreover, this shortcoming might have also created 
issues of reliability for the effects that were indeed detected. Therefore, the current findings 
of Experiment 3 should be regarded as preliminary. In fact, further data collection using the 




In conclusion, the present study has replicated in a small sample of Colombian 
children of low-middle socio-economic background important findings that had been 
obtained so far only in WEIRD populations. Specifically, I confirmed children’s lack of 
enjoyment in punishing transgressors of norm violations (Experiment 2, Chapter 2), and the 
earlier onset of the outcome-to-intention shift in judgements of transgression severity 
compared to punishment severity decisions (Cushman et al., 2013; Gummerum & Chu, 
2014). Whereas these elements of children’s morality appear to be universal, others might be 
subject to a certain degree of cross-cultural variation: culture-specific sensitivity to different 
moral domains seems to affect the importance children attribute to intentions in judging 
transgression severity, as well as the amount and developmental pattern of punishment 
inflicted upon transgressors. Therefore, further studies are needed at the intersection between 
cognitive anthropology and developmental psychology in order to shed light on the 
development of intent-based morality from a cross-cultural perspective, thus expanding on 
pivotal work conducted on adults by scholars as Barrett et al. (2016), McNamara et al. 
(2019), and Hamilton et al. (1983). This would enable a more fine-grained distinction 
between universal and culture-specific developmental patterns of judgements of transgression 
severity, punishment severity decisions and punishment-related enjoyment, ultimately 









Chapter 4: Experiment 4 




4.1.1. General introduction 
Experiment 4 was built upon the results of Experiments 1-2 (Chapter 2) and planned 
to be run across three different countries (UK, Colombia and Italy), in parallel with 
Experiment 3. Differently from Experiment 3, children in Experiment 4 witnessed a wider 
range of norm transgressions (not limited to issues of unfairness and disloyalty), and had the 
possibility to restore justice by enacting not one but two types of third-party interventions: 
punishment of transgressors (i.e., third-party punishment or 3PP) and/or compensation of 
victims (i.e., third-party compensation or 3PC). This choice was motivated by the fact that, 
whereas punitive justice has received a great deal of academic attention, compensatory justice 
still lags behind (Gummerum et al., 2016). Furthermore, very little research testing 
simultaneously both types of third-party interventions has been conducted from a 
developmental perspective, and none has adopted a cross-cultural approach. For this reason, 
in the current Chapter I intended to shed light on the factors influencing on one hand 
children’s compensatory and punitive decisions, and on the other hand children’s 
punishment- and compensation-related affective states. By drawing upon the findings of 
Experiments 1-2, I narrowed down the list of candidate modulating factors of compensatory 
and punitive decisions to judgement of transgression severity, type of moral transgression and 
children’s age. Concurrently, the variables I selected as candidate modulating factors of 
children’s affective states were judgement of transgression severity, type of third-party 
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intervention, time passed since the intervention, children’s age and endorsement of 
retribution vs deterrence. With regard to 3PP specifically, I further aimed to deepen the 
understanding of the justifications and motivations (deterrence vs retribution) leading 
children to engage in such behaviour. Specifically, I evaluated whether children’s 3PP 
explicit justifications varied across age, cultural background of upbringing, or framing 
messages about the scope of 3PP children received during the experiment. I also sought to 
establish which framing message was most in line with children’s 3PP implicit motivation. 
Besides the theoretical goal of understanding children’s responses to transgressions, 
this study also piloted a new method of conducting experimental research on young children. 
The specific behaviour lab set-up I utilised for Experiment 4 was an online virtual 
environment: a Justice System based on the world of Minecraft, a globally popular 
commercial videogame. To test the validity of this method, child participants using this 
Minecraft Justice System were met either face-to-face or over the internet, through video chat 
and voice call applications. The results obtained with the two settings were then compared. 
Thus, in comparison to Experiment 3, Experiment 4 was a testing field to verify the 
comparability between children’s normative reactions across different methodological 
settings. Since many young children are now familiar with this type of online environment, I 
believed this new method could ameliorate the practicalities of collecting behavioural data in 
the field of developmental psychology by greatly expanding recruitment pools away from 
local geographic areas. 
4.1.2. Third-party interventions: Compensation and Punishment 
One line of research has put the two types of third-party interventions in direct 
comparison to establish if people tend to be compensation- or punishment-oriented. Some 
studies have provided evidence for preference for punishment (Adams & Mullen, 2015; 
Miller & McCann, 1979; van Prooijen, 2010), others for compensation (Chavez & Bicchieri, 
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2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2018; Van Doorn, 
Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, Berger, & Okimoto, 2018). These mixed results might be due to 
whether the third-party intervention options at participants’ disposal were personally costly or 
not. In the studies showing higher willingness to compensate instead of punishing, both 3PP 
and 3PC were costly to the participants. In contrast, in studies showing preference for 
punishment over compensation there were no costs associated to either type of third-party 
intervention (Van Doorn & Brouwers, 2017).  
Of the aforementioned studies, only two included children in their sample. 
Specifically, Miller and McCann (1979) found that 7- to 12-year old children recommended 
lower levels of both (non-costly) 3PP and 3PC if the transgressor had already received some 
punishment and if the transgression was accidental rather than intentional. In case of 
intentional transgressions with severe consequences for the victim in terms of harm and 
property destruction, children expressed greater willingness to see the transgressor being 
punished than the victim being compensated, irrespective of age. Will and colleagues (2013) 
analysed instead the developmental patterns of costly third-party interventions from 9 to 22 
years of age. Participants’ investments in compensating victims showed a linear increase with 
age, while investments in punishing transgressors showed a quadratic trend (decrease 
between 9 and 16 years of age; increase between 16 and 22 years of age). Besides these two 
studies, to my knowledge there is only one additional study to have investigated children’s 
relative compensatory and punitive tendencies. Riedl, Jensen, Call and Tomasello (2015) 
showed that 3-year-old children witnessing instances of theft and unfairness preferred to give 
back lost resources to the victims (i.e., restoration) over making them inaccessible to the 
transgressors (i.e., 3PP), thus demonstrating themselves to be victim-oriented.  
My proposed research intended to expand the knowledge about children’s third-party 
interventions with the specific aim of simultaneously testing various potential modulating 
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factors of children’s compensatory and punitive choices, especially judgement of 
transgression severity, moral transgression type and children’s age. I explored whether 
punishment severity, compensation level and endorsement of compensation vs punishment 
during justice administration would change as a function of how seriously children judged 
transgressions. When transgressions were deemed more severe, I expected to observe 
children increasing their levels of both compensation and punishment, but I did not have 
strong predictions about which one they would endorse when forced to choose between the 
two. Children’s decision in the forced-choice task will highlight whether they are more 
victim- or transgressor-oriented.  
I also explored whether the type of moral transgression would affect punishment 
severity, compensation level and punishment vs compensation endorsement during justice 
administration. I did not have strong predictions in relation to punishment severity and 
compensation level. Regarding instead punishment vs compensation endorsement, I predicted 
children attributing more importance to punishment in instances of harm and property 
destruction (Miller & McCann, 1979), and to compensation in instances of theft and 
unfairness/inequity (Riedl et al., 2015). In the latter case it seemed indeed plausible that 
children would endorse compensation, as there is preliminary evidence that children’s choice 
of type of third-party intervention is at least partially motivated by the desire to even out the 
resource unbalances experienced by victims (Experiments 1-2, Chapter 2).  
Finally, regarding developmental patterns, I expected to observe a decrease in 
punishment severity across the age range I chose to focus on (7-11 years), which would be in 
line with my previous findings (Experiments 1-2, Chapter 2) and with those obtained by Will 
et al. (2013). However, I did not commit to any specific prediction about the developmental 
pattern related to compensation levels since Experiment 4 was not economically incentivised 
as that of Will et al. (2013). Additionally, I tested whether children’s endorsement of 
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punishment vs compensation – both in the forced-choice tasks during and after justice 
administration – was dependent on age. Since Riedl et al. (2015) demonstrated preference for 
compensation in 3-year-olds, whereas Miller and McCann’s (1979) study showed preference 
for punishment in 7- to 12-year-olds, I hypothesised there might be a shift towards 
endorsement of punishment over compensation with increasing age. 
4.1.3. Punishment motives: Deterrence vs Retribution 
The philosophical literature about the motivational basis of 3PP can be organised 
around two main theories of justice: Deontological theory and Utilitarian/Consequentialist 
theory. The best known deontological theory is Kant’s theory of retribution (Kant, 
1790/1952), according to which punishment is a categorical imperative, whose justification is 
not rooted in attaining a future benefit but in balancing out a past injustice (backward-looking 
concern). Under this perspective the transgressor must receive their “just deserts”, that is a 
punishment proportionate to the wrong they have committed. 
In contrast, utilitarian theories starting with Bentham’s theory of deterrence 
(Bentham, 1780/1948) conceptualise punishment as a means to achieve societal benefits, i.e. 
prevention of future transgressions (forward-looking concern). Different utilitarian theories 
have proposed different ways to actualise this preventive goal: the theory of deterrence aims 
at deterring the transgressor and/or the general community from engaging in wrongdoing by a 
threat of punishment; incapacitation theory is focused on depriving the transgressor of the 
actual ability to pursue new transgressions; rehabilitation theory seeks to re-educate the 
transgressor in order to change their stance towards wrongdoings.  
Regarding psychological research into the matter, investigations making use of a 
policy-capturing approach (Cooksey, 1996) have provided insight into people’s punishment 
motivations. This technique allows assessment of which information describing 
transgressions people are more sensitive to when making their punitive decisions. In this way, 
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it has been demonstrated that the severity of participants’ punishment recommendations 
changes depending on retribution-relevant manipulations, but is unaffected by incapacitation- 
(Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000) or deterrence-relevant manipulations, despite 
participants being willing to invest resources into deterrence of transgressions (Carlsmith et 
al., 2002). Another method adopted to investigate punishment motivations is the behavioural 
process tracing task (Jacoby, Jaccard, Kuss, Troutman, & Mazursky, 1987), which aims to 
identify which information and in which order people seek when making punitive decisions. 
Before making punishment recommendations people are most likely to first seek 
retribution-relevant information as it increases their confidence in the appropriateness of their 
decisions more than incapacitation- and deterrence-relevant information (Carlsmith, 2006; 
Keller, Oswald, Stucki, & Gollwitzer, 2010). 
Of note, a remarkable discrepancy has been noticed between people’s actual punitive 
choices and their explicit justifications. Indeed, people show support for deterrence policies 
in the abstract but they reject them once seen in operation. This indicates that people fail to 
anticipate they would perceive as unfair what contradicts the retributive principle of 
proportionality between transgression and punishment (Carlsmith, 2008). In an additional 
study, after having read a hypothetical scenario involving a transgression, participants were 
asked to provide a punishment recommendation for the transgressor and justify their decision. 
During a semi-structured interview the majority of participants were shown to persist in their 
original punishment recommendation even when the interviewer pointed out that none of 
their deterrence- or incapacitation-related justifications were applicable to the specific 
scenario. These findings not only confirm that participants’ punishment decisions were 
primarily motivated by retribution, but they also suggest that heuristic processes rather than 
rational deduction may be particularly well suited to explain the retributive motive (Aharoni 
& Fridlund, 2012). 
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A more recent study conducted by Crockett, Özdemir and Fehr (2014) analysed actual 
costly punitive behaviour instead of punishment recommendations. Its experimental 
conditions were designed to rouse one of two punishment motivations, either deterrence (i.e., 
open punishment condition) or retribution (i.e., hidden punishment condition). In the open 
punishment condition transgressors were aware their resource loss was due to third-parties 
assigning them punishment, while in the hidden punishment condition they were led to 
believe their loss was due to chance rather than to a third-party’s decision. It was observed 
that third-parties in the hidden punishment condition sanctioned transgressors almost as 
frequently as in the open punishment condition. This denotes that people are willing to enact 
costly punishment even when there is no possibility the transgressors could learn from their 
mistakes and thus be prevented from misbehaving again. Finally, when asked to report their 
justifications for punishment, third-parties’ explanations did not correlate with their 
behaviour as their endorsement of deterrence motivations far exceeded that of retribution 
motivations.  
In the face of a consistent body of evidence suggesting that adults are actually 
motivated by retribution despite the utilitarian justifications they provide, it is still unclear 
whether this mismatch between explicit justifications and implicit punishment motivations is 
present also in children. The developmental literature on the topic includes interview-based 
research studies that have shown that US children’s rationalisations of punishment may 
incorporate utilitarian justifications starting from 7-8 years of age (Stern & Peterson, 1999); 
the same has been observed among older children and early adolescents in Ghana 
(Twum-Danso Imoh, 2013). The only experimental studies to date about children’s 
expectations regarding punishment functions has been conducted by Bregant, Shaw and 
Kinzler (2016) and by Yudkin, Van Bavel and Rhodes (2019). In the former study children 
were shown a scenario depicting a character stealing an important resource from another 
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character. The theft either remained unpunished or was followed by a punishment. 
Importantly, such punishment was not decided by the children themselves, therefore it was 
not classifiable as 3PP. By asking children to predict how the thief would behave in the future 
in the two cases, it was found that children as young as five already believe that the punished 
thief will be less likely to misbehave again than the unpunished thief, which is evidence of 
early deterrence reasoning. Instead, in Yudkin et al.’s (2019) study children could decide 
whether to engage in 3PP by preventing a transgressor (i.e., a harmful peer) from accessing a 
playing opportunity. Once questioned about the reasons for their punitive decisions, there 
were some mentions of the desire to see the transgressor change their behaviour and learn a 
lesson. Importantly, these punishment justifications correlated with children’s actual 
punishment rates. Therefore, it is possible that children’s 3PP behaviour is guided by 
pedagogical considerations and deterrent rather than retributive intents. 
Given the lack of research about the (implicit) motivations leading children to engage 
in 3PP, I drew upon previous framing studies conducted on adults (Feinberg & Willer, 2013, 
2015; van Prooijen, 2010) to explore whether the measures of children’s punitive tendencies 
would change depending on the type of punishment frame they had been assigned to, i.e. 
whether children’s role as third-party punishers was framed as serving a deterrent or 
retributive purpose. The work of van Prooijen (2010) suggested that adults recommend 
higher sums of money if such transaction is framed as a means to punish transgressors instead 
of compensating victims. Feinberg and Willer (2013, 2015) demonstrated that political 
messages are effective at changing people’s attitudes when they are framed in such a way to 
appeal to the targeted individuals’ moral values. By applying the same approach, I argue that 
the punishment frame most in line with children’s pre-existing punishment motivation would 
be also the most effective at increasing their punishment severity and endorsement of 
punishment over compensation. However, given the lack of prior evidence, I made no 
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prediction as to whether specifically retribution or deterrence framing would trigger higher 
punitive tendencies. I also made no prediction about the effects of framing conditions on 
compensation level. 
Moreover, in order to deepen the understanding of children’s explicit justifications of 
the use of 3PP, children were also required to endorse deterrence or retribution in a 
forced-choice task. In this way I could explore whether children’s endorsement of deterrence 
or retribution remains stable across age, culture and framing conditions. By elucidating these 
aspects I aimed to shed light on how children’s punishment justifications develop into adults’ 
more complex crime and justice attitudes. If utilitarian concepts are mere post-hoc 
rationalisations of punishment decisions actually made under the influence of a retributive 
impulse, young children would manifest greater support for retribution than for utilitarian 
ideas because of their immature inhibitory control skills and scarce socialisation to norms of 
appropriateness. If instead children conceptualise punishment as a means to prevent 
transgressions – with little or no age, frame and cross-cultural differences – utilitarian 
reasoning might have deeper roots than currently assumed (Bregant et al., 2016). 
4.1.4. Affective states induced by third-party interventions 
Although the studies mentioned in the previous section highlight when people actually 
punish (i.e., even when there are no chances to teach a lesson to transgressors), they do not 
clarify what makes punishment satisfactory for those who have enacted it. 
Neuroscientific studies have starting clarifying the affective components involved in 
punishment and compensation. The activation of the striatum, a key area in the brain’s reward 
circuitry, seems to reflect victims’ anticipated satisfaction deriving from retaliating against 
transgressors in a second-party punishment (2PP) paradigm, in which it is the victim rather 
than an unaffected observer who punishes the transgressors (De Quervain, Fischbacher, 
Treyer, & Schellhammer, 2004). Moreover, when comparing the neural correlates of punitive 
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decisions in second- and third-party punishers, both categories of people have shown 
punishment-related activation in the striatum. However, there were important 
context-dependent quantitative differences: striatal activation was stronger in second- than in 
third-party punishers (Strobel et al., 2011). Compensation too appears to be intrinsically 
rewarding. Activation of the striatum – indicative of anticipatory satisfaction – predicts 
charitable donations to victims of misfortune (Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, & Knutson, 2013; 
Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007). More recently, the neural activity involved in 3PP and 
3PC has been examined comparatively. It has been observed that whereas the striatum is 
activated in both types of third-party interventions, the specific network being activated in 
connection with the striatum differs in the two cases (Hu, Strang, & Weber, 2015). 
Psychological research about punishment-related affective states has instead produced 
somewhat mixed results. Interestingly, people confronted with a free rider in a public goods 
game (a paradigm where 2PP and 3PP are confounded) predict that taking revenge would 
make them feel better, in line with a retributive motivation to punish. However, once they 
have enacted punishment, they end up reporting lower mood than their counterparts that did 
not have the opportunity to punish. This effect is mediated by the fact that, contrary to 
participants’ expectations, punishment causes rumination instead of bringing closure 
(Carlsmith et al., 2008). Although people – erroneously – anticipate satisfaction from 
punishing free riders, this does not seem the primary driver of their punishment decisions. 
Punishment severity is indeed unaffected by mood manipulations, e.g. people punish even 
when led to believe their mood has been frozen by a bogus drug (Gollwitzer & Bushman, 
2012). Given that results suggest that revenge is not always as “sweet” as was previously 
assumed, researchers started investigating which conditions could make punishment 
satisfactory. Gollwitzer and colleagues found that people who take revenge for the wrongs 
suffered are not more satisfied than those who decide not to avenge, possibly indicating that 
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their retribution-driven hedonic expectations have been frustrated. Interestingly though, 
avengers experience higher levels of satisfaction than non-avengers upon receiving a message 
from the transgressor that acknowledges that they have understood why they have been 
punished. These results have been replicated across different operalisations of satisfaction: 
satisfaction conceptualised as goal fulfilment measured via implicit tests (Gollwitzer & 
Denzler, 2009) and satisfaction measured via questionnaire rating scales (Gollwitzer et al., 
2011). Moreover, when asked to imagine themselves as punishers, people have been shown 
to accurately forecast actual punishers’ emotional experience as they report they would feel 
more satisfied in receiving the transgressor’s acknowledgement feedback than in receiving no 
such feedback (Funk et al., 2014). By further examining which features of the transgressor’s 
feedback made the punisher’s experience satisfactory, it was found that punishers are 
particularly sensitive to cues of transgressor’s change in moral attitude or behaviour, thus 
supporting a pedagogical interpretation of punishment motivations (Funk et al., 2014). 
Therefore, this suggests that punishment is neither satisfying (De Quervain et al., 2004; Hu et 
al., 2015; Strobel et al., 2011) nor dissatisfying per se (Carlsmith et al., 2008), but that its 
satisfaction level is in fact dependent on whether the transgressor appropriately reacts to the 
punishment’s communicative intent. 
Given the gap in knowledge about children’s affective states related to third-party 
interventions, scientific efforts have now begun focussing on the study of the emotional 
antecedents (Gummerum, López-Pérez, et al., 2019) and emotional consequences of 
children’s 3PP behaviour (Chapters 2-3). I previously demonstrated that both UK children 
(Experiment 2, Chapter 2) and Colombian children (Experiment 3, Chapter 3) do not enjoy 
enacting 3PP. On average UK children reported they experienced neither negative nor 
positive affective states in punishing, while Colombian children’s punishment enjoyment was 
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generally negative instead of neutral. Thus, on the basis of my previous studies, I predicted I 
would find comparable results also in the current study.  
Additionally, I made a series of exploratory analyses to investigate the effects of a 
variety of potential modulating factors of children’s enjoyment of third-party interventions. 
More specifically, I checked whether enjoyment of punishment would change depending on 
how severely children judged moral transgressions, as well as on whether they endorsed 
retribution or deterrence as their justification for punishing transgressors. Such analyses were 
conducted from a developmental perspective in order to examine whether children of 
different ages would enjoy punishment and compensation to a different degree. No specific 
predictions were made concerning these research questions.  
I also investigated whether enjoyment would vary according to the type of third-party 
intervention children were enacting, and to the time passed since the intervention. I predicted 
that compensation would elicit more enjoyment than punishment. Furthermore, based on 
Carlsmith at al.’s (2008) findings about the negative effect of punishment-induced rumination 
on adults’ affective states, I expected that children’s 3PP-related enjoyment would be 
time-dependent. Although in Experiment 3 I did not observe any significant difference when 
comparing reports of enjoyment during and after punishment allocation, I considered the 
possibility that its small sample size might have prevented the detection of an effect when 
there was in fact one. Conversely, the higher sample size in Experiment 4 gave me enough 
statistical power to better discriminate the effect of time on 3PP-related enjoyment. 
Therefore, I predicted enjoyment would be higher immediately after children have enacted 
punishment towards the transgressors, and then it would decrease once children have had the 
time to reflect upon their past punishment choices at the end of the experiment. However, I 
did not formulate any specific prediction for how compensation-related enjoyment would 




4.2.1. Materials  
Eight short videos depicting players’ behaviours in Minecraft were recorded and 
embedded into a Qualtrics platform questionnaire to create an online Justice System. An 
offline version was also developed for the purpose of testing at science fairs where the 
internet connection was not reliable. The system was formatted to resemble an administrative 
control-panel interface rather than a questionnaire. 
The videos, varying in length from 25 to 54 seconds, represented various instances of 
moral transgressions during Minecraft play: physical harm; property destruction; 
harm-related false accusation (control); sanctity/authority transgression; theft of resources; 
property-related trivial accusation (control); disloyalty/inequity in sharing resources; 
deception/liberty violation (see Appendix C – section γ1.6 for scenario descriptions). 
4.2.2. Sample 
After exclusions participants were 123 children (mean age: 9.83 ± 1.41 years; age 
range: from 7.05 years to 11.97 years; sex ratio: 32 females and 91 males) residing in UK, 
Colombia or Italy. My choice of countries was opportunistic but informed by the 
Individualism-Collectivism dimension in the Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001) and GLOBE models 
(House et al., 2004). According to these scales, British culture can be considered 
individualistic and Colombian culture collectivistic, with Italian culture somewhere between 
these extremes. 
Exclusions from the dataset amounted to 6 children and were differently motivated: 1 
child was excluded because of an experimenter’s technical mistake; 3 children did not fall 
into the set age range (i.e., not younger than 7 or older than 11 years); 2 children had 
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difficulties in comprehending experimenter’s questions due to lack of experience with 
playing Minecraft (see script in Appendix C – section γ1).  
Participants were tested in one of two alternative settings: either face-to-face (at 
science fairs or a technology-themed summer camp) or remotely over the internet (via Skype 
or WhatsApp video or voice calls, depending on the reliability of the internet connection 
participants had access to from their homes). Data collection lasted from late June 2018 to the 
beginning of March 2019. The stopping rule was to collect as much data as possible by the 
set end date. 
The Italian sample, consisting of 33 middle-class children, was tested entirely over the 
internet (nationwide recruitment). The Colombian sample, formed by 23 upper-class children 
all recruited at the same summer camp of a large city, was tested entirely in a face-to-face 
setting. The British sample, coming from a mixed socio-demographic background, was tested 
in both settings: 35 children over the internet (nationwide recruitment) and 32 face-to-face 
(recruitment at two different science fairs in the same medium-sized English city). The 
categorisation of the children in terms of their class was not made through detailed 
socio-economic status assessment, but rather through informal communications with 
gatekeepers or general impressions about the catchment areas. 
4.2.3. Design 
I adopted a mixed design in which the between-subject factors were: Country of 
residence (UK; Colombia; Italy); Type of experimental setting (over the internet; 
face-to-face); Type of frame used to describe children’s role (retribution; deterrence; 
compensation); Gender (male; female); Age (between 7 and 11 years of age). The 
within-subject factors were: Timing of questions (during or after justice administration); Type 
of moral transgression (8 different scenarios; see Materials – section 4.2.1). Between-subject 
nuisance factors that were counterbalanced against other between-subject factors were: Order 
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of transgression appearance (4 possible orders; see Appendix C – Table γ1 for details); 
Order of questions (2 levels: compensation mentioned before punishment and deterrence 
mentioned before retribution, or compensation mentioned after punishment and deterrence 
mentioned after retribution; see Appendix C – sections γ1.8, γ1.9, γ1.10 for details). 
The dependent variables I measured during justice administration (i.e., repeatedly 
after each moral transgression) were: 
Children’s judgement of transgression severity: 6 options, ranging from -5 = “very bad” to 0 
= “neither bad nor good”.  
Levels of punishment of the transgressor: punishment was a ban from the Minecraft server 
with an 11-point ordinal scale: no ban from the server; 1 hour ban; 2 hours; 6 hours; 
12 hours; 1 day; 2 days; 4 days; 1 week; 2 weeks; 4 weeks. 
Levels of compensation of the victim: between 0 to 10 Minecraft diamonds.  
Levels of punishment-related enjoyment: 11 options where -5 was “very bad”; 0 was “neither 
bad nor good”; +5 was “very good”. 
Levels of compensation-related enjoyment: 11 options where -5 was “very bad”; 0 was 
“neither bad nor good”; +5 was “very good”. 
Type of third-party intervention endorsed: 2 options, i.e. forced-choice between 
compensation and punishment. 
Frame memorisation (intended as a manipulation check): tested with an open-ended question; 
children’s answers were coded as “punishment undetermined motivation”, 
“punishment retribution”, “punishment deterrence” or “compensation”. 
The dependent variables I measured after justice administration (i.e., after children 
have finished watching moral transgression scenarios) were: Levels of punishment-related 
enjoyment; Levels of compensation-related enjoyment; Type of third-party intervention 
endorsed (all with the same options as during justice administration); Type of punishment 
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justification endorsed (2 options, i.e. forced-choice between deterrence and retribution) and 
Believability of the game (2 options, i.e. forced-choice between yes and no). 
4.2.4. Procedure 
Parents gave consent for their children to participate after having received information 
about the experiment; an opt-out system was applied in Colombia, opt-in in Italy and the UK. 
In addition to a specific age range (7-11 years), the other requirement for participation was to 
have at least a small amount of experience with playing Minecraft in order to understand the 
dynamics between the players during the experiment. The age range in Experiment 4 was 
narrower than in Experiments 1-3 because I did not trust children younger than 7 to fully 
grasp the Minecraft setting. 
The procedure began with the researcher explaining that during the experiment they 
would not be Minecraft players themselves but rather judges helping to test a newly set up 
Justice System for a Minecraft server called Squidcraft. Participants were told that players on 
the server experiencing misbehaviours from other players could log their complaints into the 
Justice System. These complaints along with the chat logs between the players and video 
renditions of the behaviour in question (see Appendix C – section γ1.6 for details of the 
complaints and chat logs) would then be shown to a Justice System judge for action to be 
taken. In reality the complaints and chat logs had been previously written, as well as the 
videos pre-recorded. This element of deception was revealed to the children once the 
experiment was completed. Participants’ role as judges of the Minecraft justice system was to 
rate the severity of players’ moral transgressions and decide the amount of compensation to 
allocate to the complainers (i.e., victims) and punishment for the accused (i.e., transgressors). 
Children did not have to pay any economic cost to enact their third-party decisions. In order 
to avoid ceiling effects with compensation choices, the experimenter specified that server 
137 
 
diamonds were limited and discouraged the children from always giving the maximum 
number of diamonds. 
  According to the between-subject condition children were assigned to, the purpose of 
the Justice System was framed by either emphasising its retributive or deterrent or 
compensatory functions. This frame was repeated twice, paraphrased in different ways (see 
Appendix C – sections γ1.2 and γ1.4). The experimenter checked twice whether children had 
memorised the frame: before trial 1, and then again at the halfway point of the experiment, 
that is between trial 4 and 5. In both frame manipulation checks, children were asked if they 
remembered the purpose of the Justice System. The experimenter took note of whether their 
explanations contained mentions of compensation, deterrence, retribution or of a general 
punitive motivation with no specific links to retribution or deterrence. When children’s 
answers did not match the assigned frame, the experimenter repeated the frame to them. 
Recordings were blind double-coded (see Appendix C – section γ2 for double-coding 
criteria).  
After children had responded to the first frame manipulation check, the experimenter 
presented them with the first complaint of the Justice System, thus starting the justice 
administration phase of the experiment. Following the reading of the relevant chat log and the 
viewing of the video, children were asked if they believed the accused player had done what 
the complaining player said they did. In case of an affirmative answer, children were required 
to judge the accused player’s transgression by rating its severity on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from “very bad” to “neither bad nor good”. At this point, children were given the 
possibility to both punish the transgressor (with a ban from the Minecraft server) and 
compensate the victim (with server diamonds). The order of punishment and 
compensation-related questions was counterbalanced across participants. 
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Right after children decided to enact punishment and/or compensation (i.e., during 
justice administration), the experimenter asked them to use an 11-point Likert scale ranging 
from “very bad” to “very good” (whose first 6 points were identical to the scale used to rate 
judgements of transgression severity) to indicate how they felt in punishing and/or 
compensating. A substantial difference between Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 should be 
noted in this context. Whereas in Experiment 3 the enjoyment question during justice 
administration was asked only once (i.e., once children had punished for the first time), in 
Experiment 4 the same question was asked multiple times (i.e., every time children had 
punished a moral transgression). 
If children had decided to assign both punishment and compensation, they answered a 
forced-choice question about whether they considered the former or the latter more important 
in this specific case (the ordering of the forced-choice question was counterbalanced across 
participants with regard to whether punishment or compensation was mentioned first). 
The procedure from trial 1 was repeated in trials 2 to 4. At the end of trial 4 children 
were re-asked if they remembered the purpose of the Justice system. Then trials 5 to 8 
followed the same procedure as the previous ones. All participants were presented with the 
same 8 complaints but their order of appearance was counterbalanced across participants. 
When all the 8 complaints had been judged (i.e., after justice administration), 
participants had to answer the final block of questions. Children had to rate on the Likert 
scale how performing acts of punishment and compensation made them feel (it should be 
noted that both in Experiments 3 and 4 the enjoyment question after justice administration 
was asked only once); whether they attributed more importance to punishing transgressors or 
compensating victims; and whether their main reason for punishing transgressors was for 
deterrence or retribution. The internal order of these questions was counterbalanced across 
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participants. Finally the experimenter checked whether children believed they had judged 
misbehaviours that had actually happened on the Minecraft server. 
4.2.5. Analysis Strategy and Statistics  
The key dependent variables of Experiment 4 were the following: punishment 
severity (continuous); compensation level (continuous); punishment vs compensation 
endorsement during justice administration (binary) and after justice administration (binary); 
retribution vs deterrence endorsement (binary); punishment-related enjoyment (continuous); 
compensation-related enjoyment (continuous).  
To test my research hypotheses, I adopted linear models implemented using the lme4 
package (Version 1.1-21) in the R programming environment (Version 3.5.1, R Core Team, 
2018). Depending on the case, I used different types of functions: lmer to analyse 
mixed-effects models of continuous dependent variables; glmer to analyse mixed-effects 
models of binary dependent variables; and glm to analyse fixed-effects models of binary 
dependent variables.  
All models included the full range of independent variables as follows, 
distinguished into variables of theoretical interest (details in section 4.3.2) and variables of 
methodological interest (setting method; believability; gender; country of residence). 
Regarding the nuisance variables, only question order but not transgression order was 
included in the models because of stronger theoretical reasons to expect an effect (Condon & 
DeSteno, 2011). Additionally, type of moral transgressions and children’s ID were included 
as random factors in models of dependent variables measured during justice administration, 
in which there were multiple data points per individual. 
The significance of fixed and random effects were obtained via ANOVA tests 




The statistic I utilised to calculate effect sizes is based on Nakagawa et al.’s paper 
(2017). I obtained two main values for each model: R2GLMM(m), which measures fit of the 
fixed components of the model, and R2GLMM(c), which measures fit for fixed and random 
components together. Effect sizes for individual factors were stated as ΔR2. Importantly, 
when I calculated the effect size for a random/fixed factor, ΔR2 was defined as the reduction 
in R2GLMM(c)/R2GLMM(m) when that factor was removed from the model, but all other factors 
remained.  
4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Preliminary analyses on variables of methodological interest 
and nuisance variable 
4.3.1.1. Setting Method 
The experimental setting being adopted – whether the experiment was conducted 
remotely over the internet or face-to-face – did not have any effect on any of the key 
dependent variables: all ps > .1 (see Tables 8 to 14). 
4.3.1.2. Believability of the game 
In total 88% (95% CI [82%, 94%]) of children believed the events showed in the 
moral scenarios had actually happened in Minecraft. However, such belief did not exert any 
effect on the key variables: all ps > .1 (see Tables 8 to 14).  
4.3.1.3. Question order 
The order with which questions were asked during the experimental procedure had a 
significant effect on children’s punishment-related enjoyment (p = .026, see Table 13). 
Specifically, punishment-related enjoyment was higher when the question about punishment 
was asked first, before the question on compensation enjoyment (M = 2.59, SD = 1.83), than 
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when was asked second (M = 1.96, SD = 2.03). Conversely, question order did not have any 
effect on all the other key variables: all ps > .1 (see Tables 8-12 and 14).  
4.3.1.4. Gender 
Gender did not exert any effect on any of the key variables (all ps > .1, see Tables 
8-12 and 14), except for punishment-related enjoyment, p = .008 (see Table 13). Specifically, 
male children enjoyed punishing transgressors (M = 2.53, SD = 1.89) more than female 
children (M = 1.55, SD = 2.00). 
4.3.1.5. Country of residence 
Children’s country of residence was a significant predictor of endorsement of 
punishment vs compensation after justice administration (p = .050, see Table 11). In 
particular, in the UK 48% (95% CI [36%, 61%]) of children endorsed punishment over 
compensation; in Colombia 68% (95% CI [47%, 89%]) of children endorsed punishment; in 
Italy 76% (95% CI [60%, 91%]) of children endorsed punishment. Thus, when forced to 
choose between punishment and compensation, Italian children proved to be more punitive 
than British (p = .009) but not than Colombian children (p = .568); no significant differences 
were found between Colombian and British children in terms of endorsement of punishment 
(p = .099). 
Country of residence was also a significant predictor of punishment-related 
enjoyment (p = .039, see Table 13). British children enjoyed punishing (M = 1.78, SD = 
1.84) less than Italian (M = 3.11, SD = 1.79, p < .001) and Colombian children (M = 2.52, 






4.3.2. Main analyses on variables of theoretical interest 
4.3.2.1. Compensatory and Punitive tendencies 
4.3.2.1.1. Variables measured during justice administration  
Two of the eight different moral scenarios during the experiment were controls: one 
was a harm-related false accusation; the other a property-related trivial accusation. In the 
former case, none of the 120 children declared that the accused player had done something 
bad, χ2 (1) = 118.01, p < .001. In the latter case, children barely expressed negative 
judgements related to the transgression severity, M = -0.61, 95% CI [-0.84; -0.37]. For this 
reason, the two control scenarios were excluded from the statistical analyses. The six 
remaining scenarios being analysed were: physical harm; property destruction; theft of 
resources; disloyalty/inequity in sharing resources; deception/liberty violation. 
Linear mixed-effects analysis (Table 8) revealed that punishment severity did not 
change across ages and framing conditions, however judgement of transgression severity was 
a significant predictor. Thus, the more severely children judged the transgressions, the 
harsher they were in punishing the transgressors, B = -1.07. Furthermore, although 
transgression type was also a predictor of judgement of transgression severity (χ2 (1) = 30.73, 
p < .001, ΔR2 = .055), transgression type had a significant effect on punishment severity 
independently of judgement of transgression severity. From a visual representation of the 
data (Figure 11), it appears that some transgression types (harm) elicited higher 3PP severity 
and others (theft) lower 3PP severity compared to what would be expected given the 






Table 8. Factors influencing punishment severity during justice administration. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Age 2.41 .121 .013 
Gender 0.00 .966 .000 
Setting Method 0.01 .917 .000 
Frame 2.26 .324 .008 
Question Order 0.19 .662 .002 
Believability 0.01 .906 .000 
Judgement of transgression severity 249.04 < .001 *** .224 
Country of residence 2.37 .305 .005 
Transgression type 11.55 .001 *** .007 




Figure 11. Punishment severity in relation to Judgement of transgression severity across 
transgression types. 95% CIs are shown for each transgression type; the regression line is 






As for punishment severity, linear mixed-effects analyses conducted on 
compensation level (Table 9) did not show changes depending on framing conditions. 
Differently from punishment severity, children’s age but not transgression type was a 
significant predictor of compensation level. Specifically, the younger were the children 
judging the transgressions, the higher were the compensation levels they enacted towards the 
victims, B = -0.51. Finally, compensation level was significantly predicted by judgement of 
transgression severity. Thus, the more severely children judged the transgressions, the more 
they compensated the victims of such transgressions, B = -0.73.  
 
Table 9. Factors influencing compensation level during justice administration. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Age 16.44 < .001 *** .059 
Gender 0.20 .655 .000 
Setting Method 1.22 .270 .003 
Frame 1.58 .453 .007 
Question Order 0.35 .554 .000 
Believability 1.76 .185 .005 
Judgement of transgression severity 114.21 < .001 *** .114 
Country of residence 5.54 .063 .020 
Transgression type 1.79 .181 .005 
* p ≤ .05.   ** p ≤ .01.   *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Generalised linear mixed-effects analyses of children’s endorsement of punishment 
vs compensation during justice administration (Table 10) revealed that it was not affected 
by children’s age or frame, whereas judgement of transgression severity and transgression 
type proved to be significant predictors. Specifically, the more severely children judged the 
transgressions, the more likely they were to endorse punishment over compensation, B = 
-0.16. Moreover, it was found that the majority of transgression types did not elicit 
preferential endorsement either of punishment or compensation (Figure 12). The only two 
exceptions whereby punishment was clearly the favourite option were for transgressions 
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related to sanctity/authority (73% of children endorsed punishment; 95% CI [64%, 81%]) and 
liberty/deception (66% of children endorsed punishment; 95% CI [58%, 75%]). Finally, from 
a visual representation of the data, it is also possible to conclude that instances of theft not 
only elicited lower 3PP severity (as previously seen in Figure 11) but also lower endorsement 
of punishment over compensation than what would be expected from the judgement of the 
severity of such transgression (Figure 12). Further, whereas harm violations elicited higher 
3PP severity compared to the expectation deriving from the judgment of transgression 
severity (as seen in Figure 11), they did not appear to elicit higher endorsement of 
punishment over compensation (Figure 12). 
 
Table 10. Factors influencing punishment vs compensation endorsement during justice 
administration. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Age 2.68 .102 .006 
Gender 1.63 .201 .004 
Setting Method 0.35 .553 .001 
Frame 0.70 .705 .002 
Question Order 0.22 .641 .001 
Believability 0.62 .430 .001 
Judgement of transgression severity 4.50 .034 * .008 
Country of residence 1.63 .444 .005 
Transgression type 10.73 .001 ** .032 





Figure 12. Proportion of endorsement of punishment over compensation in relation to 
judgement of transgression severity across transgression types. 95% CIs are shown for 
each transgression type; the regression line is based on the proportions for each transgression 
type. 
 
4.3.2.1.2. Variables measured after justice administration 
After justice administration children’s punitive preferences became more clearly 
detectable. Indeed, 60% (95% CI [51%, 68%]) of children endorsed punishment over 
compensation in the forced-choice task. Punishment vs compensation endorsement after 
justice administration was not affected by framing condition (Table 11). Age was a 
significant predictor: the older the children, the more likely they were to endorse punishment 
over compensation, B = 0.46. The significant effect of children’s country of residence is 




Table 11. Modulating factors of punishment vs compensation endorsement after justice 
administration. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Age 7.59 .006 ** .072 
Gender 0.61 .436 .006 
Setting Method 0.60 .438 .005 
Frame 4.31 .116 .041 
Question Order 0.06 .810 .000 
Believability 2.13 .145 .021 
Country of residence 6.00 .050 * .057 
* p ≤ .05.   ** p ≤ .01.   *** p ≤ .001. 
 
4.3.2.2. Retribution vs Deterrence 
4.3.2.2.1. Frame memorisation 
In the four models analysed so far (Tables 8-11) it has been shown that framing 
condition was not a predictor of any DV (all ps > .100). Since my frame manipulation did not 
have any effect on the measures of children’s punitive and compensatory tendencies, I turned 
my attention to our two frame manipulation checks conducted before and half-way through 
the test trials. I defined “frame memorisation” as the capacity of the children to retain the 
main information provided by the experimenter during the framing explanation, namely the 
purpose of the Justice System. Testing whether children’s memorisation of the frame changed 
depending on the type of frame, it was found that the association between framing condition 
and frame memorisation was significant, both at the first (p = .033) and second manipulation 
checks (p = .041), Fisher’s exact tests.  
Post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the degree of memorisation of the 
deterrence frame was higher than that of the retribution frame, p = .034 at the first check and 
p = .040 at the second check. For the degree of memorisation of the compensation frame 
there was no significant difference from that of retribution (p = .220 at the first check and p = 
.344 at the second check) and of deterrence (p = .368 at the first check and p = .267 at the 
second check), see Figure 13. 
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Agreement between two coders on classifying children’s explanations about the 
purpose of the Justice System was investigated for the different coding categories: 
punishment undetermined motivation; punishment retribution; punishment deterrence; 
compensation (see Appendix C – section γ2 for double-coding criteria). There was only 
moderate agreement between the two coders in the classification of punishment undetermined 
motivation (Cohen’s κ = .479), punishment retribution (κ = .576), and compensation (κ = 
.500). Importantly, there was substantial agreement between the two codes in the 
classification of punishment deterrence (κ = .794). 
Figure 13. Proportion of participants memorising frame across framing conditions. 95% 
CIs are shown. 
 
4.3.2.2.2. Punishment justifications 
After justice administration 88% (95% CI [80%, 93%]) of children endorsed 
deterrence over retribution. Generalised linear models (glm function for fixed-effects models) 
revealed that deterrence vs retribution endorsement after justice administration was not 




Table 12. Modulating factors of deterrence vs retribution endorsement after justice 
administration. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Age 0.18 .668 .002 
Gender 0.03 .870 .000 
Setting Method 1.13 .287 .011 
Frame 4.81 .090 .037 
Question Order 0.01 .926 .000 
Believability 0.50 .478 .003 
Country of residence 1.97 .373 .018 
* p ≤ .05.   ** p ≤ .01.   *** p ≤ .001. 
 
 
Figure 14. Proportion of deterrence vs retribution endorsement across framing 
conditions.  
 
4.3.2.3. Enjoyment of third-party interventions  
4.3.2.3.1. Comparison between punishment- and compensation-related 
enjoyment  
In order to understand whether enacting punishment or compensation differently 
affect children’s enjoyment, I developed a model including as predictors average judgement 
of transgression severity (across trials), and deterrence vs retribution endorsement in addition 
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to the standard predictors. Average judgement of transgression severity was used as a 
measure of children’s general reactivity to moral transgressions. On the basis of the linear 
mixed-effects analyses, type of third-party intervention was a significant predictor of 
children’s enjoyment, χ2 (1) = 76.38, p < .001, ΔR2 = .093. On average, compensation elicited 
more enjoyment (M = 3.31, SD = 1.34) than punishment (M = 2.27, SD = 1.96). The effect of 
the other independent variables on children’s enjoyment is reported in the next two sections, 
broken down for each type of third-party intervention.  
4.3.2.3.2. Punishment-related enjoyment  
Please note that punishment-related enjoyment during justice administration is an 
average calculated across trials in order to be directly comparable to punishment-related 
enjoyment after justice administration (of which there was only one data point per 
individual). By performing linear mixed-effects analyses (Table 13) I concluded that, 
whereas frame, children’s age and endorsement of deterrence vs retribution did not affect 
punishment-related enjoyment, time was a significant predictor. Enjoyment deriving from 
punishment was lower when measured after justice administration (M = 2.04, SD = 2.31) 
than when measured during justice administration (M = 2.50, SD = 1.53). Another significant 
predictor of punishment-related enjoyment was average judgement of transgression severity. 
Namely, the more severely children judged transgressions in general, the more they enjoyed 
enacting punishment, B = -0.65. The significant effects of gender, question order and country 







Table 13. Modulating factors of punishment-related enjoyment. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Time (during or after justice administration) 7.19 .007 ** .015 
Age 0.06 .803 .000 
Gender 7.08 .008 ** .031 
Setting Method 0.03 .864 .000 
Frame 0.37 .832 .002 
Question Order 4.95 .026 * .021 
Believability 1.27 .260 .005 
Average judgement of transgression severity 12.17 < .001 *** .054 
Deterrence vs Retribution endorsement 0.43 .514 .002 
Country of residence    6.47 .039 * .028 
* p ≤ .05.   ** p ≤ .01.   *** p ≤ .001.    
 
4.3.2.3.3. Compensation-related enjoyment 
Please note that compensation-related enjoyment during justice administration is an 
average calculated across trials in order to be directly comparable to compensation-related 
enjoyment after justice administration (of which there was only one data point per 
individual).  Linear mixed-effects analyses of compensation-related enjoyment (Table 14) 
revealed that time was a significant predictor, meaning that compensation-related enjoyment 
was higher after justice administration (M = 3.59, SD = 1.44) than during justice 
administration. (M = 3.05, SD = 1.17). Another significant predictor was average judgement 
of transgression severity. The more severe were the judgements of transgressions, the more 
children enjoyed compensating victims, B = -0.69. Finally, framing conditions as well as 
children’s age and endorsement of deterrence vs retribution were not significant predictors of 








Table 14. Modulating factors of compensation-related enjoyment. 
Factor χ2 p ΔR2 
Time (during or after justice administration) 19.81 < .001*** .035 
Age 2.35 .125 .010 
Gender 0.15 .695 .001 
Setting Method 2.03 .154 .008 
Frame 0.98 .613 .004 
Question Order 0.01 .910 .000 
Believability 0.01 .909 .000 
Average judgement of transgression severity 28.77 < .001*** .132 
Deterrence vs Retribution endorsement 0.49 .482 .002 
Country of residence    3.96 .138 .016 
* p ≤ .05.   ** p ≤ .01.   *** p ≤ .001.    
 
4.4. Discussion 
My research pursued in parallel two main goals: one theoretical (advancing 
knowledge about children’s moral behaviour) and one methodological (validating a new 
experimental method). Concerning the former point, this research project has produced 
valuable new information about important but relatively un-investigated topics: the 
modulating factors of children’s third-party interventions, namely punishment of 
transgressors and compensation of victims; the emotional consequences of enacting 
punishment and compensation; and the motivations and justifications (deterrence vs 
retribution) behind children’s decisions to inflict punishment from a third-party perspective.  
Before moving to an in-depth discussion of our theoretical results, I will briefly dwell 
upon its methodological findings. Indeed, to my knowledge mine has been the first project in 
which developmental psychologists have met young children on the internet, by making use 
of video chat and voice call applications, to test them in an online virtual environment (i.e., a 
Justice System) positioned within their playground of choice, the world of Minecraft. The 
lack of any differences in the key variables depending on whether children were tested over 
the internet or face-to-face, together with the high believability of the experimental 
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procedure, provided evidence that this innovative computer-mediated paradigm has the 
potential to revolutionise the practicalities of collecting behavioural data in areas with reliable 
internet connections.  
Coming to the theoretical discussion, one of Experiment 4’s most interesting results 
concerns children’s explicit justifications for punishment. High levels of endorsement of 
deterrence over retribution were found, with no age, frame or cross-cultural differences, 
indicating that conceptualising punishment as a means to deter future transgressions is deeply 
rooted. Explanations linking children’s endorsement of deterrence to the development of 
inhibitory control skills, social desirability bias during the experiment, or socialisation to 
cultural norms of appropriateness seem therefore unlikely (Bregant et al., 2016). Regarding 
instead children’s implicit punishment motivations it was found that, contrary to my 
predictions, whether the punishment frame was deterrence or retribution had no effect on 
children’s severity or endorsement of punishment. The failure of our framing manipulation 
thus suggests that, on average, children do what they think is right, not merely what they are 
told should be done. Nonetheless, it cannot rule out that this null effect is due to the 
ineffectiveness of my framing manipulation: the length of the experimenter’s explanations 
about the scope of the justice system might have excessively taxed children’s working 
memory, compromising the possibility to detect behavioural differences between children 
assigned to different punishment frames. It has to be noted, however, that the studies I drawn 
upon to develop Experiment 4’s framing manipulation (Feinberg & Willer, 2013, 2015; van 
Prooijen, 2010) demonstrated a frame effect on adults’ recommendations or attitudes towards 
morally-loaded issues rather than on their actual behaviour. Interestingly though, children in 
Experiment 4 memorised the deterrence frame to a higher degree than the retribution frame, 
providing evidence that deterrist messages were more easily internalised because they were 
more aligned with children’s pre-existing punishment motivations. It has to be acknowledged 
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that the inter-coder reliability in the classification of children’s explanations about the 
purpose of the Justice System was suboptimal. However, the two coders were in agreement 
about the higher degree of memorisation of the deterrence frame compared to that of the 
retribution frame. It remains to be clarified whether the differential degree of internalisation 
between deterrence and retribution frames was due to the higher frequency at which children 
are familiarised with adults’ deterrist justifications for punishment, or whether children have 
worked out by themselves that punishment should serve a deterrent scope. 
With respect to children’s affective states related to third-party interventions, it was 
found that compensation elicited more enjoyment than punishment, as predicted. This could 
be due to a “warm glow” effect deriving from the experience of giving to people in need 
(Andreoni, 1990). Moreover, both compensation- and punishment-related enjoyment were 
time-dependent but followed different temporal patterns: compensation-related enjoyment 
increased, while punishment-related enjoyment declined over time. The decrease in 
punishment-related enjoyment is unlikely to be due to emotional memory extinction (LaBar 
& Cabeza, 2006) because the same process should have governed compensation-related 
enjoyment too, which instead showed an increase over time. Whereas the temporal pattern of 
compensation-related enjoyment might be indicative of children’s positive reappraisal of the 
impact of their action on the victims, the temporal pattern of punishment-related enjoyment is 
in accordance with Carlsmith et al.’s (2008) finding that enacting punishment causes 
rumination and thus lowering of mood. It is also possible that the decrease of 
punishment-related enjoyment over time might also indicate that children experienced a 
social desirability bias to show regret.  
To sum up, children’s higher enjoyment of compensation over punishment is not in 
line with the suggestion of a primarily retributive motivation to punish, which consists of 
meting out punishment with the expectation of deriving rewarding effects from the 
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transgressors’ suffering (Crockett et al., 2014). This conclusion is further supported by 
children’s more proficient internalisation of deterrent over retributive messages, and by their 
overwhelming endorsement of deterrence irrespective of age, frame and culture. However, an 
aspect worth highlighting is that in Experiment 4 children’s punishment-related affective 
states were positive, albeit not as positive as compensation-related affective states. This 
finding is thus in contrast with previous studies that found that children’s 3PP-related 
affective states are neutral (version of the MegaAttack paradigm in Experiment 2, Chapter 2) 
or negative (version of the MegaAttack paradigm in Experiment 3, Chapter 3). Although this 
prevents me from conclusively discarding a retributive explanation for 3PP, I argue that 
children are neither always nor primarily motivated by retribution. Indeed, the specificities of 
the different experiments might account for these contrasting results. First of all, in the 
MegaAttack paradigm the allocation of 3PP to the transgressor was more visually and 
auditorily salient for the participant than in the Minecraft paradigm, probably exerting a 
greater emotional involvement with the punished transgressor. Moreover, in MegaAttack 
experiments children did not have previous experience with the game, whereas participants in 
the Minecraft experiment were familiar with Minecraft and enjoyed playing it. Finally and 
most importantly, in the MegaAttack paradigm children could only assign punishment (i.e., 
3PP was plausibly felt as a moral obligation), while in the Minecraft paradigm they could 
both punish transgressors and compensate victims (i.e., contributing to a greater sense of 
justice being restored).  
Relatedly, it was observed that the more severe were the judgements of 
transgressions, the more children enjoyed both punishing transgressors and compensating 
victims. As stated before, this could be interpreted as enjoyment deriving from goal 
fulfilment (i.e., justice restoration) and satisfaction in a job well done. Additionally, analyses 
revealed that punishment- and compensation-related enjoyment were not affected by 
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children’s age. Conversely, it was found that punishment-related enjoyment was influenced 
by question order, children’s gender and country of residence. Specifically, when asked to 
assign compensation to victims prior to punishment to transgressors, children showed lower 
punishment-related enjoyment. This could be explained by a compassion effect that carried 
over from the victim to the punished transgressor (Condon & DeSteno, 2011). Additionally, 
female (vs male) children and British (vs Italian and Colombian) children reported lower 
punishment enjoyment, thus opening fascinating questions about the interplay between nature 
and nurture in the elicitation of moral emotions. Relatedly, previous research that measured 
3PP rates instead of 3PP severity found gender differences in punitiveness among Swedish 
children (Kenward & Östh, 2015), with girls being less punitive than boys. Therefore, it 
might be that the expectation of lack of punishment-related enjoyment is sufficient to 
decrease girls’ rates of 3PP but not necessarily their levels of 3PP severity. 
Furthermore, as expected, the seriousness of a transgression can shape children’s 
third-party interventions. Indeed, the harsher the judgements of transgression severity, the 
higher the severity of punishment and amount of compensation children assigned respectively 
to transgressors and victims. Moreover, when forced to endorse either compensation or 
punishment, children were more likely to express a punitive preference in response to 
transgressions being judged more severely. This result reveals a transgressor-centred 
approach to justice restoration, in accordance with other studies in which third-party 
interventions were not costly to the participants (Adams & Mullen, 2015; Miller & McCann, 
1979; van Prooijen, 2010), but in contrast with studies where participants’ resources were at 
stake (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 
2018; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, et al., 2018). As Van Doorn and Brouwers 
(2017) suggested, this could be due to participants acting upon intuition rather than 
deliberation when they can carry out third-party interventions at no cost to themselves. 
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Conversely, being required to invest their own resources might induce third-parties to attend 
more to the victim’s needs and to be more careful in choosing the type of intervention 
conferring them higher reputational benefits.  
Contrary to my predictions, children did not preferentially endorse punishment in 
cases of harm violation and property destruction (Miller & McCann, 1979), and 
compensation in cases of theft and unfairness/inequity (Riedl et al., 2015). Transgressions in 
sanctity/authority and liberty/deception were in fact the only contexts eliciting preferential 
endorsement of punishment. To note, among all the moral norm violations we presented, the 
scenario depicting a sanctity/authority transgression (i.e., killing a squid, usually allowed but 
not on this Minecraft server) was the one prompting the harshest judgements as well as the 
highest levels of punishment severity and endorsement of punishment. Whereas all the other 
moral norms such as killing and stealing were unconditionally obligatory independent of this 
Minecraft server, this norm was novel and unique. This is particularly telling, on one hand, of 
the malleable nature of children’s norm learning and, on the other, of the volatility of moral 
norms on the internet.  
Interestingly, while controlling for judgement of transgression severity, type of moral 
transgression did exert a significant influence on both punishment severity and punishment vs 
compensation endorsement, but not on compensation level. This suggests that, whereas 
decisions about compensation levels mostly rely on information about transgression severity, 
punishment vs compensation endorsement and punishment severity are governed by both 
information about transgression severity and transgression types. Therefore, even if the type 
of transgression does not affect the choice of the type of punishment in terms of moral 
domains (the deep separation model is rejected, Chapter 2), it does affect the severity and 
endorsement of punishment. This also means that some transgression types prompted higher 
or lower 3PP severity and endorsement compared to what would be expected on the basis of 
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the judgement of their severity. For example, harm violations evoked higher 3PP severity 
while instances of theft evoked lower 3PP severity than expected. Theft also elicited higher 
endorsement of compensation over 3PP than expected.   
In order to explain the special “status” of theft transgressions, I refer to the evidence 
that children use 3PP as an opportunity to directly right the wrong when it concerns resources 
(Experiment 1, Chapter 2). However, in the current experimental setting 3PP (i.e., giving a 
time-out from the game to the transgressor) was not suitable for equalising the resource 
unbalance between victim and transgressor after a theft, so children reacted to this scenario 
by rather using compensation (i.e., giving diamonds to the victim) to fulfil their equalisation 
purposes. Instead, the special “status” of the harm violation (i.e., cold-blooded murder of a 
person) might be explained by the fact that children used 3PP not only to make the 
transgressor pay for their action, but also to send a message of moral unacceptability for the 
action itself.  
Finally, regarding the investigation of developmental patterns, it was found that 
compensation levels but not punishment severity decreased with children’s increasing age, in 
contrast with my previous findings (Experiments 1-2, Chapter 2) and with those obtained by 
Will et al. (2013). Furthermore, as hypothesised on the basis of the studies conducted by 
Riedl et al. (2015) and Miller and McCann (1979), I observed an increase in the proportion of 
children endorsing punishment over compensation (after justice administration) with 
development. This points to the possibility that, although children are willing to punish 
transgressors from a very early age (Hamlin et al., 2011), attitudes towards this type of 
third-party intervention are further subject to learning processes. Since compensation is a 
more socially approved choice than punishment (Patil, Dhaliwal, & Cushman, 2018; Raihani 
& Bshary, 2015b), I believe it is unlikely that children learn that endorsing punishment over 
compensation is a way to gain reputational benefits. Instead, I suggest it is more plausible 
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that throughout development children come to better understand the instrumental value of 
punishment in maintaining social order and communicating messages about the acceptability 
of specific actions within society (Bregant et al., 2016; Funk et al., 2014). Thus, depending 
on contextual factors in different societies, I would expect cross-cultural variation in the need 
to uphold the social contract through punishment. Such speculation is indeed supported by 
Experiment 4’s preliminary evidence that the proportion of children endorsing punishment 
over compensation (after justice administration) varied across countries (i.e., higher in Italy 
than in the UK).  
Importantly, the samples of children I managed to recruit were not necessarily 
representative of the respective national populations and this is a limitation. Children tested 
face-to-face while attending science fairs and technology-themed summer camps came from 
households characterised by higher education and socio-economic conditions than the 
national average. In comparison, online testing was more geographically-spread out and 
potentially more able to reach children of diverse backgrounds. However, only families with 
a sufficiently good command of video chat and voice call applications could participate in the 
online experiment (on average, technological literacy was higher among British than Italian 
parents). Regarding the limitations of my experimental design, I have to acknowledge that I 
was unable to fully counterbalance the setting method across different countries. Only British 
children were tested in both settings, whereas Colombian children were tested exclusively 
face-to-face and Italian children exclusively over the internet because of logistical issues. 
Having said that, the statistical analyses I conducted always controlled for children’s country 
of residence and setting method, and my aim to test a broad range of children in terms of 
nationalities was mainly motivated by the desire to maximise the chances of detecting 
universal patterns of moral behaviour rather than cross-cultural differences. 
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Future avenues for investigating children’s third-party interventions should take 
advantage of multiple methodologies. Qualitative and possibly longitudinal studies could 
provide a more detailed insight into the development of children’s concepts about punishment 
justifications. Children might see punishment as a tool to re-establish the norms the society 
has been built around in order to maintain cooperation and smooth functioning. From 
interviews with children and their parents and teachers, it would be also possible to discern to 
what extent children’s beliefs about punishment are affected by their familiarity with deterrist 
justifications in the family and school setting. Questionnaire studies could shed light on 
personality differences in children endorsing punishment vs compensation and retribution vs 
deterrence. Areas of interest might include children’s assertiveness/dominance, need for 
order/control, and impulsiveness. Finally, experimental studies could complement the picture 
by measuring children’s affective states (in terms of activation of the brain’s reward regions, 
skin conductance, facial expressions) in three different conditions: when they are given only 
the opportunity to enact 3PP of transgressors; when they are given only the opportunity to 
compensate victims; and when they can choose to either punish or compensate. This would 
allow the scientific community to better disentangle the contribution of the different motives 
playing a role in children’s third-party interventions. Importantly, if a computer game is 
adopted for testing children’s affective states, it is advisable to develop a paradigm that 
guarantees high believability without requiring children to have previous experience with the 
game. This would avoid confounding effects between familiarity-induced enjoyment of the 
game and actual emotional experience of moral decisions. I however encourage future 
research to test the generalisability of the findings across a variety of settings, by using not 
only computer-mediated experiments but also puppet shows and experiments conducted with 
real people.  
161 
 
In conclusion, I have demonstrated that children overwhelmingly reported deterrence 
as their punishment justification, across different ages and cultures, and even when the 
system was framed as being for retribution. The deterrence frame was more efficiently 
internalised by children, probably because more in line with their pre-existing punishment 
motivations. Moreover, children derived higher enjoyment from compensating victims than 
from punishing transgressors. Additionally, whereas compensation-related enjoyment 
increased, punishment-related enjoyment decreased over time. As retribution-motivated 
people are supposed to adopt punishment because they derive or expect to derive satisfaction 
from imposing costs upon transgressors, children appeared unlikely to be motivated by 
retribution. Finally, the more severely children judged the transgressions, the more they 
endorsed punishment over compensation, revealing a transgressor-centred approach to justice 
restoration. Taken together, the findings of the current study further theoretical understanding 
about children’s third-party interventions and provide support for the use of a novel, virtual 












Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
5.1. Summary of results  
The literature in developmental psychology has shown that children intervene as 
third-party punishers on behalf of victims of harm and fairness transgressions from a young 
age and even when doing so is economically or socially costly to themselves. However, 
numerous topics related to children’s 3PP specifically, and to the interrelations between 3PP, 
victim compensation and judgement of transgression severity, remained un-investigated. Of 
these, the present PhD thesis was aimed at examining the following topics: 
 The effects of the kind of moral norm-violations on 3PP, in terms of punishment type, 
punishment severity and endorsement of punishment over compensation (Experiments 
1, 2, 4);  
 The emotional experience related to the allocation of 3PP to transgressors and 
compensation to victims (Experiments 2-4); 
 Reputational concerns by evaluating audience effects on 3PP and judgements of 
transgression severity (Experiments 2-3);  
 The effects of intention and outcome information on 3PP and judgements of 
transgression severity across moral domains (Experiment 3); 
 Deterrence vs retribution motives to engage in 3PP (Experiment 4). 
In order to research the aforementioned topics, I presented elementary school-aged 
children across different countries (UK, Colombia and Italy) and socio-economic 
backgrounds with a variety of moral transgressions, asking them to make their moral 
evaluations and decisions. The transgressions shown supposedly occurred in an online 
computer game, either novel (MegaAttack game for Experiments 1-3) or already familiar to 
the children (Minecraft for Experiment 4).  
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In Experiment 1 I measured the type of punishment (fining or banning) children 
assigned to fairness and loyalty transgressors. My aim was to verify whether children had the 
tendency to make the punishment fit the crime in terms of moral domains (Graham et al., 
2013; Graham et al., 2009). According to the deep separation model I had hypothesised, 
fairness transgressions would motivate an economic type of punishment (fine) whereas 
loyalty transgressions would motivate a social type of punishment (ban). According instead 
to the domain general model, the type of transgression would have no effect on children’s 
decision about the type of punishment to assign. It turned out that the deep separation model 
was only partially supported by evidence: children did preferentially assign fines rather than 
bans to players allocating resources unfairly, but showed no systematic punishment choice 
preference for disloyal players. Experiment 2 provided potential explanations, although still 
not conclusive, about this result pattern. Cognitive associative processes might have 
prompted children to choose a form of punishment employing an element that had a salient 
role in the transgression scenario. More probably, or in combination, resource equalisation 
concerns (Shaw & Olson, 2012) might have led children to select the type of punishment 
allowing them not only to impose a cost on the transgressor but also to equalise as much as 
possible the resource imbalance between the victim and the transgressor. On that matter, 
Experiment 4 offered a further demonstration of the importance of inequity aversion in 
motivating children’s moral behaviour. In this experiment, the only type of punishment at 
children’s disposal was banning misbehaving players from the game. However, differently 
from the other experiments, in Experiment 4 children could also compensate victims by 
giving them valuable resources. Crucially, when the wrongdoing being judged was a theft, 
the type of third-party intervention suitable for equalising the resource imbalance between 
victim and transgressor was compensation rather than 3PP. Therefore, children responded to 
the theft transgression by endorsing compensation more than 3PP, most likely because the 
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former would guarantee the fulfilment of their equalisation purposes. At the same time, the 
theft transgression prompted lower 3PP severity compared to what would be expected simply 
on the basis of the judgement of the transgression severity. Thus, even though the type of 
transgression did not fully predict the choice of punishment type in terms of moral domains 
(Experiments 1-2), it proved to be a significant predictor of the severity and endorsement of 
punishment (Experiment 4). 
Regarding the investigation of the emotional experiences associated with justice 
restoration, I measured children’s punishment-related enjoyment in isolation (Experiments 
2-3) and in comparison to compensation-related enjoyment (Experiment 4). When children 
could restore justice only by resorting to 3PP, the rates of punishment were high but children 
did not enjoy punishing transgressors. Specifically, in Experiment 2 British children’s 
emotional experience of punishing was on average neither positive nor negative. 
Additionally, the number of children reporting no punishment enjoyment was higher when 
they were told their 3PP decisions were going to be actually inflicted on transgressors, in 
comparison to when they were told their decisions were just pretend. In Experiment 3 
Colombian children’s emotional experience of punishing was negative rather than neutral. In 
particular, they anticipated punishment to feel worse than how it actually felt during and after 
punishment allocation. Thus, children’s lack of punishment enjoyment in Experiments 2-3 
was surprising in the context of the broader literature on the topic: neuroscientific studies 
have demonstrated that the experience of 3PP is linked to the activation of key areas in the 
brain’s reward circuitry in adults (Hu et al., 2015; Strobel et al., 2011), while psychological 
studies have indicated that adolescents associate 3PP with positive emotions (Hao et al., 
2016). The only studies suggesting that punishers felt worse (Carlsmith et al., 2008) or at 
least no better than non-punishers (Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; Gollwitzer 
et al., 2011) were using 2PP paradigms or variations of the public goods game, where 2PP 
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and 3PP are confounded. I speculate that 3PP decisions represent a cognitively demanding 
task for children, while for adults and gradually for adolescents 3PP choices are easily and 
intuitively made (see section 5.2 for further details). The age-dependent levels of effort 
involved in 3PP decision-making might thus be at the origin of the differential enjoyment of 
the intervention. My findings are also consistent with the fact that children are gradually 
socialised to believe that wrongdoing deserves punishment. This gradual socialisation into a 
deservingness belief might causes more enjoyment in adolescents and adults. 
Moreover, in order to deepen the knowledge about children’s emotional experience of 
third-party interventions, I compared children’s 3PP enjoyment with their compensation 
enjoyment in Experiment 4. As expected, children enjoyed compensating victims more than 
punishing transgressors, in line with the so-called “warm glow” effect (Andreoni, 1990). 
Additionally, compensation enjoyment increased while punishment enjoyment decreased 
over time. The former temporal pattern could be due to children’s positive reappraisal of the 
impact of their action on the victims; the latter pattern could be induced by rumination about 
the transgressors’ suffering following punishment or by a social desirability bias to show 
regret. Notably, in Experiment 4 children’s emotional experience of punishment was positive, 
although not as positive as that of compensation. Probably this difference in findings between 
Experiments 2-3 and Experiment 4 could be explained as follows: in the MegaAttack 
paradigm children could only assign punishment, therefore 3PP was plausibly perceived as a 
moral duty that ought to be delivered. Conversely, in the Minecraft paradigm children could 
decide to both punish and compensate, thus increasing their sense of goal fulfilment (i.e., 
justice restoration). 
With regard to children’s reputational concerns, I wanted to verify whether children 
would express more severe judgements of transgression severity and inflict more severe 3PP 
in the perceived presence of an audience. The audience was operationalised in terms of cues 
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of being observed (presence of a commentator and other players observing over the internet, 
and the attention of the experimenter) in Experiment 2, and in terms of cues of being 
scrutinised and held personally accountable (presence of an animated mentor watching and 
judging children’s refereeing decisions) in Experiment 3. It was found that in Experiment 2 
British children were more judgemental of the transgressions when being observed relative to 
when they were not being observed, mirroring Bourrat, Baumard & McKay’s (2011) finding 
obtained with adult participants. However, no audience effects were detectable in the levels 
of 3PP severity. This might suggest that signalling higher moral outrage to an audience is 
perceived to be associated with more reputational gains than signalling higher punitiveness. 
Such an explanation makes sense in light of the evidence indicating that third-party punishers 
can be perceived as aggressive and thus be feared more than liked (Eriksson, Andersson, & 
Strimling, 2016; Gordon et al., 2014; Patil et al., 2018; Raihani & Bshary, 2015a, 2015b). 
However, it has to be acknowledged that research about the effects of observability cues on 
moral behaviour has produced highly mixed results including several failed replications 
(Bradley et al., 2018; Dear et al., 2019; Kelsey et al., 2018; Northover et al., 2017; 
Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015; Raihani & Bshary, 2012). Additionally, in Experiment 3 
Colombian children showed no differences in the severity of either their judgements or 3PP 
decisions, irrespective of whether they were being held accountable for their choices or not. 
A potential explanation for the absence of effects of accountability cues is that people tend to 
base their moral judgements and punishment decisions on the heuristic that reputation is 
generally at stake, even when an audience is factually absent (Jordan & Rand, 2019; Tennie, 
2012). Consequently, even children in the No Audience condition of Experiment 3 might 
have felt motivated to increase the harshness of their judgements and punishment decisions 
with the (non-conscious) intuition this would have conferred them reputational gains.   
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Experiment 3 was also designed to investigate the so-called “outcome-to-intention 
shift” in a non-WEIRD sample. In other words, I wanted to clarify when Colombian 
children’s condemnation of accidental transgressions begins to decrease in favour of an 
intent-based morality, and whether this occurs in parallel across judgements of transgression 
severity and 3PP severity decisions. According to the expression view/capacity 
model/parallel hypothesis (Killen et al., 2011; Margoni & Surian, 2016; Zelazo et al., 1996), 
the developmental changes in children’s explicit moral evaluations are due to cognitive 
changes (i.e., executive functions and explicit theory-of-mind skills) outside the realm of 
morality, and thus should simultaneously affect judgements of transgression severity and 3PP 
severity decisions. According instead to the emergence view/theory model/constraint 
hypothesis (Cushman, 2013; Cushman et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2019), the developmental 
changes in children’s explicit moral evaluations are primarily the consequence of cognitive 
changes (i.e., conceptual reorganisation) inside the realm of morality, and thus could have 
different onsets in judgements of transgression severity and 3PP severity decisions. What I 
found in my Colombian sample was that the outcome-to-intention shift was already 
detectable for judgements of transgression severity but not yet for 3PP severity decisions, in 
accordance with previous findings obtained with British children (Gummerum & Chu, 2014), 
and supporting the emergence view/theory model/constraint hypothesis. Interestingly, the 
outcome-to-intention shift in Colombian children’s judgements of transgression severity was 
moral domain-dependent. Judgements of unfairness were of equal severity between 
accidental and failed intentional transgressions, whilst judgements of disloyalty were harsher 
for failed intentional than accidental transgressions. While taking into account that 
non-WEIRD cultures are especially concerned about binding over individualising moral 
domains, cultural group selection (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) could be well suited to explain 
why intentionality is more important within the moral domains emphasised by a specific 
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culture. As negative intentions are a stronger predictor of recidivism than accidents, it makes 
evolutionary sense that people are watchful about clues indicating someone’s intention to 
disregard the moral norms that their own group cares particularly about (e.g., loyalty norms 
in collectivistic societies). 
Finally, I wanted to shed light on whether children are motivated by deterrence or 
retribution when they decide to deliver 3PP. It has been theorised that people motivated by 
deterrence enact 3PP to teach a moral lesson to transgressors with the aim of preventing them 
from reoffending again. Instead, people motivated by retribution would engage in 3PP for the 
satisfaction derived from seeing the transgressors suffer (Crockett, Özdemir, & Fehr, 2014). 
Adults appear to be motivated by retribution, despite the deterrent justifications they provide 
(Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Carlsmith, 2006, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Keller et al., 
2010). With regard to children, it has been found they expect punished transgressors to be 
less likely to misbehave again compared to unpunished transgressors (Bregant et al., 2016) 
and they report deterrent justifications when questioned about the reasons for their punitive 
decisions (Stern & Peterson, 1999; Twum-Danso Imoh, 2013; Yudkin et al., 2019). However, 
it remained to be clarified whether the mismatch between explicit justifications and implicit 
punishment motivations is present in children as in adults. Therefore, in Experiment 4 the 
purpose of the Justice System operated by the children was framed in three alternative ways: 
retribution; deterrence; or compensation. I measured children’s frame memorisation rates, 
and their endorsement of retribution vs deterrence as punishment justifications. Children were 
shown to overwhelmingly endorse deterrence over retribution. Since endorsement of 
deterrence was irrespective of age, country and frame, this finding was unlikely to be the 
product of children’s cognitive development (in terms of inhibition control and 
forward-looking reasoning), socialisation to cultural norms of appropriateness or social 
desirability bias during the experiment (Bregant et al., 2016). Furthermore, the deterrence 
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frame was better memorised than the retribution frame, thus providing tentative evidence that 
deterrent messages were more easily internalised because they were more in line with 
children’s pre-existing punishment motivations (Feinberg & Willer, 2013, 2015; van 
Prooijen, 2010). 
Notably, children’s believability rate regarding the presented reality of the games 
increased across studies: it was 55% in Experiment 1 (where voice-overs were used to 
comment the MegaAttack game); 67% in Experiment 2 (where a live-streamer was shown 
commenting the MegaAttack game); 91% in Experiment 3 (which employed live dialogues 
between internet players in the MegaAttack game); and 88% in Experiment 4 (which 
consisted in a Minecraft administrative control-panel interface). Thus, slight procedural 
modifications enabled the optimisation of computer-mediated paradigms suitable for 
face-to-face (Experiments 1-4) or over-the-internet testing sessions (Experiment 4). These 
computerised methodologies are anticipated to drastically improve the practicalities of 
collecting behavioural data from children because they can simplify the simultaneous 
manipulation of numerous variables and, in the specific case of internet-mediated testing, 
they can also obviate the needs of a local geographical focus and substantial physical 
resources, causing a reduction in expense. 
In conclusion, by adopting innovative computerised paradigms I was able to gather 
experimental evidence that elementary school-aged children do not yet integrate outcome and 
intention information in their 3PP decisions as adults do. Children use 3PP as a levelling tool 
to equalise the imbalance between victims and transgressors, but not demonstrably as a 
signalling tool to accrue reputational benefits. Importantly, their reported deterrent 
justifications, better internalisation of deterrence framing messages compared to retribution, 
and lack of punishment enjoyment or lower enjoyment of punishment compared to 
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compensation, together suggest that children’s 3PP motivations are primarily deterrent 
instead of retributive. 
 
5.2. Theoretical speculations and future avenues for 
investigation 
By applying traditional dual-process models of cognition to 3PP motivations 
(Kahneman, 2011 for an overview), it has been argued that in adults retribution is driven by 
automatic and unconscious heuristics (Type I process), while deterrence is governed by 
rational and conscious deliberation (Type II process) (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Keller et 
al., 2010). This conclusion had socially problematic implications as it would imply that 
human beings are endowed with an instinctive and innate propensity to inflict 3PP to cause 
transgressors to suffer. From this perspective, only effortful cognitive processes would have 
the potential to override such a destructive impulse in order to bring in preventive and 
pedagogical considerations. However, dual-process theories have been recently re-elaborated 
to propose a tripartite view of cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Ingram & 
Moreno-Romero, 2019; Railton, 2014; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011). According to this 
view, Type II process remains a unitary construct, whereas Type I processes include both 
innate responses (Type 1a process) and learned responses through automatisation (Type 1b 
process). This conceptualisation has already been provisionally applied to explain emotional 
responses to moral transgressions (Dys & Malti, 2016; Gummerum, López-Pérez, et al., 
2019) and the outcome-to-intention shift during childhood (Ingram & Moreno-Romero, 
2019). Thus, at odds with the idea that people’s moral decision-making becomes increasingly 
reliant on controlled processes with age (Gummerum, López-Pérez, et al., 2019), I propose 
that children’s 3PP decisions are mostly based on deliberate (Type II) processes taking into 
account deterrent goals. Thereafter, the repeated presentation of morally salient stimuli (i.e., 
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moral transgressions) would gradually cause – at some point during adolescence – punitive 
reactions to become automatised as retributive impulses (Type 1b process). 
A way to test the contribution of Type I or Type II processes to 3PP cognition would 
be to adopt intuition and deliberation manipulations. Specifically, if 3PP in adulthood is 
governed by an intuitive Type 1b process, the probability or severity of adults’ punishment 
responses would be most strongly affected by intuition manipulations, such as inducing 
emotional choices. Vice versa, if 3PP in childhood is explained by a deliberate Type II 
process, the probability or severity of children’s punishment responses would be most 
strongly influenced by deliberation manipulations, such as time pressure and cognitive load. 
During adolescence there would be a shift in the efficacy of the two kinds of manipulations. 
Moreover, as suggested by Ingram & Moreno-Romero (2019), another way to test this 
research hypothesis is to measure people’s response times during 3PP decision-making. As it 
is demonstrated that more automatic choices produce shorter response times than choices 
made under deliberation (Rubinstein, 2007), response times should decrease with 
participants’ increasing age. 
Once the cognitive processes motivating the enactment of 3PP in children are 
clarified, another line of research to further investigate would be children's expressions of 
emotions following the observation of moral transgressions from a third-party perspective. 
Specifically, future studies should aim at clarifying whether children manifest moral 
domain-specific patterns of facial expressions; whether the type and intensity of their facial 
expressions predict subsequent punitive interventions; and the extent to which children’s 




According to Moral Foundations Theory each moral domain is linked to a specific 
emotion, which is elicited by the violation of the respective moral concern (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004, 2007). For example, anger would be triggered by harm violation, and disgust by purity 
violations. Importantly, patterns of facial movements are considered diagnostic of these 
prototypical emotions (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002, but see also Barrett, Adolphs, 
Marsella, Martinez, & Pollak, 2019). Research on adults has provided tentative evidence that 
there are both emotion-specific moral domains and emotion-unspecific moral domains 
(Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Franchin, Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2019; 
Landmann & Hess, 2018), contrary to the predictions of Moral Foundations Theory. I believe 
that studies on the development of the association between emotions and moral domains 
would greatly inform this field by clarifying whether emotions are socially constructed or not.  
However, in order to be able to proficiently conduct such research, it would be crucial 
to rely on a database containing validated stimuli, known to activate specific moral 
concerns/representations across cultures and ages. This would avoid the inconvenience of 
researchers designing, for example, an experiment with the intention to be representing an act 
of disloyalty which is in fact interpreted by participants as an instance of unfairness. I 
recommend these validation endeavours to be undertaken especially for the use of animated 
videos, as they are less cognitively taxing for young children than questionnaires or vignettes. 
 
5.3. Practical implications 
Increased understanding of moral developmental processes has the potential to be 
practically as well as theoretically fruitful. The study of children’s reactions to moral 
transgressions can indeed inform intervention studies about the acceptance of the criminal 
justice system.  
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It has been demonstrated that when court rulings run counter to lay people’s 3PP 
motivation, this has a detrimental effect on people’s trust towards the criminal justice system 
and on their future adherence to legal codes (Nadler, 2005; Tyler, 1990). Since the cardinal 
principles of the Western penal system are deterrent and rehabilitative in nature (Beccaria, 
1764), Robinson and Darley (1997) have suggested that the criminal justice system should 
probably be reformed in order that sanctions are devised by taking into higher consideration 
the offence components that are of utmost relevance for retribution theory. They argued that, 
by partially rejecting deterrent elements from the legal codes, reformers would help ensure 
that lay people better recognise the authority of the justice system to guide their own moral 
behaviour. Paradoxically, this would also cause higher abidance to the law and, in their view, 
reduction of future crimes. Crucially, this argument is based on the premise that retributive 
intuitions are hard-wired in human cognition and thus fixed (i.e., governed by Type 1a 
process). However, as summarised in section 5.1, my evidence suggests a strong deterrent 
motivation leading children to deliver 3PP against moral transgressors. Situated in the context 
of the broader literature, this finding implies that 3PP motivations are subject to 
developmental processes, meaning that there is a shift from deterrence- to 
retribution-motivated punishment somewhere in the passage from childhood to adulthood. 
Hence, I tried to argue in section 5.2 that, rather than being innate responses to moral 
transgressions, retributive attitudes are more likely to be learned responses through 
automatisation (i.e., driven by Type 1b process). Should my research hypothesis be verified, 
this would have important implications for intervention studies as learned responses can be 
reversed by manipulating the modulating factors involved in the learning process. Preventing 
retributive responses from being internalised and “encapsulated” as automatic during 





The experimental work presented in this PhD thesis furthers understanding of 3PP in 
children, in terms of the factors modulating children’s decisions as well as their motivations 
and emotional experiences of 3PP. Results also suggest that the novel computerised 
experimental methods, developed and used in the current studies can be effective tools, 
whose use would encourage and facilitate research in the field. Whilst the presented findings 
are not without limitation, as discussed in detail in each experimental chapter, overall, results 
have implications for theoretical accounts of the cognitive processes underlying 3PP, 
methodological implications for future research approaches and also, potentially, practical 
implications for the implementation of intervention studies to promote greater acceptance of 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Information related to Chapter 2 
Table α1. Counterbalance of experimental conditions across 
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Table α2. Counterbalance of experimental conditions across 
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α1. Script of Experiment 1 
α1.1. CONSENT PHASE 
Following initial greeting, verbal recap of salient points from the information sheet. 
<Start Audio Recording> 
 Experimenter to the child: “My boss and I have made this new game you can play 
both locally or on the internet. In this game you can be either a player or a referee. 
When you are a player I will be your team member, and we will play together against 
robot enemies, without being connected to the internet. When you are a referee, other 
children will connect to this game via the internet to be players. I’ve noted that 
sometimes in this game players behave badly towards their team-member. And your 
job as a referee will be to tell me if the players have behaved badly or not, a bit like in 
football games but in space!” 
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 Consent phrasing: “It takes about 15 minutes to be in the study. Your parent is happy 
for you to take part in our project, but remember, you don’t have to be in it if you 
don’t want to. So you can stop playing with me if you want, even if we start. If you 
have any questions, now you can ask them all. [Pause to answer the questions]. 
Alright! Does all this sound OK? You want to do this now?” [Pause so verbal consent 
can be recorded]”. 
 Experimenter explains the keys before starting the game. “Now let’s start with being a 
player! You just need to remember four keys: the up arrow key is to move forward; 
the right arrow key is to rotate towards the right; the left arrow key is to rotate 
towards the left; the space bar is to shoot” 
α1.2. PLAYING FAMILIARISATION (to clarify moral norms) 
The child is introduced to every element of the game screen by the experimenter: 
 Gems. “This is the game arena in which we are going to play. Do you see these 
purple gems? We must collect them. All the gems we collect go into this storage at the 
top, all together because we belong to the same team. And the more gems we collect, 
the more weapons we can buy later on if we play for a long time.”  
 Enemies. “While collecting the gems, we must also defend ourselves or the 
team-member from the attacks of the enemies – these green rockets – by shooting at 
them” 
 Shield. “Do you know what this coloured circle around you is? This is the shield that 
protects you from the enemies’ attacks. But remember that it won’t last forever so try 
not to get killed.” 
 Time. “And this bar at the top shows that the time is passing.” 
The child and the experimenter play together for 4 game bouts (order of events 
remains the same across participants). 
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 1° Game bout:  
 The experimenter teaches the child how to use the controls.  
 The child plays with the experimenter.  
 The experimenter does not trigger the mega-attack targeting the child player.  
 At the end of the trial there is no gem distribution. 
 2° Game bout:  
 The child and the experimenter play together.  
 The experimenter does not trigger the mega-attack targeting the child player.  
 At the end of the trial the child has to distribute the gems between themselves 
and the experimenter. The experimenter makes no comment on the division 
chosen by the child. 
 3° Game bout:  
 The child and the experimenter play together.  
 The experimenter does not trigger the mega-attack targeting the child player.  
 Fairness norm illustration. At the end of the trial the experimenter distributes 
the gems between herself and the child; the experimenter always chooses a fair 
division. 
 4° Game bout:  
 The child and the experimenter play together.  
 Loyalty norm illustration. Making sure to remain unnoticed, the 
experimenter triggers the mega-attack by pressing X on the keyboard. The 
experimenter explains: “this mega-attack is against you, you are not going to 




 At the end of the trial the experimenter has to distribute the gems between 
herself and the child. Just before deciding for a fair split, the experimenter 
pauses to say: “After this, we look on the internet for a game to referee. 
Sometimes on the internet, you hear the comments being made live by a kid 
who likes to practice their youtubing skills and that sort of thing”.  
α1.3. REFEREEING FAMILIARISATION (players do not violate any moral or 
descriptive norm) 
The experimenter speaks during the game to explain the main features to the child. 
 Referee presentation stage. “Now it’s time for you to referee the game! Observe 
carefully how the players behave because I will ask you some questions about their 
behaviour. Look, there’s the referee at the bottom. That’s you!” 
 Audience presentation stage. “Look, at the edges of the arena there are plenty of 
internet players. They all want to play, indeed everyone is ready to enter the arena 
with their blue/red shield [according to the descriptive norm]…but only two at a time 
can play; the others will have to wait and look at the game in the meanwhile.” 
 Shield choice stage/Descriptive norm establishment. “This time the two players are 
[name of the 1° player] and [name of the 2° player]. Now we are seeing them 
choosing their shield. As usual, both players have chosen a blue/red shield [according 
to the descriptive norm] like all the other players in the audience. Now that they have 
made their choice, they are ready to teleport into the arena to start the game!” 
 Gem collection stage [players abide by Loyalty norm]. “Wow, there a lot of gems 
that players can collect. [While players are collecting gems]…The players are making 
a really good job, look at how many gems are now in the communal store! The 
players have been hit a bit by the enemies, but after all, the team is managing to get 
by without getting hurt too much… Very good, at the end no player has died!” 
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 Gems distribution stage [players abide by Fairness norm]. “Now it’s time to split 
the gems which were collected before. These points are very important because they 
can allow the players to level up and get better weapons. The [name of the 1° player] 
is deciding how to split the points. [The 1° player splits the points equally]…and it 
was a fair split!” 
 Judgement stage. “Remember that now you are the referee, it’s your job to decide if 
they did anything wrong”.  
 [By pointing at the player on the right] “Did this player do anything wrong?”. 
The child is expected to answer no, so the experimenter proceeds by saying: 
“Now press N [on the laptop’s keyboard] to go to the next player then”.  
 [By pointing at the player on the left] “Did this player do anything wrong?”. 
Also in this case the child is expected to answer NO.  
 If the child answers YES to one or both questions, the experimenter will 
follow the script for the test trials (see below). 
α1.4. TEST TRIALS (players are shown violating moral and/or descriptive 
norms; order of players’ transgressions varies across participants) 
The experimenter remains quiet during the recorded commentary. 
 Judgement stage (i.e. children’s judgement of transgression severity) 
 At the end of the scenario, for each player in turn, the experimenter asks the 
child: “Did this player do anything wrong?” 
 If the child answers NO, the experimenter says: “Press N to go to the next 
player then”. 
 If the child answers YES, the experimenter asks the two following questions: 
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• “What did this player do wrong?”. If the children have a false memory, 
the experimenter is allowed to correct it, so that she does not accept 
their claim about a wrong behaviour that did not happen, but she does 
accept any claim that something was wrong, if it actually happened. 
• “And how bad was the player’s behaviour?”. The experimenter shows 
a 5-point smiley face scale on a paper (Figure α1) and asks the child to 
point at the face of their choice by saying: “Choose a face on this scale, 
where this [pointing at the face on the right] is just a little bad, while 
this [pointing at the face on the left] is super bad”.  
 
Figure α1. Judgement of transgression severity scale: 5 points, ranging from 1 = 
“just a little bad” (on the right) to 5 = “super bad” (on the left). 
 
 Punishment stage 
 Experimenter to the child: “Now press P [on the laptop’s keyboard] so you can 
give the mean player a penalty”. At this point the child is required to decide 
the type and severity of punishment. 
 Type of punishment  
Experimenter to the child: “Now you can give a time-out from the game to the 
mean player [experimenter pointing at the icon on the left side of the laptop’s 
screen, see Figure α2] – so that they wouldn’t be allowed to play for a while – 
or you can take away some of their gems [experimenter pointing at the icon on 
the right side of the laptop’s screen, see Figure α2]. Which kind of penalty do 
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you want to give the mean player? Move the referee with the arrow keys and 
then press G when you have decided the type of penalty for the mean player”. 
 
Figure α2. Types of punishment: on the left social punishment (banning from the 
game); on the right economic punishment (loss of gems). 
 
 Severity of punishment 
• If the child chooses Time out, the experimenter asks: “How long do 
you want the time out to be?”. The child is given six options on a scale 
shown on the laptop’s screen: 0 minutes; 1 minute; 5 minutes; 20 
minutes; 1 hour; 1 day. 
• If the child chooses Lose Gems, the experimenter asks: “How many 
gems do you want the mean player to lose?”. The child is given six 
options on a scale shown on the laptop’s screen: 0 gems; 2 gems; 5 
gems; 10 gems; 50 gems; 100 gems. 
• In both cases, the child has to move the referee by using the arrow keys 








α1.5. SATISFACTION RATING OF THE ACTIVITY  
NB: the following question was asked for advertisement rather than scientific 
purposes; in order to recruit more children we needed data to support our claim that the 
activity was enjoyable. 
After all the test trials, the experimenter assesses the child’s enjoyment of the activity 
by asking: “Now that you’ve made your choices, can I ask you if you have liked being a 
referee in this game?”.  The experimenter shows a 5-point smiley face scale on a paper 
(Figure α3) and asks the child to circle the face of their choice by saying: “Can you choose a 
face on this scale?”. 
 
Figure α3. Judgement of activity scale: 5 points, ranging from 1 = “Boring” to 5 = 
“Terrific”. 
 
α1.6. BELIEFS ABOUT PUNISHMENT TYPES 
Experimenter to the child: “As a referee, at the end of each game you could decide 
whether to give a time-out or take away gems from the mean player. In general, which do you 
think was worse for the mean player? Receiving a time-out from you or having their gems 
taken away? Or is it the same?”.  
α1.7. REALITY CHECK 
 Experimenter to the child: “Do you think you really refereed games with internet 
players now?”.  
 If the child answers NO, the experiment is considered completed. 
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 If the child answers YES, then the experimenter further asks: “Did you really give the 
internet players time-outs and/or take away gems?” NB – data was not analysed. 
 After the child has replied to this final question, the experiment is considered 
completed.  
<Stop Audio Recording> 
 
α2. Description of video clip with Experiment 1 paradigm  
The voice-over comments that the descriptive norm is for the player-avatars to choose 
red shields, as shown by the audience of avatars outside the game arena. The players 
teleported into the game arena are Fox and Panda. Player Panda abides by the descriptive 
norm by appearing with a red shield, while player Fox commits a descriptive norm violation 
in choosing a blue shield. After each player has collected several gems, player Panda gets 
surrounded and attacked by computer-controlled enemies in a mega-attack. Player Fox makes 
a loyalty transgression as they do not come to the aid of the team-mate, whose space-ship 
thus ends up destroyed. However, player Fox then shares the gems equally between 
themselves and player Panda, following a fairness norm. In the refereeing stage the child 
judges that player Panda has done nothing wrong, whereas they punish player Fox with a 
1-hour time out from the game.  
α3. Script of Experiment 2 
α3.1. ICE-BREAKER 
 “Have you ever played computer games?” Channel child into answering according to 
these categories: Never; Only sometimes; Most weeks (at least once); Most days; 
Every day. NB – data was not analysed. 
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 “Do you ever play on the internet where there are other players, like you are all 
playing together on the internet?” Record YES/NO. If they answer NO, explain to 
them that this is a thing. “You can see e.g. space-ships on the screen and they are 
actually controlled by other players”. NB – data was not analysed. 
 
α3.2. CONSENT PHASE 
Following initial greeting, verbal recap of salient points from information sheets. 
<Start Audio Recording> 
Experimenter to the child: 
 “We invented it some time ago, people play it on the internet.” 
 “It has a special feature because sometimes people do bad things: you can referee 
like in football.” 
 “Now we just want to know what kids think about the game. Maybe we can make it 
better.” 
 “You can play locally, not on the internet – I will teach you now.” 
 “Then you are going to be a referee – we need your help for testing this.” 
 “Players are always in a team together against robot enemies.” 
 “Is that all OK?” (consent) 
 Explain the keys before starting the game. 
 Consent phrasing: “It takes about 15 minutes to be in the study. Your parent is happy 
for you to take part in our project, but remember, you don’t have to be in it if you 
don’t want to. So you can stop playing with me if you want, even if we start. If you 
have any questions, now you can ask them all.” [Pause to answer the questions]. 
 “Alright! Does all this sound OK? You want to do this now?” [Pause so verbal 
consent can be recorded]. 
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α3.3. PLAYING FAMILIARISATION (to set up moral norms) 
 When the experimenter introduces the children to the scale, she will talk about 2 
experiences of hers – a strongly negative and a strongly positive –, and then she will 
ask the children about their feelings in two other situations. 
 Experimenter to the child: “Since during the game I will be asking you your opinion 
about the players’ behaviour by using this scale [experimenter indicates the scale in 
Figure α4], I want to be sure that we are on the same page”.  
 
Figure α4. Scale used to measure judgement of transgression severity, affective 
state in enacting punishment and beliefs about punishment types. The scale has 
11 points, ranging from from -5 = “very bad” (on the left) to +5 =“very good” (on the 
right). 
 
 “For example, when I had a big fight with my best friend, I felt very very bad, so the 
best face to describe that feeling is that” [experimenter points at the first face from the 
left]. “When instead I went to a friend of mine’s birthday party and I had a lot of fun 
with her and all her guests, the best face to describe that feeling is that” 
[experimenter points at the first face from the right]. 
 “Now tell me: how would you feel if someone gave you an ice cream? [record face 
indicated by the child]. How would you feel instead if you were going to play a game 
with a friend but then your friend got sick, so that you couldn’t play the game you 
wanted to play?” [record face indicated by the child]. 
The child is introduced to every element of the game screen by the Experimenter: 




 Explain shooting enemies; the shield protects from enemies [like in Experiment 1 
script]. 
 Explain time ticking – probably in the 2° Game bout [like in Experiment 1 script]. 
 Explain in the 2° Game bout that bombs defend the team from mega-attacks: “These 
are the TEAM’s bombs. We start off by sharing them out between the two of us 
because we need them to defend ourselves from the enemies during mega-attacks even 
if mega-attacks don’t happen very often.” [in fact they never happen in Experiment 2] 
 Explain cooperative task (i.e. mega-gem collection) in the 2° Game bout – the child 
has to be the first one to reach the mega-gem so that the experimenter can comment: 
“Once you are locked on the mega-gem you are stuck in it and you can’t protect 
yourself from enemies until your team-mate helps you get the mega-gem”.  
The child and the experimenter play for 4 game bouts. 
 1° Game bout: 
 The experimenter teaches the child how to use the controls; the child plays 
with the experimenter 
 NO bomb distribution 
 NO cooperative task. 
 2° Game bout:  
 Bomb distribution (the child is the decider of the distribution) 
 NO cooperative task 
 NB: the experimenter just explains how the bomb distribution works 
remarking that the bombs belong to the team and that each team-member 
needs them in case of a mega-attack from the enemies; no comment on the 




 3° Game bout:  
 Bomb distribution (the experimenter is a fair distributor) 
 Cooperative task (the experimenter is loyal) 
 4° Game bout:  
 Bomb distribution (the experimenter is a fair distributor) 
 Cooperative task (the experimenter is loyal) 
Now at the menu: “Now, we will look on the internet for a game to referee. Quite 
often with internet games, there is someone practicing their YouTube skills by doing a live 
commentary”. 
α3.4. REFEREEING FAMILIARISATION  
 (Once started): “Look, there’s the referee at the bottom. That’s you!”  
 “Sometimes you can see in the corner a commentator, who likes to watch and 
comment on the game” 
 At the end, there is a refereeing phase as in the test trials (see below), but we expect 
children to say that none of the players did anything wrong. 
α3.5. TEST TRIALS 
Notes on the Audience (within-subject) manipulation: In the NO AUDIENCE 
CONDITION the live-streamer does the commentary (commentary actually pre-recorded) but 
during the judgement and punishment stages he disappears from the screen, whereas the 
experimenter appears distracted (by a piece of paper). In the AUDIENCE CONDITION the 
live-streamer comments the game and, while directing his gaze at the refereeing child, tells 
the child something to make them feel judged in their choices (i.e., “Let’s watch the referee 
making their decision” or “Let’s see what the referee thinks”); also the experimenter appears 
to pay close attention to the child’s punitive choices.  
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 Judgement stage  
 The experimenter to the child: “Remember that now your job is to judge the 
behaviour of the players. You are the referee” 
 For each player in turn: “Did this player do anything wrong?” 
 If they say NO: “Press N to go to the next player then.” 
 If they say YES: “What did they do wrong?”. If they have a false memory, 
correct it, so don’t accept they claim a wrong behaviour that didn’t happen, but 
do accept any claim that something was wrong, if it actually happened. 
 Judgement of transgression severity: “On this scale [same 11-point smiley 
face scale as in Figure α4], where this [indicating the 1° face from the left] is 
very very bad, and this [indicating the 5° face from the left] is just a little bad, 
how bad do you think that was?” 
 “Since you said that this player’s behaviour was wrong, now press W for 
wrong”. This command makes the child go to the Punishment Stage. 
 Punishment Stage (Punishment Opportunities + Punishment Severity)  
NB: Punishment opportunity is a between-subject manipulation. 
 Pretend Punishment 
• “You aren’t going to do anything to the player [=the one the child has 
indicated as the mean player]. But let’s just pretend for a moment that 
you could give them a time-out from the game – so that they wouldn’t 
be allowed to play for a while - or you could take away some of their 
gems. You can’t actually do anything, but would you choose time-out 
or take away gems or would you choose neither?”. The experimenter 
helps them select their option. 
221 
 
• Punishment severity: [Depending on the punishment type chosen by 
the child] “If you were giving a time-out / If you were taking away 
gems, how long would the time-out be/how many gems would you take 
away?” [levels of punishment severity are identical to Experiment 1]. 
 Warning message 
• “You can send a warning to the player [=the one the child has indicated 
as the mean player]. Nothing happens to them if you send the warning, 
but if they keep being naughty, they could get a time-out from the game 
– so that they wouldn’t be allowed to play for a while - or they could 
have some of their gems taken away. Do you want to send a warning 
about a time-out or a warning about taking away gems, or no warning 
at all?” 
• Punishment severity: [Depending on the punishment type chosen by 
the child] “The warning is about losing gems - but how many? / The 
warning is about a time-out - but how long? [levels of punishment 
severity are identical to Experiment 1]. 
 Real Punishment 
• “Now you can give a time-out from the game to the mean player – so 
that they wouldn’t be allowed to play for a while - or you can take 
away some of their gems. Do you want to give a time-out or do you 
want to take away gems, or do you want to do neither?”. 
• Punishment severity: [Depending on the punishment type chosen by 
the child] “How long do you want the time-out to be? / How many 
gems do you want the mean player to lose?” [levels of punishment 
severity are identical to Experiment 1]. 
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α3.6. AFFECTIVE STATES MEASUREMENT 
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter asks the child: 
 “How has it been playing the game with me? Really really bad, really really good, or 
somewhere in-between?” [reference to the usual 11-point scale, see Figure α4]. 
 “In the second part of the game you sometimes had to choose between time-out, 
losing gems or no punishment. When you chose time-out or losing gems, what 
happened to the players? I am going to give you three options, tell me which one is 
correct: 1) They actually got the penalty; 2) They just got a warning; 3) Nothing 
actually happened to them.” [record 1, 2 or 3]. 
 The following questions are skipped if the child never punished [remember to take a 
note, e.g. NP, when the child chooses No Punishment]. 
 “So when you chose time-out or losing gems, how did it make you feel?” [reference to 
the usual 11-point scale, see Figure α4]. 
 “Why did you choose that number on the scale?” [transcribe the recordings]. 
 “Do you regret the choices you made?” YES or NO. If children do not know the 
meaning of the word “regret”, explain it to them. NB – data was not analysed. 
 “Would you make the same choices again?” YES or NO. NB – data was not 
analysed. 
 If the child answers NO to the previous question, ask: “What would you do different?” 
[transcribe the recordings]. NB – data was not analysed. 
α3.7. BELIEFS ABOUT PUNISHMENT TYPES 
Ask both questions to each child, counterbalance order between children, show the 
same 11-point scale (Figure α4): 
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 “How bad would it be to lose 10 gems on this scale from very bad to just a little 
bad?” NB – data was not analysed. 
 “How bad would it be to receive a time-out from the game for 20 minutes on this 
scale from very bad to just a little bad?” NB – data was not analysed. 
α3.8. CONTROL QUESTIONS 
Same question for each Punishment-opportunity condition: “Do you think you really 
watched games with internet players now?”.  If they say NOT, ask why not. 
 
α4. Supplementary statistical analyses of Experiment 1  
I tested whether children’s belief in real internet players affected key variables and 
whether it moderated tested effects. 
To test moderation of potential descriptive norm violation effects, I calculated the 
Judgement Descriptivity Effect (JDE) Score, defined as judgement of transgression severity 
when the descriptive norm is violated minus judgement of transgression severity when the 
descriptive norm is adhered to. Children who believed the game was unreal obtained a JDE 
Score (M = 0.07; SD = 0.70) that was not significantly different from the score obtained by 
children who believed the game was real (M = -0.01; SD = 1.01), t(63.68) = 0.38, p = .704, d 
= -0.09, 95% CI for d [-0.57, 0.39].    
I calculated the Punishment Descriptivity Effect (PDE) Score, defined as punishment 
severity when the descriptive norm is violated minus punishment severity when the 
descriptive norm is adhered to. Children who believed the game was unreal obtained a PDE 
Score (M = 0.00; SD = 0.83) that was not significantly different from the score obtained by 
children who believed the game was real (M = 0.08; SD = 0.79), t(60.66) = -0.41, p = .686, d 
= 0.10, 95% CI for d [-0.38, 0.58].   
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Children who believed the game was unreal expressed judgements of transgression 
severity (M = 3.47; SD = 0.94) that were not significantly different from those expressed by 
children who believed the game was real (M = 3.55; SD = 0.77), t(56.07) = -0.38, p = .707, d 
= 0.10, 95% CI for d [-0.39, 0.58].  Children who believed the game was unreal made 
punishment severity choices (M = 4.34; SD = 0.97) that were not significantly different from 
those made by children who believed the game was real (M = 4.43; SD = 0.89), t(59.50) = 
-0.38, p = .703, d = 0.10, 95% CI for d [-0.39, 0.58]. Children who believed the game was 
unreal had a PFTC score (Mdn = .75; IQR = .50) that was not significantly different from that 
obtained by children who believed the game was real (Mdn = .50; IQR = .50), Mann-Whitney 
U = 679.00, p = .105.  
 
α5. Supplementary statistical analyses of Experiment 2 
I tested whether children’s belief in real internet players affected key variables and 
whether it moderated tested effects. 
Children who believed the game was unreal had a PFTC score (Mdn = .50; IQR = .50) 
that was not significantly different from that obtained by children who believed the game was 
real (Mdn = .50; IQR = .31), Mann-Whitney U = 709.00, p = .330. Children who believed the 
game was unreal expressed judgements of transgression severity (M = -3.07; SD = 1.09) that 
were not significantly different from those expressed by children who believed the game was 
real (M = -3.10; SD = 1.03), t(44.72) = 0.13, p = .897, d = -0.03, 95% CI for d [-0.51, 0.44]. 
Children who believed the game was unreal made punishment severity choices (M = 4.69; 
SD = 1.16) that were not significantly different from those made by children who believed 
the game was real (M = 4.31; SD = 1.16), t(44.57) = 1.31, p = .198, d = -0.33, 95% CI for d 
[-0.82, 0.17].  
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I calculated the Judgement Audience Effect (JAE) Score, defined as judgement of 
transgression severity in the presence of an audience minus judgement of transgression 
severity in the absence of an audience. Children who believed the game was unreal obtained a 
JAE Score (M = -0.14; SD = 1.20) that was not significantly different from the score obtained 
by children who believed the game was real (M = -0.33; SD = 0.97), t(39.19) = 0.67, p = 
.504, d = -0.18, 95% CI for d [-0.66, 0.30].   
I calculated the Punishment Audience Effect (PAE) Score, defined as punishment 
severity in the presence of an audience minus punishment severity in the absence of an 
audience. Children who believed the game was unreal obtained a PAE Score (M = 0.27; SD = 
1.05) that was not significantly different from the score obtained by children who believed 
the game was real (M = 0.09; SD = 1.06), t(39.65) = 0.69, p = .492, d = -0.18, 95% CI for d 
[-0.68, 0.32].  
Children who believed the game was unreal experienced affective states (M = -0.21; 
SD = 1.74) that were not significantly different from those experienced by children who 
believed the game was real (M = 0.33; SD = 2.80), t(67.14) = -1.02, p = .310, d = 0.22, 95% 










Appendix B: Supplementary Information related to Chapter 3 
Table β1. Counterbalance of experimental conditions across 
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β1. Script of Experiment 3 
β1.1. ICE-BREAKER 
 “Have you ever played computer games?” Channel child into answering according to 
these categories: Never; Only sometimes; Most weeks (at least once); Most days; 
Every day. NB – data was not analysed. 
 “Do you ever play on the internet where there are other players, like you are all 
playing together on the internet?” Record YES/NO. If they answer NO, explain to 
them that this is a thing: “You can see e.g. space-ships on the screen and they are 
actually controlled by other players”. NB – data was not analysed. 
β1.2. CONSENT PHASE 
Following initial greeting, verbal recap of salient points from information sheets. 
<Start Audio Recording> 
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Experimenter to the child: 
 “This game is called MegaAttack and was invented some time ago by some people in 
the UK, where it’s becoming popular. These people want to know what kids think 
about the game to make it better in the future. And one of them is here [pointing at 
Rhea]. Now they have brought this game in Colombia to let Colombian children have 
a go. And I am here to help them.” 
 “This game is divided into two parts: in the first part we will play together as a team, 
and our team will have to fly spaceships, shoot at the enemies (computer-controlled 
green rockets) and collect some purple gems (our points). In the second part instead, 
once you have learnt the rules of the game, you will become a referee, a bit like in 
football games but in space! And the referee’s job is to look carefully at internet 
players’ behaviour and to tell me if they are behaving badly or not.”  
 “Do you like the idea to try out this game?”. Consent phrasing: “It takes about 20 
minutes to be in the study. Your parent is happy for you to take part in our project, 
but remember, you don’t have to be in it if you don’t want to. So you can stop playing 
with me if you want, even if we start. If you have any questions, now you can ask them 
all.” [Pause to answer the questions]. 
 “Alright! Does all this sound OK? You want to do this now?” [Pause so verbal 
consent can be recorded].  
 “Now it is important that you learn the keys to move your spaceship and to shoot at 






β1.3. PLAYING FAMILIARISATION (to set up moral norms) 
 When the experimenter introduces the children to the scale, she will talk about 2 
experiences of hers – a strongly negative and a strongly positive –, and then she will 
ask the children about their feelings in two other situations. 
 Experimenter to the child: “Since during the game I will be asking you your opinion 
about the players’ behaviour by using this scale [experimenter indicates the scale in 
Figure β1], I want to be sure that we are on the same page”.  
 
Figure β1. Scale used to measure judgement of transgression severity and 
affective state in enacting punishment. The scale has 11 points, ranging from -5 = 
“very bad” (on the left) to +5 =“very good” (on the right). 
 
 “For example, when I had a big fight with my best friend, I felt very, very, bad, so the 
best face to describe that feeling is that” [experimenter points at the first face from the 
left]. “When instead I went to a friend of mine’s birthday party and I had a lot of fun 
with her and all her guests, the best face to describe that feeling is that” 
[experimenter points at the first face from the right]. 
 “Now tell me: how would you feel if someone gave you an ice cream? [record face 
indicated by the child]. How would you feel instead if you were going to play a game 
with a friend but then your friend got sick, so that you couldn’t play the game you 
wanted to play?” [record face indicated by the child].  
The experimenter selects “Play local game” on the menu to start playing MegaAttack 
with the child: “Now we are going to play locally, without internet connection”. The child is 
introduced to every element of the game screen by the experimenter: 




 Explain shooting enemies; the shield protects from enemies [like in Experiments 1-2 
scripts]. 
 Explain that the length of the bar at the top of the screen indicates the passing of the 
time – probably in the 2° Game bout [like in Experiments 1-2 scripts]. 
 Explain in the 2° Game bout that bombs defend the team from mega-attacks: “These 
are the TEAM’s bombs. We start off by sharing them out between the two of us 
because we need them to defend ourselves from the enemies during mega-attacks even 
if mega-attacks don’t happen very often.” [in fact they never happen in Experiment 3] 
 Explain cooperative task (i.e. mega-gem collection) in the 2° Game bout – the child 
has to be the first one to reach the mega-gem so that the experimenter can comment: 
“Once you are locked on the mega-gem you are stuck in it and you can’t protect 
yourself from enemies until your team-mate helps you get the mega-gem”.  
The child and the experimenter play for 4 game bouts. 
 1° Game bout: 
 The experimenter teaches the child how to use the controls; the child plays 
with the experimenter 
 NO bomb distribution 
 NO cooperative task. 
 2° Game bout:  
 Bomb distribution (the child is the decider of the distribution) 
 NO cooperative task 
 NB: the experimenter just explains how the bomb distribution works 
remarking that the bombs belong to the team and that each team-member 
needs them in case of a mega-attack from the enemies; no comment on the 
division made by the child. 
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 3° Game bout:  
 Bomb distribution (the experimenter is a fair distributor) 
 Cooperative task (the experimenter is loyal) 
 4° Game bout:  
 Bomb distribution (the experimenter is a fair distributor) 
 Cooperative task (the experimenter is loyal) 
Now again, looking at the menu: “Now, we will look on the internet to find games for 
you to referee. You will watch some teams of Colombian players playing the same 
game we have just played. They are beginners, so they might still be not very good at 
controlling the keys. Since this game is on the internet, the players in the team need to 
be able to talk to each other over the internet. And since you are the referee you can 
hear them”. 
β1.4. REFEREEING INTRODUCTION 
NB: The experimental design includes two between-subject manipulations: Audience 
vs No Audience, and Outcome vs No Outcome Focus. 
 To all the children [while showing the menu which appeared after the last Play 
Familiarisation]: “Remember that to be a good referee, the most important thing is to 
be fair. You should only think about punishing when you think someone has done 
something wrong. And you should not punish unless someone did something wrong. If 
you see a player behaving badly, you will have to decide if you want to give them a 
time-out from the game – so that they wouldn’t be allowed to play for a while.” 
 To children in the AUDIENCE condition [while scrolling the menu until Referee 
internet game is highlighted]: “Be aware that we are rating referees for how good 
they are. Only very good referees get to referee in the MegaAttack game 
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championships”. [Experimenter presses S to show the leader board] “So before you 
get to referee, let's have a look at the ranking of our referees. You need to know that 
it’s the top referees in this ranking who judge how good the other referees are. One of 
these will be your referee mentor. The referee mentor is a kid like you but with much 
more experience with refereeing the game than you. The mentor will get to see all the 
decisions you make to see how good you are at refereeing, and will decide how many 
points you get.” [To move from the leader board press Return]. NB – if Colombian 
children question about the identity of this top referee-kid, say that they got 
experience in MegaAttack game in the UK. 
 To children in the NO AUDIENCE condition: “No one is checking how good you are 
at refereeing. You shouldn’t worry about it too much because this is your first time. 
No one is judging you, not even me. No other children will see the decisions you are 
going to make. So feel free to referee in the way you think is right.” 
 To all the children [now that Referee internet game is highlighted, press S]: “Look, 
there’s the referee at the top. That’s you! Now you can decide the nickname for your 
referee-avatar. Decided it? good! now write it up here!” [Press Return to enter name, 
and then Return again to move on from next screen]. 
 Only to children in the AUDIENCE condition: “Let’s see who will be your referee 
mentor….It’s DaviD! So DaviD is the kid who is going to judge how you referee the 
game”  
 Before pressing Enter to accept the referee’s name, ask one of these two questions:  
 To children in the NO OUTCOME FOCUS condition (time point: BEFORE): 
“So, you might punish some players. How do you think it will feel to do that?” 
[refer to Likert scale in Figure β1]. 
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 To children in the OUTCOME FOCUS condition (time point: BEFORE): “So, 
you might ban some players from the game so they can’t play for quite a while. 
How do you think it will feel to do that?” [refer to Likert scale in Figure β1]. 
β1.5. REFEREEING FAMILIARISATION  
 (After having pressed Return): “Look, there you are!” [Experimenter pointing at the 
child’s avatar]. 
 Only to children in the AUDIENCE condition: “...and besides you there is DaviD’s 
avatar”. 
 Scenario: player distributes bombs fairly and helps the team member in getting the 
mega-gem. 
 Extract of dialogue between players: 
 Player 1: “Let’s split the bombs equally, 5 for me and 5 for you” 
 Player 2: “Perfect! Thank you very much” 
 Player 1: “Uh the mega-gem, we must have it! Let’s lock on it at the same 
time” 
 Player 2: “We did it! Now we have plenty of gems in our storage” 
 At the end of the video used for the refereeing familiarisation, there will be a 
Judgement stage as in the test trials (“Did this player behave badly?” etc. – see 
below), but children are expected to say that none of the players did misbehave.  
β1.6. TEST TRIALS – OBSERVATION OF MORAL SCENARIOS 
NB: between the end of the 2nd test trial and the beginning of the 3rd one, children in 
the AUDIENCE condition will be shown again the leader board with the highest 
scoring referees in the MegaAttack game championships. [Experimenter presses S to 
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show the leader board] “Remember that your mentor DaviD has been chosen from the 
top referees in the MegaAttack game championships, as you can see from this leader 
board. DaviD is watching all the decisions you make to see how good you are at 
refereeing, and will decide how many points you get at the end.” [To move from the 
leader board press Return] 
Accidental Unfairness 
 Player 1 intends to split the bombs fairly with the team-member but, accidentally, 
presses the wrong key ending up with more bombs for themselves than for the 
team-member. 
 Extract of dialogue between players: 
 Player 1: [By pressing alternatively the left and right key] “I want us to have 
the same number of bombs.”  
 Player 2: “That’s nice of you” 
 Player 1: [The player stops when the distribution is 7 for them and 3 for the 
team-member]. “Let me press G… [during the distribution] Oh no, I didn’t 
mean to do it! I pressed G at the wrong time. I wanted us to be even”. 
 Player 2: [with a slightly sad tone of voice] “well, now we are not even. I have 
less than you”. 
Failed attempt at Disloyalty 
 Player 1 incites the team-member to lock on the mega-gem with the intention to leave 
them stuck in it but, while collecting the gems around the mega-gem, inadvertently 
locks on the mega-gem freeing the team-member.  
 Extract of dialogue between players: 
 Player 1: “Uh, the mega-gem has appeared. Go lock on it!” 
 Player 2: “Done it. Now it’s your turn to lock on it” 
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 Player 1: “Ahahahah, I tricked you! you shouldn’t have believed me! Now 
you’re stuck in the mega-gem and you’ll be hit by enemies while I will be 
collecting all the gems around you” 
 Player 2: “That’s really mean! You shouldn’t have done it” 
 Player 1: “Look at how many gems I am taking for myself…. Oops, I was 
steering too close to the mega-gem. I touched it without wanting and now I’ve 
freed you by chance” 
 Player 2: “Lucky me that you touched the mega-gem by mistake. I’ve survived 
enemies’ attacks” 
Failed attempt at Unfairness 
 Player 1 intends to take more bombs for themselves than for the team-member but, 
accidentally, presses the wrong key ending up with a fair distribution. 
 Extract of dialogue between players: 
 Player 1: “Ahah, it’s my time to decide how to split the bombs now! I want to 
give more bombs to myself than to you. [The player stops momentarily when 
the distribution is 7 for them and 3 for the team-member]”  
 Player 2: “But this wouldn’t be fair!” 
 Player 1: [After pressing alternatively the left and right key, the player stops 
when the distribution is 5 for them and 5 for the team-member]. “Oh damn it, 
this is not what I wanted. I am an idiot; I wanted more bombs for me”. 
 Player 2: “Fortunately for me you made this mistake and now we are even”. 
Accidental Disloyalty  
 Once the Player 2 locks on to the mega-gem, the Player 1 wants to come to their aid 
but inadvertently presses the wrong key, thus going in the wrong direction. Being too 
235 
 
late to come to aid of the team member, the trial finishes with Player 2 being stuck in 
the mega-gem and shot several times by the enemies, thus losing many life points.  
 Extract of dialogue between players: 
 Player 1: “Go towards the mega-gem, I’m gonna follow you after I pick up this 
gem!” 
 Player 2: “Oook, I’ll do it.” [After locking on] “Done it! Now I am stuck in it, I 
need your help” 
 Player 1: “Yes, I’m coming… Opsss, I am a clod with these keys. I’ve ended up 
on the other side” 
 Player 2: “The time is passing, the game is finishing! Be quick, I’m getting hit 
a lot!” 
 Player 1 [trying to go towards the mega-gem]: “I’m trying”. 
 [The trial finishes] Player 2: “Too late, because of your mistake we didn’t 
collect the mega-gem and I was killed by the enemies” 
β1.7. TEST TRIALS – DECISION MAKING 
 Judgement stage  
 Only to children in the AUDIENCE condition: In order to increase the feeling 
of accountability in children the experimenter tells the child: "when you see 
your mentor's avatar moving this means DaviD is ready to judge how you are 
going to referee. He will take note of all your decisions and, at the end of the 
game, he will give you a score that indicates how fair you are as a referee in 
his opinion" [said for the refereeing familiarisation] / “now that your mentor's 
avatar is moving you can make your decisions as a referee" [said for each one 
of the following 4 test trials]. 
 For each player in turn: “Did this player behave badly?” 
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 If they say NO: “Press N to go to the next player then.” 
 If they say YES: “What did they do that was bad?”. If they have a false 
memory, correct it, so don’t accept they claim a wrong behaviour that didn’t 
happen, but do accept any claim that something was wrong, if it actually 
happened. 
 Judgement of transgression severity: “On this scale [same 11-point smiley 
face scale as in Figure β1], where this [indicating the 1° face from the left] is 
very, very, bad, and this [indicating the 5° face from the left] is just a little 
bad, how bad do you think that was?”. NB: the experimenter allowed the 
children to express “neither bad nor good” judgements [middle face of the 
scale] in case they had changed their mind after having said the player behaved 
badly. 
 “Since you said that this player’s behaviour was bad, now press W”. This 
command makes the child go to the Punishment Stage. 
 Punishment Stage  
• Experimenter to the child: “Now you can decide if you want to give a time-out 
from the game to the mean player - so that they wouldn't allowed to play for a 
while. So, if you don't want to give any time-out your choice on this scale is 0 
minutes. If instead you want to punish the mean player, you can decide how 
long the time-out will be by choosing one of these [experimenter pointing at 
the other options: 1 minute; 5 minutes; 20 minutes; 1 hour; 1 day]. What is 
your decision as referee? When you have decided press G”.  




• Only to children in the NO OUTCOME FOCUS condition (time point: 
DURING): “You just decided to punish a player. How did it feel to do 
that?” [refer to Likert scale in Figure β1]. 
• Only to children in the OUTCOME FOCUS condition (time point: 
DURING): “You just banned a player from the game so they can’t play 
for quite a while. How did it feel to do that?” [refer to Likert scale in 
Figure β1]. 
β1.8. END OF THE GAME  
 Experimenter to the child: “This was the end of the game” 
 To the children in the NO OUTCOME FOCUS condition (time point: AFTER): “So 
now that you have a bit of experience as a referee, tell me: When you were punishing 
players, how did it make you feel?” [refer to Likert scale in Figure β1]. 
 To the children in the OUTCOME FOCUS condition (time point: AFTER): “So now 
that you have a bit of experience as a referee, tell me: When you were banning 
players from the game so they can’t play for quite a while, how did it make you feel?” 
[refer to Likert scale in Figure β1]. 
 At this point the experimenter presses “End” on the menu. In the AUDIENCE 
condition this will make appear the score assigned by the mentor (10/10 for all the 
children).  
 After that the experimenter asks the question to verify whether children have enjoyed 
the Play Familiarisation: “In the first part of the game we were players playing 
together in a team. I would like to know: How has it been playing the game with me? 
Really really bad; really really good; or somewhere in-between?” [refer to Likert 
scale in Figure β1]. NB – data was not analysed. 
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β1.9. FINAL QUESTIONS (for all children) 
 Experimenter to the child: “In the second part of the game you became a referee and 
as a referee you sometimes had to choose if you wanted some players to be punished 
or not.” 
 Question to check if our audience manipulation was effective: “Did you feel like your 
decisions as a referee were judged by others?”. Then if they say YES, ask “did you 
feel your decisions were judged a lot, just a little, or somewhere in between?” 
 Question to check if children believe fairness or loyalty transgressions were more 
serious: “What is the worst thing to happen to you as a player? Not being helped by 
your team-mate when you are stuck in the mega-gem, or not receiving an equal share 
of bombs from your team-mate?” 
 Question to check if children believe the game was true: “Do you think you really 
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γ1. Script of Experiment 4 
All participants participate in all tasks, in the order written here. Two-way 
audio-visual contact with parent and child established via Skype will be maintained 
throughout. 
γ1.1. INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION 
All participants will receive the same introductory information. 
<Start Audio Recording> 
Experimenter to the child: “Hello, my name is [researcher’s name]”. (Insert some 
small talk here). As part of small talk: “Have you played survival mode before?” If child is 
not certain about survival mode: “Like where you have to collect materials if you want to 
build anything, and you can die if you get damaged?” If yes: “Have you played survival 
mode a lot, or just a little?” [Code on the spreadsheet: no; a little; a lot]. 
“We’ve got a peaceful survival-mode Minecraft server called SquidCraft. It’s called 
SquidCraft because the squid is the holy animal; we have holy squid no one can hurt. 
Squidcraft is getting quite popular, but that means some players have started being naughty 
sometimes. So, we have recently set up a Justice System for the server. The way this Justice 
System works is that if a player has something mean done to them, they make a complaint 
about the mean thing that happened to them. You know what a server log is?” If not, the 
experimenter explains it to the child. “Our server logs record absolutely everything that 
happens, so if a complaint is made, we can see what players did and what they chatted. I’m 
going to show you on our Justice System some videos of some of the things players did that 
made other players complain. Our Justice System is new, so we are getting kids to try it out. 
We would like you to decide what you think should happen to the players who do these 
naughty things to other players – basically you are going to run the Justice System. And we 
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also want to know what you think about our Justice System. So, we’ll be asking questions that 
will help us to make the Justice System better. Does that sound ok?”. 
“By the way, sometimes Skype has bad sound - could you really hear everything I 
said? Please do interrupt me and let me know if you can’t hear something. Also, can you 
please add me as a contact now? Because I need to send you a link to the Justice System and 
I can’t unless you add me.” 
γ1.2. FRAMING MANIPULATION 
The children will be split into three groups. Each group will have a specific 
introduction which is framed, corresponding to one of retribution, deterrence and 
compensation. This is counterbalanced between subjects and decided by the experimenter 
before starting the session. 
Experimenter to the child: “So, the most important thing is that you understand the 
reason for the Justice System, so listen carefully now. The reason we need the Justice System 
is because…”. One of the following frames will be used for each participant: 
 Retribution – “This bad behaviour is getting people on the server upset. People on 
the server are thinking people who do bad things should be punished. Because people 
on the server think people who do bad things deserve bad things to happen to them.” 
 Deterrence – “People on the server believe, if people who do bad things are 
punished, this will stop them from doing bad things again in the future. People on the 
server think that people will be scared to be naughty if they think bad things are going 
to happen to them.” 
Compensation – “People on the server think, because people are having bad things 
happening to them, it would be good for them to receive some diamonds to make up for it. 
That way they won’t feel so bad about having bad things happen to them.” 
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γ1.3. EXPLANATION OF INTERVENTION OPTIONS 
This part is an explanation to the participants about what they have to do. 
Experimenter to the child: “So, there will be some decisions I will ask you to make, 
after you see what someone did that made someone else complain. You will have to decide if 
you think the accused player actually did what the complainer said. Then, if you think they 
did something wrong you can decide to ban them from the server, and you will have to decide 
how long the ban will be. You will also have the opportunity to make it up to the victims by 
giving them some diamonds from the server. But, we can’t give away too many diamonds 
because that would be unfair on the players who don’t get extra diamonds, and so you can’t 
just give away all the diamonds every time. So, do you understand what you are going to do 
and do you have any questions?” 
At this point a link to the Justice System Qualtrics is sent via Skype: 
http://bit.ly/obust33. The child is asked to read to the experimenter the session code number. 
The session code is a 3-digit number (XQY), where X indicates the order of the videos in the 
Justice System, Q indicates the order of the questions the experimenter will ask the 
participant, and Y is a digit that, added to X and Q, must equal 9 (Y is used by the 
experimenter to check that the child has read the session code correctly). 
Experimenter to the child: “Can you still see me on the screen? Am I a little window? 
Make sure I’m in the very top right corner or I might cover up the Justice System.” 
γ1.4. RE-FRAMING 
More framing will occur after having explained the options at children’s disposal to 
intervene as third-parties; again there will be three different forms of framing (retribution, 
deterrence, compensation). 




 Retribution – “Bad things keep happening to the people on our server and the people 
on the server want mean players to get punished, as a dose of their own medicine.” 
 Deterrence – “People on the server want there to be good behaviour, so they want 
punishment, to stop mean players from doing mean things again and again.” 
 Compensation – “By giving victims server diamonds when something bad happens to 
them, it means the victims are being taken care of when bad things happen to them.” 
γ1.5. FIRST FRAMING MANIPULATION CHECK and if necessary re-framing 
repetition (before 1st trial) 
Experimenter to the child: “So, I’d just like to check you remember that, if that’s OK. 
Would you mind just repeating back to me why we need to have a good Justice System?”. The 
child is allowed to answer spontaneously. No clues at this point, and the only further prompts 
the experimenter may give is to repeat the question, and to say things like “take your time” 
and “don’t worry” and “have a think and try and remember” if the child is struggling (but 
don’t let them struggle too long). 
There is one follow-up question that may be put, in the event that the child says 
something like “because people are doing mean things” that only partially answers the 
question. If the child says that, the experimenter asks: “How does the Justice System help 
with people doing mean things?”. 
If in the experimenter’s judgement the child did not give an answer consistent with 
the correct frame (retribution/deterrence/compensation), even after the follow-up question, 
then the experimenter says: “OK, but remember, I said we need a good Justice System 
because…” and then repeats the re-frame. Re-frame repetition is not necessary here if the 
child got it right. If they got it partially right, the experimenter can fill in the gaps. For 
example, in the retribution condition, if they said “people want punishment” but did not 
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specify why, the experimenter can conclude by saying: “that’s right, because people want 
them to get a taste of their own medicine”. 
γ1.6. JUSTICE SYSTEM COMPLAINTS  
Date Accused Complainer Complaint Chat Log 
04/06/2018 
16:31 Samicle Dieg0123 
I was just farming some weet on my 
farm Samicle came and just killed 
me with his sword I lost loads of XP 
NONE 
03/06/2018 
08:23 Futur0 elactor11 
Futur0 said to build a house 
together. we both said we'd help but 
then when we finished the last 
window he broke it and burnt the 
house! 
elactor11: Do u 
wanna build a 
house? we both 
do it 2gether // 
Futur0: Ye I got 
sum nice acacia 
we can use 
05/06/2018 
18:05 Slam1000 Victoriaaa 
I got set on fire it was Slam1000 




18:29 Maximo8 _NIC0LAS_ 
I was offering gold to the holy squid 
in the squid temple and then 
Maximo8 came in and just killed all 




17:40 eNiGmA inspectorMango 
me and _S_O_B_ were trading an 
enchanted pick for a emrald but then 
eNiGmA came and stole them both 
and rode off on my horse so I 
couldn't get them 
NONE 
05/06/2018 
16:54 LossoL DiRECTORFiNAL 
in the village common forest i 
wanted all the trees i need a lot of 
wood LossoL cut down a tree too 
NONE 
01/06/2018 
11:33 Epica2 _sofia67 
me and epica2 were mining together 
and we said if we got any diamond 
or emerald we share and then we 
found 2 emeralds but she took them 
both and escaped in a minecart 
sofia67:  lets 
mine together - if 
we get diamond 
or emerald we 
share equal? // 
Epica2: yeah 
cool, we'll share 
equal, lets go 
03/06/2018 
08:11 F4NT4SI4 auto_animal 
F4NT4SI4 told me to see what he 
made I went with him. but when I 
got there he trapped me in an 
obsidian pit and I couldn’t get out he 






γ1.7. ADDITIONAL MANIPULATION CHECK and if necessary extra reframing 
(between 4th and 5th trial) 
Experimenter to the child: “You are doing really well. Well done. I just want to check 
one thing. Can you remember what I said was the reason why we need a Justice System?”. 
The child is allowed to answer spontaneously. No clues at this point, and the only further 
prompts the experimenter may give is to repeat the question, and to say things like “take your 
time” and “don’t worry” and “have a think and try and remember” if the child is struggling 
(but don’t let them struggle too long). 
The same follow-up question as before may be put, in the event that the child says 
something like “because people are doing mean things”, only partially answering the 
question. In which case, the experimenter asks: “How does the Justice System help with 
people doing mean things?”. 
Irrespective of what the child finally answers, the experimenter then says: “Great. I’ll 
just remind you then about exactly what I said. We need a really good Justice System 
because…” and then the re-framing phrase is repeated (irrespective of the child’s answer). 
γ1.8. QUESTIONS FOR EACH VIDEO – INSIDE THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
For each video, the experimenter reads the complaint and chat log (if it exists) in the 
following way: “The accused is [accused’s name]. The complainer is [complainer’s name]. 
[Complainer’s name] said… [contents of complaint].” If there is a chat log, the experimenter 
also says: “The system also logged a relevant chat from before this all happened: 
[complainer’s name] said [first line of the chat log], and [accused’s name] said [second line 
of the chat log]”. 
For the first trial only: “Do you see where it says View of the accused? That means the 
video is what [accused’s name] could see – so we can watch everything they did to find out if 
the complaint is true”. 
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 Question to test video comprehension – After having watched the video the 
experimenter asks: “So, did player [accused’s name] do what player [complainer’s 
name] said they did [specify “in the complaint” in the first trial]? If you are not sure 
then you can watch the video again.” The correct answer is always “YES” except in 
the video in which the characters are Slam1000 and Victoriaaa. If the child responds 
incorrectly, the researcher can ask: “Are you sure?” and suggest to watch the video 
again. If they still get it wrong, the researcher can engage in some discussion with the 
child to see if she can help them understand. However, if they are still not getting it, 
better not to push further. 
 If the child says “NO”, the next video will be visualised on the Justice System. 
 If they say “YES” then the next thing they see is the Likert [good-bad] scale at 
the top of the page. On the first trial only, the experimenter points out: “There 
is a good and bad scale here. It has very bad, really bad, pretty bad, quite 
bad, a little bit bad, not bad, a little bit good, quite good, pretty good, really 
good, and very good. You can use numbers too: minus five is very very bad, 
plus five is very very good.”  
 Question about Judgement of transgression severity – the experimenter asks for 
each video: “How bad is what player [accused’s name] did, on this scale?” [Code: 
value on the bottom half of the Likert scale].  
 Questions about the extent of punishment and compensation – the next two 
questions are both asked for each video, but in counterbalanced order according to the 
value of Q in the session code shown on the first screen of the Justice System. 
 If Q = 0 this question is asked first; if Q = 1 the question is asked second: 
“Now you can make it up to the victim if you want. How many diamonds do 
you want to give [complainer’s name]? If you don’t want to give any, choose 
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none. Otherwise you can choose to give a number of diamonds from 1 up to 
10” [Code: number of diamonds chosen by the child]. 
 If Q = 1 this question is asked first; if Q = 0 the question is asked second: 
“Now you can punish the accused player if you want. How long do you want 
[accused’s name] to be banned from the game, so they can't play for a while? 
If you don’t want to punish them, choose no ban. Otherwise you can choose to 
give a ban lasting from 1 hour up to 4 weeks” [Code: ban length chosen by the 
child]. 
γ1.9. QUESTIONS FOR EACH VIDEO – OUTSIDE THE JUSTICE SYSTEM  
The next set of questions does not appear on the participants’ screen: 
 Questions about affective states during justice administration – The next two 
questions are both to be asked for each video, provided that the participant enacted a 
ban/gave compensation. If the child did not make this verbally clear, the experimenter 
asks “did you ban them then?”/“did you give them diamonds then?”. Moreover, just 
for the first trial, before these questions are asked, the experimenter says: “This next 
question is about how it feels to use the Justice System, so it isn’t on the Justice 
System in front of you - just tell me the answer. 
 Question about compensation-related affective states (to be asked 
immediately after the child chose to compensate a complainant): “Now you 
have made it up to [the complainant] by giving them some diamonds. How do 
you feel now you gave them diamonds? Do you feel good, bad or somewhere 
in between? Tell me something from the scale, from very bad to very good.” 
(The “tell me something from the scale” bit is only said on the first two trials 
or else it gets very repetitive) [refer to the whole Likert scale]. 
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 Question about punishment-related affective states (to be asked 
immediately after the child chose to punish an accused player): “Now you have 
banned [the accused], so they can’t play for a while. How do you feel now you 
banned them? Do you feel good, bad or somewhere in between? Tell me 
something from the scale, from very bad to very good.” [refer to the whole 
Likert scale]. 
 Question about punishment vs compensation endorsement during justice 
administration – This question needs to be asked once per video but only if 
participants chose to both punish and compensate. According to counterbalance 
variable Q, the internal order of the question is different: 
 If Q = 0: “Finally for this one, do you think it was more important to make it 
up to [the complainant] or to punish [the accused]?” [note punishment or 
compensation]. 
 If Q = 1:  “Finally for this one, do you think it was more important to punish 
[the accused] or to make it up to [the complainant]?” [note punishment or 
compensation]. 
γ1.10. QUESTIONS AT THE END OF THE EXPERIMENT – OUTSIDE THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
After the end of the last trial, trying to get the participant to stay on the last screen 
(because they need to see the scale), the experimenter says: “That was actually the last one 
for now. You did really well. Now I just have a couple of last questions about the Justice 
System.” These questions are only asked after the participants have watched all the videos 
and answered the other questions. 
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 Question to test perceived utility: “So now that you have a bit of experience as a 
judge, tell me: Do you believe this Justice System will work well for our Minecraft 
server?” [note yes or no] – NB: data was not analysed. 
 Questions about affective states after justice administration – The next two 
questions are in counterbalanced order, according to the counterbalancing variable Q. 
 First if Q = 0, second if Q = 1: “When you were making it up to players by 
giving them diamonds, how did it make you feel?” [refer to the whole Likert 
scale]. 
 First if Q = 1, second if Q = 0: “When you were banning players from the 
server, how did it make you feel?” [refer to the whole Likert scale]. 
 Question about punishment vs compensation endorsement after justice 
administration – According to counterbalancing variable Q, the order of the next one 
is different: 
 If Q = 0: “What do you think is the most important thing you were doing today 
- was it making it up with extra diamonds, or was it punishing with server 
bans?” [note punishment or compensation]. 
 If Q = 1: “What do you think is the most important thing you were doing today 
- was it punishing with server bans, or was it making it up with extra 
diamonds?” [note punishment or compensation]. 
 Question about retribution vs deterrence endorsement after justice 
administration – According to counterbalancing variable Q, the order of the next one 
is different: 
 If Q = 0: “What do you think is the most important reason for banning 
players? Is it because it stops bad behaviour, or is it because bad things 
should happen to people who do bad things?” [note deterrence or retribution]. 
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 If Q = 1: “What do you think is the most important reason for banning 
players? Is it because bad things should happen to people who do bad things, 
or is it because it stops bad behaviour?” [note deterrence or retribution]. 
 Question to test believability: “Do you believe you saw real events from the 
SquidCraft server?” [note yes or no]. 
γ1.11. DEBRIEF 
A verbal debrief will be given to each participant and parent at the end of the 
experiment. In the debrief, the participants will be made aware of the deception with regards 
to the Justice System and the videos not being real. At this point, the parent may well have 
stopped paying attention, so it is a good idea to check they are listening at this point. 
Experimenter to the child: “I haven’t been entirely honest with you. The videos you 
have just seen are not real, I made them. The Minecraft survival mode server and the Justice 
System itself are also not real. Although, some of the bad behaviour you have seen 
unfortunately does actually happen on many Minecraft servers. The reason for this is because 
I wanted you to believe what I had shown you was real and I wanted to find out what you 
really thought about the bad behaviour and what you would do to the mean players. I also 
want to let you know that you didn’t ban or give diamonds to anyone, so I don’t want you to 
feel bad about your decisions.” On thanking the parent and participant, the experimenter asks 
them if they have any questions at all. 
Experimenter to the child: “Another thing that might be good to talk about is what we 
think about punishment, whether it’s a good thing or not. Actually, even grown-ups don’t 
agree about whether punishment is a good idea. Some people do think it’s good for bad 
things to happen to people who did bad things, but other people think the best way to stop 
bad behaviour is just to be nice to everyone. Most people think it's complicated and it 
depends on all kinds of things, so it’s a hard thing to be sure about, and I think it would be 
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good if you have a talk with your parent now and decide together what you think. Have you 
got any questions about anything before I go?” 
 
γ2. Double-coding criteria 
Recordings of the testing sessions are to be classified on the basis of their sound 
quality and their content in relation to the purpose of the Justice System. 
● Sound category code. The coder has to indicate one of these three codes:  
 Uncodable = coding made impossible by extremely poor audio.  
 Attempt = coding attempt made but low confidence due to poor audio.  
 Acceptable = acceptable quality of the audio. The three codes are mutually 
exclusive. 
 NB: In case of “attempt” or “acceptable”, the coder has to proceed by 
indicating also the purpose of the Justice System.  
● Purpose of the justice system remembered by the child. Children’s answers have 
to be classified under one or more of the following categories: 
 Punishment Retribution = any statement about the normativity of 
punishment, for example that it is deserved or appropriate (e.g. “should”, 
“must” or “it’s right to”), but without justification by further instrumental 
reason. This includes expressions such as “teach them a lesson”. 
 Punishment Deterrence = any statement indicating that the function of 
punishment is to reduce the rate of transgressions by the perpetrator or by 
other potential perpetrators. This includes expressions such as “to make them 
think about it” or “to learn a lesson”. 
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 Punishment undetermined motivation = any statement that the function of 
the justice system is simply “punishment” but with no further claim about 
normativity or instrumental effect. 
 Compensation = any statement according to which the function of the justice 
system is victim-centred. 
 NB: Possible combinations of categories = retribution + deterrence; retribution 
+ compensation; deterrence + compensation; retribution + deterrence + 
compensation; punishment undetermined motivation + compensation.  
Mutually exclusive categories = retribution and punishment undetermined 
motivation; deterrence and punishment undetermined motivation. 
 
